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Where does indigenous culture fit into the twenty-first-century challenge 
of creating a sustainable, and equitable, global society on a habitable 
planet? At first blush, there seems to be little place for indigenous culture 
in this immense project. In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
where the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are 
meticulously displayed, there is little mention of indigenous people other 
than an appearance in longish lists of vulnerable populations that should 
be targeted and consulted during sustainable development planning. The 
17 SDGs and 169 associated targets make no mention of indigenous cul-
ture. If we look at the SDGs in isolation, we may feel that indigenous 
peoples feature only as targets of modernist, managerial, technocratic 
development. The SDGs certainly do not evoke a sense that sustainable 
development will be guided in any way by indigenous cosmovisions and 
holistic understandings of nature–human relationships.
Away from the strict delineations of the SDGs, however, we do see 
many instances where indigenous culture is described as integral to envi-
ronmental sustainability. In places, indigenous culture has been evoked as 
a discursive corridor through which we may access another, amodern, and 
perhaps premodern form of development to challenge extractivist, mod-
ernist development teleologies (Blaser et al. 2004). It has also been framed 
as a political–economic resource with which equity and environmental 
protection may be produced (Yúdice 2003). The United Nations 
Education, Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 2019) 
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recognizes culturally embedded indigenous knowledge of ecosystems as 
essential “for developing meaningful action worldwide” in the interest of 
sustainable development. Similarly, the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA) website claims that “[i]ndigenous communities 
play a vital role as custodians of our planet, possessing vital knowledge that 
will support global efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.” 
In a National Geographic magazine article, Raygorodetsky (2019) has 
echoed these refrains, suggesting that modern society must learn the 
holistic relational viewpoints integral to indigenous culture in order to 
solve the challenging environmental problems of the Anthropocene.
But what does the indigenous contribution to the economics and poli-
tics of sustainable development look like from the ground up? What has 
been, is, and may be, the contribution of indigenous culture to the rei-
magining of human progress? This book explores indigenous cultures and 
movements in Latin America, as well as the history of culture in develop-
ment thinking, to answer these questions. Far from being an antithesis of 
development in general, the argument will be presented that indigenous 
culture has always been present, if greatly marginalized, in the intellectual 
movements that frame progress, environment, and development. Similarly, 
it will be argued that although indigenous culture continues to be margin-
alized in very violent and systematic ways, it inhabits a creative and increas-
ingly important place in the economic, ecological, social, and cultural 
reimagining of global human and non-human society. To make this case, 
it will be necessary to wrestle with some famously ambiguous concepts.
It is difficult to imagine a triumvirate of words that could be more 
ambiguous than culture, sustainability, and development. The first of these 
words has been noted by Raymond Williams (1977) as being “one of the 
two or three most complicated words in the English language” (p. 76); 
the next has been criticized for being an empty notion that changes mean-
ing depending on the user (Redclift 2005); and the third is an embattled 
concept that continues to have multiple definitions (Cowen 2003). 
Despite the semantic ambiguity of these terms, however, engagement with 
them cannot be avoided if we care about making life more livable for the 
majority of people on the planet.
There are good reasons for believing this. In contrast to the stale econ-
omism of the twentieth century, the twenty-first century has seen a rise in 
awareness that culture, politics, and economy are inseparable. A steadily 
accumulating mountain of literature contains arguments to this effect 
from many perspectives. Particular cultures, it has been argued, can act as 
 T. MACNEILL
3
the rich soil in which economies and political systems flourish. Others have 
been cast as barren dustbowls in which these systems perish (Harrison and 
Huntington 2002). From a different perspective still, it has been argued 
that competitive consumer culture in the West may have precipitated the 
multiple, and continuing, series of economic bubbles and corresponding 
crashes that have tormented the globe in recent years and that this same 
culture may have pushed global ecosystems beyond their capacity to sus-
tain us (Heinberg 2011; Schor 2004). More substantively still, it has been 
argued that it is culture that shapes our values—determining what counts 
as progress and development in the first place (Sen 2004).
All of these cultural considerations complicate both the everyday prac-
tice of development and the theoretical underpinnings of this practice. 
Before conceiving of development projects, for example, practitioners 
must decide whose cultural idea of development ought to be the goal—
that of the funding agency, or its home country; that of the practitioner, 
or that of the target population. Similarly, questions must be addressed 
regarding the value of culture. Should traditional culture be shed as an 
impediment to development? Should traditional societies be protected 
from the cultural change that development seems to carry with it? Is there 
such a thing as traditional culture at all? Can traditional or indigenous 
culture be retained while still achieving something that might be called 
development? Finally, can development be reimagined from the non- 
Eurocentric starting point of indigenous culture?
Understanding the interaction of culture and development is not only 
important for development practitioners working in the Global South, 
however. We live in a time of global ecological, political, and economic 
crisis. Many have wondered if it is not modern culture itself that is at the 
root of such upheaval (Hamilton et al. 2015). As we face ecological and 
political barriers to the expansion of the current global economic system, 
it is culture that will allow us to imagine the social and economic innova-
tions that will help us transcend the global turmoil of the early twentieth 
century. This may involve a re-evaluation of our personal goals, desires, 
values, and aspirations. It may also include a reimagination of what we call 
progress, development, economic growth, and the good life, on a global 
level. Such moves would require a reformulation of the social, political, 
and economic policies that we use to achieve these lofty goals. It may be 
the case that traditional or indigenous culture has something to teach 
modern culture in this regard.
1 INTRODUCTION 
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Exploring the folds, fissures, and fuzzy edges of culture is not an easy 
task, however. Culture, of course, is the very thing we use to order and 
understand our social world. Policymakers, practitioners, consumers, vot-
ers, and intellectuals alike can only think through their own culture. It 
frames our thoughts—determining what is imaginable and comprehensi-
ble to us. Ideas such as progress, development, and gross domestic product are 
entrenched in the culture of modernity and are ubiquitous in our global-
ized world. There is no escape, or outside vantage-point from which to 
gaze on these complex perceptions. One cannot escape their cultural logic 
by going to the remote beaches of the Corn Islands, the mysterious 
oxbows of the Amazon basin, or the lush highlands of Guatemala. We will 
not meet an indigenous tribe on an excursion to the interior of Sumatra 
that will impart on us the lost and pristine wisdom of an ancient culture—
helping us to see clearly an alternative to corrosive Western practices, or 
the secret of culturally appropriate development. How, then, do we begin 
to rethink some of our most dearly held beliefs and associated social and 
economic policies?
In the absence of a clear “outside-looking-in” position, there is no easy 
way to rethink our world. Given this reality, what is required is a careful 
and open-minded look at the history of policy related to the idea of devel-
opment. We must understand the ways in which we have thought of the 
economy and its relation to culture in the past before we can open new 
territory for the future. In other words, we must understand culture of 
development the way it is before pushing it in new directions. This is the 
only way we can avoid falling into past habits of thought.
That is the first step in imagining new directions in social and economic 
policy. The second step is to try and understand instances where modern 
culture is already being pushed in new directions. All culture is varied, 
constantly changing, but also connected. This is certainly the case in our 
often contested and diverse global culture. From this, we can realize that 
although there is no outside to the culture of global modernity, it con-
stantly mutates and it does have edges. Amongst these edge-areas we may 
include things such as tribal wisdom from the Amazon, the colonially sup-
pressed knowledge of Maya cosmovision, or anarchist strains of North 
American and European intellectualism. These ephemeral and constantly 
changing edges of modernity can be explored in order to imagine alterna-
tive futures. By doing such exploration, new ideas can be folded into 
mainstream society from its innovative edges, and more effective develop-




The purpose of this book is to begin the work of reimagining development 
by taking two important first steps. First, there will be a detailed look at 
the way in which culture relates to the long history of thought on develop-
ment and progress. Second will be an investigation of three examples of 
indigenous-driven sustainable development projects from Latin America. 
These edge-ideas occur on multiple scales within three countries—
Guatemala, Honduras, and Ecuador—and have international linkages 
between each other, as well as with broader indigenous rights and envi-
ronmental movements.
Through the relation of Latin American indigenous movements and 
the history of Western thought on culture and development, the argu-
ment will be made that indigenous sustainable development is not an 
amodern or postmodern idea. It is better framed as transmodern. When 
discussing indigenous ideas of development, it is easy to fall into two con-
ceptual traps. The theoretical construct of transmodernity helps us to 
avoid these errors. The first, the essentialist trap, results from the reifica-
tion of indigenous cultures as eternal, pre-historical, and unchanging. The 
second, the strategic essentialist trap, positions indigenous movements, 
politics, and identity solely as calculated tactical reactions to current legal 
institutions and discourses (Paradies 2006).
The theory of transmodernity is part of a research paradigm that is 
emerging largely from Latin America, but is applicable throughout the 
globe (Dussel 2012; Herrera Guillén 2016; Arias 2017; Escobar 2007). 
The theory begins with the assertion that non-modern cultures were not 
erased by colonialism or neocolonialism, but remained hidden, subverted, 
and marginalized. As Dussel (2012) argues, they were pushed to the 
edges, or the borders of modernity, where they continued to interact cre-
atively with it. In fact, these cultures contributed to the creation of moder-
nity through their labour, cultural traditions, and struggles for rights, 
freedoms, and nations. Modernity, this implies, was not fully established 
before colonization, but evolved with substantial contributions from the 
premodern cultures at its edges. As such, transmodern cultures do not 
reject all elements of modernity (Escobar 2007). These points differenti-
ate transmodern movements from anti-modern and postmodern ones 
according to Dussel (2012). As he explains, transmodernity “assumes the 
positive moments of Modernity” as cultures that have been pushed to its 
edges to deconstruct their own traditions, while they challenge European 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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cultural hegemony using “critical elements” adopted from their own tra-
ditions and also “others adopted from Modernity itself” (18–21).
Dussel’s argument suggests that transmodern cultures cannot be accu-
rately described as postmodern, since the bulk of their cultural elements 
have never been entirely modern, and draw substantively on the premod-
ern. Importantly, the movements associated with transmodernity seek 
decolonization through self-valorization as they combine their own pre-
modern cultural elements with the most progressive tools of modernity, 
and discursive exchange with other transmodern elements across the 
globe. In this way, subsistence practices, nature-relatedness, and diverse 
cosmovisions are combined discursively with appeals to rights, democracy, 
sovereignty, and equality, while local, national, and transnational identities 
are reformed and reworked (Escobar 2007).
Another important concept related to current articulations of culturally 
sustainable development is neoliberal multiculturalism. This concept, 
which has been most notably explored by Charles Hale (2006), forefronts 
a rarely acknowledged tension within the current manifestation of neolib-
eralism. In our current post-Washington Consensus global policy climate, 
collective government political power has been diminished, while the eco-
nomic power of markets has become dominant. As property rights have 
been sanctified and individualistic ideology has been reinforced, non- 
governmental organizations, community groups, and indigenous move-
ments have asserted rights through claims to collective cultural rights. As 
Hale (2006) put it:
Neoliberalism encompasses economic doctrine but also promotes a reorga-
nization of “political society” along the lines of decentralization, trimming 
down of the state, affirming basic human rights, and calling for minimally 
functional democracies. …[N]eoliberalism brings forth a new direction in 
social policy, emphasizing the development of civil society and social capital, 
and an approach to cultural rights that at first glance appears highly counter-
intuitive. (p. 12)
As we will explore in this book, the neoliberal period has also seen the rise 
of movements for cultural protection and indigenous rights. In many 
Latin American countries, indigenous culture has moved in status away 
from that of a remnant of pre-Columbian backwardness and towards a 
national resource to be embraced. Accordingly, states such as Ecuador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala have come to support the resuscitation of 
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indigenous dress, language, tradition, and culture. This process is helped 
along by an international development funding system that has come to 
recognize indigenous culture as a form of social capital. Along with this, 
national commitments to indigenous rights instruments such as the 
International Labour Organization Convention 169 Convention on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples have also helped.
The elevation of indigenous rights and culture goes only so far, how-
ever. Where indigenous rights and community organizations threaten 
transnational capital investments, neoliberal multiculturalism reaches its 
limit. Repression of indigenous groups and communities becomes com-
mon in such instances. Neoliberal multiculturalism has no difficulty 
respecting the rights of individuals to not be discriminated against due to 
their ethnicity or any other reason. It protects private capital with legal 
instruments, and often repressive power, however, when ethnic minorities 
make claims to material resources such as land, wage shares, or personal 
wealth. This is the tension faced by transmodern Latin American indige-
nous groups as they seek to rewrite the concept of development from their 
perspective.
ouTline of The book
Tensions around transmodernity and neoliberal multiculturalism will be 
apparent in the explorations of this book. We will see that indigenous ideas 
of development are at once old and new, modern and amodern—properly 
transmodern. We will explore the way in which indigenous cultural under-
standings can inform, and are informed by, new global ideas of develop-
ment that are respectful of cultural differences and ecological limits. We 
will also see how transmodern indigenous development draws from and 
continues to contribute to centuries-old political–economic thinking 
about the meaning of progress, development, and culture. It is hoped that 
understanding indigenous redefinitions of these concepts will aid develop-
ment thinkers, policymakers, practitioners as well as citizens in reimagin-
ing social, political, and economic policy in a time of multiple global crises.
As argued earlier, culture is a central term in this discussion. 
Understanding the place of this term vis-à-vis ideas of development and 
progress is key to developing the understanding we need in order to take 
the first step in reimagining development thinking. This work will begin in 
Chaps. 2 and 3 by tracing the strands of culture in ideas of development 
and progress that began in the late eighteenth century. Allusions (or lack 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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thereof) to the concept of culture and to culture-like ideas will be located 
in the works of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, and others. 
These works are keystones to the large edifice of modern thought on 
progress and development. To examine them is to examine the intellectual 
history of our culture and the cultural history of our intellect as it relates 
to progress, development, politics, and economy.
This analysis will continue in Chaps. 4 and 5, but the focus will be 
shifted to post-WWII development thought. This is a time in which dis-
courses around the topics of economy, politics, development, and progress 
were extraordinarily diverse and contested. Different policy frameworks 
were imagined, and the politics around these had immense human and 
environmental consequences. Works produced by W.W. Rostow, Andre 
Gunter Frank, Amartya Sen, Arturo Escobar, and many others will be 
mapped according to their treatment of culture. They will be also histori-
cally contextualized as key features of discourses that spin around the cen-
tral concept of development.
In Chap. 6, attention will be turned to Guatemala, El Centro 
Pluricultural para la Democracia, and the Maya idea of culturally sustain-
able development (CSD). An attempt will be made to understand the his-
torical forces out of which El Centro and CSD have emerged. The hope is 
that such historical understanding will help in the proper conceptualiza-
tion of the work and the ideas of the organization. This is a story of mar-
ginalization, global economics, and civil war, mixed with allusions to Maya 
cosmovision and aspirations to a better future—that is, to progress and 
development. It is a story of continuing struggle to develop and imple-
ment a new kind of development amidst racial and economic marginaliza-
tion, genocide, and war.
The historical and spatial situation of El Centro from Chap. 6 will serve 
as the contextual basis for a description of the organization, its ideas, and 
its work that will be expounded in Chap. 7. This account is based on tex-
tual interpretation of the organization’s publications, participant observa-
tion, qualitative interviews, and focus groups undertaken with members of 
El Centro between 2006 and 2015.
It is in this chapter where the idea of culturally sustainable development 
will be described and explored in full. This chapter represents and attempts 
to answer the question “what is CSD and how does it work?” Central to 
the topic is the concept of cosmovision—the component of culture that 
orders the way in which one understands the functioning of the cosmos, 
the relation of human to human, and human to nature. Members of El 
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Centro argue that to make development culturally sustainable in 
Guatemala’s Western Highlands requires that the entire process be guided 
by Maya cosmovision. To understand CSD, one must have at least a 
clumsy understanding of Maya cosmovision, among other important ele-
ments. All of these are explored in Chap. 7.
Chapter 8 results from ongoing field research I have undertaken since 
2011 with Afro-indigenous Garifuna communities in Honduras. To 
understand the Honduran Afro-indigenous movement, and locally 
sourced sustainable development ideas that are associated, it is necessary 
to grasp important elements of Garifuna history and current political 
economy. The chapter shows how hybrid Garifuna culture formed via 
colonialism and anti-colonialism, how the repressive Honduran state and 
predatory international capital constrain current development possibili-
ties, and how the Garifuna use international solidarities to form a resis-
tance, and development alternative, around the idea of indigenous food 
sovereignty.
Chapter 9 looks at a national-level project in Ecuador, where I have 
been involved in research since 2007. Indigenous sustainable develop-
ment in that context revolves around the idea of Sumak Kawsay (living 
well), which has been incorporated, somewhat problematically, into the 
national constitution. This particular cosmovision will be discussed, as will 
events around the formation of the national constitution. Following this, 
I will describe the life and death of an innovative national programme to 
acquire international funding to “keep the oil in the ground” in biologi-
cally sensitive indigenous territories. This description of the Ecuadorian 
case provides a nuanced understanding of the key multiscale issues facing 
indigenous sustainable development.
In Chap. 10, these indigenous alternative ideas of development will be 
compared and contrasted with the discourse of international development 
literature that was set out in Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5. This will be done by 
attempting to understand where indigenous sustainable development can 
easily be incorporated into the more well-known theories, when it cannot, 
and when such incorporation threatens to mutate powerful theories of 
development into something very new. This last consideration becomes 
particularly interesting when the relationship between development eco-
nomics and indigenous development is considered. The work of this chap-
ter helps us to begin to think outside of our culturally prescribed intellectual 
boxes in tackling the most important issues of our time.
1 INTRODUCTION 
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All of the ideas of the book are synthesized and reflected on in Chap. 
11, the final chapter. More importantly, this chapter specifically engages 
the idea of sustainable development. Mainstream ideas, encapsulated in 
the SDGs, are compared with indigenous ideas of sustainable develop-
ment. Important tensions between the two are located, and ways in which 
indigenous thought can guide mainstream development policy are 
suggested.
The book in total seeks less to find easy answers than to begin a long 
intellectual journey. This journey may well end in the transformation of 
society, but this book only begins to address that great challenge. Both the 
journey and the book start with an attempt to understand how the con-
cept of culture has been intertwined with our ideas about development, 
progress, economy, and policy. That work needs to be followed by the 
examination of multiple indigenous transmodern edge-ideas in our glo-
balized neoliberal society.
inTerpreTing indigenous culTure
As we have discussed already, the second part of this book is an interpreta-
tion of the most prominent Latin American examples of such ideas. An 
attempt is made to understand the complex historical terrain that has pro-
duced these indigenous movements, their members, and their ideas. The 
ideas themselves are interpreted and elucidated, and finally—in an attempt 
to make them more intelligible to Western-trained academics and policy-
makers—they are explored in relation to the more globally powerful dis-
courses on development that were delineated in the beginning of the 
journey. It is hoped that others may take this framework to study other 
edge-ideas—perhaps eventually helping us to think our way out of our 
current global conundrum of economic instability, inequality, and envi-
ronmental catastrophe, and perhaps helping us to devise better develop-
ment projects.
For me personally, this intellectual journey was accompanied necessarily 
by a continuing ethical introspection. At its core, this project is an attempt 
to create a representation of members of historically marginalized groups. 
Such work must be done with a strong sense of ethical responsibility to 
both the politics of the represented “Other” and to the validity of the 
research. Nowhere has this type of self-reflection proven more important 
than in discussions of indigeneity in Guatemala. Even the most careful of 
sympathetic ethnographies, for example, have been criticized by their 
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subjects as undermining their political objectives (Warren 1998). Accounts 
of Guatemalan history, which arose from the mouths of indigenous Maya 
leaders through their Western anthropological intermediaries, have been 
criticized as misrepresentations (Menchú and Burgos-Debray 1984; Stoll 
2008). These criticizers have then been critiqued themselves for under-
mining the political and social justice objectives of marginalized peoples all 
in the name of the Western ideal of objective truth (Arias 2017).
All of this implies that a representation such as that which appears in 
this study is necessarily undertaken through dense tangles of political and 
ethical underbrush. Throughout the process, the need to create a critical 
and accurate description will be acknowledged. But this will constantly be 
balanced with a necessity to avoid undermining Latin American indige-
nous political movements, of which even the most integrated investigator 
can only hope to attain a partial understanding.
To the extent to which such a balance is achieved, it will not be accom-
plished by avoiding criticism of indigenous movements and their ideas. 
The “hard” questions must be asked of movements for indigenous devel-
opment, but they are asked while members are both literally and figura-
tively “in the room.” Such open criticism was built into the research 
process for this book. Tricky questions were posed to indigenous leaders. 
In this context, for example, members were asked questions about the 
possibility that the largely university-educated members of El Centro are 
disconnected from the often illiterate members of the communities with 
which they work. In other words, are the people who work at El Centro 
really members of the communities with which they work, or part of an 
educated indigenous elite class that has separate interests and understand-
ings from the most impoverished Maya citizens?
Another difficult question involved claims of culturally rooted proclivi-
ties to environmental stewardship that are the centrepiece of many indig-
enous organizations’ programmes. Are these little more than politically 
motivated fictions? Similarly, is gender equality really a central feature of 
Maya, Garifuna, and Kechwa culture as advocates seem to assume, or 
would a revitalization of indigenous belief systems simply work to rein-
force culturally rooted inequalities? Such questions were asked openly, and 
the responses generated understandings that were integrated into my 
interpretation of indigenous movements and their ideas. This interpreta-
tion was then presented to community members themselves, in a focus- 
group setting, for their consideration and discussion. Often, follow-up 




Holding these interpretive and representational issues aside, this work 
does have a central focus. It seeks to describe indigenous sustainable devel-
opment and compare it with other ideas of development to the end of 
developing new policy and new perceptions of the possibilities of human 
society. In the end, it is found that the inclusion of edge-ideas and indig-
enous cosmologies in conversations about development necessitates a 
major rethink of traditional Western frames of analysis. This is a good 
thing since now, more than ever, we are in need of modifying the central 
ideas of our global civilization and of devising more effective development 
programmes.
Constantly circling this central question, however, are issues related to 
representation, essentialism, and politics. Just as important as the conclu-
sions attained regarding the central question, were the necessary conclu-
sions reached on these encircling issues. What were these conclusions? 
First, ideas of development are political. There is no avoiding the politics 
in the name of some imaginary “truth.” Second, representations that for-
eigners create of their often romanticized “Others” will always be imper-
fect. The trick is to be aware of this throughout the project and to integrate 
participatory safeguards into the research or development project.
Finally, questions regarding the historical factuality of indigenous 
essentialist cultural claims will always miss the point. Cultures move, and 
they are always projects of construction and reconstruction. Claims to 
cultural essences that are made by indigenous organizations are part of this 
process. They are part of a global-scale imagining of indigeneity that is not 
just set on the work of defining indigenous culture, but perhaps of redefin-
ing all cultures as they interact with one another and engage with issues of 
poverty, development, democracy, and environment. In the case of the 
indigenous ideas presented in this book, the best, most democratic and 
environmentally sound aspects of a diverse cultural heritage are being cen-
tralized in this process. This is part of a cultural project to create a sustain-
able and democratic future, not to glorify an imaginary past.
Before joining indigenous movements in the re-evaluation of the politi-
cal and economic structures of our world and the reimagination of devel-
opment practice, however, we must understand where these ideas came 
from. That requires us to explore the murky ambiguities, stark disjunc-
tures, and not-so-subtle politics of the intellectual and cultural history of 
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CHAPTER 2
Classic Ideas of Modernity, Culture, 
and Progress
My first assignment as a graduate student in development economics in 
2003 was to write a critique of an econometric study on land tenure and 
productivity in Burkina Faso. Having just graduated from an undergradu-
ate programme in international development studies, I was eager to dis-
play my ability to undertake the most thorough and cutting critique 
possible—that, for me, implied an analysis from a post-development per-
spective. With a level of diligence and care only achievable by an insecure 
first-year graduate student, I prepared what was essentially a culture-based 
critique of the study. The gist: due to the author’s hopeless immersion in 
an enlightenment-based, Western worldview, the variables used in the 
study were incorrectly chosen, and, furthermore, assumptions made about 
human “nature” were Eurocentric and not applicable to the African con-
text. This, I argued, caused the author to generate misleading, irrelevant, 
and potentially harmful conclusions.
The head of the development economics programme at my university 
was a brilliant neoclassical economist who was clearly dedicated to improv-
ing the lot of the world’s poor. He was trained in one of the highest 
ranked and liberal economics departments in the United States, and he 
had a reputation for pushing the limits of that discipline by writing about 
things like culture, arts, and social cohesion. The papers he would be 
grading from other students, I was sure, would be critiquing only the 
superficial parameters of the econometric analysis. But I was utilizing a 
theoretical perspective that had, arguably, emerged from marginalized 
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peoples themselves—one that challenged the authority of Western tech-
nocratic experts, questioned the discourse of development itself, and was 
inspiring radical new grass-roots revisualizations of the problems of devel-
opment all over the “Third World.” I was certain that my ability to slice 
into deeper issues and to understand the substantive critiques of develop-
ment that were erupting forcefully from non-Western academics and 
social movement leaders would impress this cutting-edge economist as he 
graded my paper—securing for me his immediate respect, and a corre-
spondingly high grade. I was wrong. As he handed back my work, he 
explained to me that he didn’t grade it, that he didn’t know how to grade 
it, that he had never seen anything like it, and that, frankly, he didn’t 
understand it. There was an uncomfortable silence.
In this chapter and the next, I will try to locate the source of this 
uncomfortable silence. This will require a thorough review of the history 
of culture in development thinking. I will begin this review with a consid-
eration of the historical roots of development theory in general in the 
current chapter. This will be followed by a taxonomy of postwar schools of 
thought on culture and development in the next chapter. I will argue that 
an intellectual break exists at theoretical and methodological levels 
between neoclassical economics and the other social sciences—one which 
precludes any meaningful discussion of culture. Further, I hope to explain 
that this uncomfortable silence is also represented in a fissure in under-
standing between Western enlightenment thinking and understandings 
that emanate from, or are at least embraced and transformed by, other 
traditions. The small pause in conversation that occurred between my pro-
fessor and I was just one of many similar silences which pervade develop-
ment theory, policy, and planning. These, I will argue, are symptoms of an 
ontological barricade that can and must be overcome if we are to have 
meaningful transdisciplinary discussions regarding development.
As Escobar (1999) has reminded us, the idea of development emerged 
in force in the immediate postwar period of the twentieth century. With 
the advent of the statistic of “annual per capita income,” he explained, 
“almost by fiat, nearly 70 percent of the world’s population were trans-
formed into poor subjects” (p.  382). Resultantly, needs for economic 
growth and development “became self-evident, necessary, and universal 
truths” to the Western technocratic mind (ibid.). It was within this climate 
that, as Escobar (2005) would continue to argue,
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full of hopes and aspirations, scouting the landscape with fruition and eager 
to apply the best of his knowledge to a complex but exciting task, after hav-
ing just left behind the cataclysm of the War and perhaps with the smile of 
somebody who is new to the world, there arrived in the Third World, 
dressed in full regalia, the Development Economist. (171)
This development economist was not, however, to remain a cohesive sub-
ject, nor was he alone. As I will argue later in this chapter, postwar devel-
opment economics was split into two enduring schools: Neoclassical 
Development Economics and Critical Political Economy of Development. 
Furthermore, the technocratic and often materially reductionist experts of 
these two schools were joined quickly in the debate by postcolonial theo-
rists who articulated the earliest of the Cultural Approaches to Development. 
It is around these three schools of thought that the story of the next chap-
ter will pivot, but it will not do to start abruptly here. Despite the apparent 
suddenness with which he appears in Escobar’s account, the liberal devel-
opment economist was the product of a tangible history of thought—as 
were the critical political economist and the cultural theorist. It is to these 
histories that we must first turn if we are to understand development the-
ory, and the place of culture within it.
It is the work of the current chapter to explore the important thinking 
that existed before the “invention” of the ideas of “development” and 
“underdevelopment” that occurred in the mid-twentieth century (Escobar 
1999). It was this pre-development thinking that would make post-WWII 
ideas of culture and development possible. In this exploration, I will be 
looking to outline the main tenets of the various theories presented, and 
also to focus on the ideas of culture and development that appear, explic-
itly or tacitly, in each. Both the concepts of “development” and “culture” 
will be accorded a very wide definitional range in this review, since the goal 
is to tease-out the ways in which the theorists discussed tended to define 
these concepts themselves. Accordingly, any allusion to, or assumption of, 
what constitutes positive social change or progress will be considered a 
discussion of “development.” “Culture” will be considered to be at issue 
when a theorist discusses any extra-individual social force that is presumed 
to impact the preferences, habits, motives, values, and valuations of actors, 
or their understanding of the way the world works. These concepts will be 
tracked through literature in classical political economy, early neoclassical 
economics, Marxian political economy, and sociology.




The bulk of mid-twentieth-century thinking on development stems from 
the same origin. Many claim that what I am calling both the neoclassical 
economic and the critical political economy traditions of development 
theory began with the publication of Adam Smith’s foundational work of 
classical political economy An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations in 1776 (Deane 1978). Polanyi (1944/2001) goes fur-
ther in suggesting that it was our very market-capitalist “civilization which 
started approximately with the publication of The Wealth of Nations” (47). 
These two opinions regarding the social role of Smith’s text are telling and 
yield two key principles that will be assumed during the extent of this 
review of literature. First, texts such as The Wealth are descriptive let us 
understand the varying ways in which social phenomena have been under-
stood in varying times and places. Second, they may be thought of as 
productive or performative. This, following Foucault (1969/2002), is 
meant to imply that such texts are embedded in larger discourses which 
tend to produce the very social forms that they mean to describe. In this 
sense we can examine The Wealth as an artefact that exhibits a particular 
way of thinking about economy and development, but we can also place 
the text within the context of historical social change in which ideas and 
discourses play an active part. That is, we can remember Polanyi’s asser-
tion regarding Smith’s Opus that “no misreading of the past ever proved 
more prophetic of the future” (45).
In The Wealth, Smith embraced the enlightenment thinking of his time. 
It is no secret that he was an admirer of Sir Isaac Newton. In fact, Newton’s 
depiction of the universe as a great machine in which particles were acted 
upon by a limited number of inalienable natural laws to produce a stable 
system was lauded by Smith as being “the greatest discovery that has ever 
been made by man” (1759: 3). It is evident that Smith followed Newton’s 
lead in his own work. In the economic system that he described, human 
particles were propelled by a lust for individualistic personal gain—having 
a natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange on thing for another” 
in an attempt to satisfy their own self-interest (22–23). An anarchic and 
cruel Hobbesian jungle does not result for Smith, however, since two 
other laws—those of supply and demand—guide human interaction, 
through price signals, towards a stable, mutually beneficial equilibrium. In 
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this way, the raw power of self-love inspires profits to be sought via divi-
sion of labour, which allows economic man to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale and the benefits of trade. Smith argued that “although he 
intends only his own gain,” this economic man—or homo economicus—is 
“led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention” (572). This end is greater economic output—the wealth of 
nations, or what it would later be called: development.
This simple depiction of the market as an efficient self-adjusting system 
that synthesizes self-interest with aggregate economic betterment is often 
all that is taken from The Wealth. To do so, however, is to forget much of 
what Smith wrote. First, he seems to have had a keen sense of the cultural 
construction of his seemingly “natural” economic man. Of the propensity 
to engage in market exchange in atomistic self-interest, Smith offers that,
whether this propensity be one of those original principals of human nature, 
of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more prob-
able, it can be the necessary consequence of the facilities of reason and 
speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. (22)
Later, he argues that “the difference between the most dissimilar charac-
ters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, 
seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and educa-
tion” (25). This admission of the culturally situated character of homo 
economicus is not central to the thesis of The Wealth, however, since the 
topic is strictly related to economic action of humans within a market 
structure. Culture and non-price communication are almost exclusively 
assumed to exist a priori to and outside of the economy.
Smith’s scepticism regarding the ability of markets to function in the 
real world, as his model suggests, is also often overlooked. For Smith, rela-
tion to the three essential means of production—land, labour, and capi-
tal—corresponded to three classes: “those who live by rent, those who live 
by wages, and those who live by profit” (336). The latter should not be 
trusted since “the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the 
prosperity, and fall with the declination of society. On the contrary, it is 
naturally low in rich, and high in poor countries” (338). This is the case 
since high wages or rents necessarily erode profits. “The interest of this 
third order,” Smith argued, “has not the same connection with the gen-
eral interest of the society as that of the other two” (338). Government, 
according to Smith, must be wary of the strong political influence of this 
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class and seek to protect competition in the face of their propensity to col-
lude to create monopoly power. Furthermore, he believed that govern-
ment should intervene in the economy to provide schooling, which he 
hoped would allow workers an opportunity to escape the routine and 
degrading work which resulted from the division of labour. He also saw an 
active government role regarding defence, protective tariffs, rule of law, 
quality control, banking regulation, public goods provision, postal service, 
administering copyrights and patents, according temporary monopoly 
rights to corporations in order to direct commerce towards socially benefi-
cial ends, public health measures, maintenance of infrastructure, taxation 
to discourage improper or overly luxurious behaviour, and establishing 
ceilings on interest rates (Heilbroner 1996: 104).
The Wealth, for Smith, was meant to be contextualized within the larger 
philosophical theory that he outlined earlier (1759) with his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. In that text, Smith insists that there are natural needs 
that humans are compelled to fulfil, such as needs for nutrients and shel-
ter, but that these needs have an upper-bound—that homo economicus is 
not insatiable. What makes man seem insatiable, for Smith, is the need to 
communicate social belonging and status to others. As he explains, “the 
rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw 
upon him the attention of the world” (I.III.16). As a result, the compul-
sion to amass wealth is driven by “that emulation which runs through all 
the different ranks of men” (I.III.16). Furthermore, humans, Smith 
argues, are fundamentally creatures of empathy and sympathy, and these 
sentiments, in the end, trump any tendency to emulative self-interest. 
Markets, where humans compete and communicate only through prices, 
are well and good to the extent that they efficiently create wealth. In 
moments of crisis, however, humans adhere to higher sentiments of moral-
ity, ethics, and empathy. There is a “stronger power,” he argues, that is 
“capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love”:
It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man 
within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever 
we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a 
voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we 
are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and 
that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we 




In summarizing Smith’s thinking, it is evident that the “natural” propen-
sity to barter in maximizing self-interest is, in fact, a result of human social 
and communicative activity—a cultural activity. Further, the drive to self- 
interested behaviour that results from this social activity, according to 
Smith, is easily subdued by a higher propensity to engage in other- 
regarding behaviour. Markets, for Smith, may be capable of generating 
great wealth, but must be monitored and regulated not only by govern-
ment, but also by the higher order of ethics and morality.
It should be no surprise that Smith gave ethics a central role in his con-
ception of society. To do so was in keeping with much the rich tradition of 
Western economic thought that had preceded him. As Heilbroner (1996) 
insists, in economic thought in the Bible, by Aristotle, the Physiocrats, and 
by St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, the economy was not a separate sys-
tem, but rather the economic was a type of action that must be morally 
judged as are all other forms of human conduct. Even with the “commercial 
revolution” in economic thought, beginning approximately with Mendeville 
in the seventeenth century, and continuing through with the mercantilists, 
economic action needed ethical justification. With Smith, and Cantillon 
before him, Heilbroner argues, focus shifted from the study of economics as 
an action, to the study of a system called the economy. But still, as we have 
seen, the discussion was morally, culturally, and politically situated.
David Ricardo
This tendency in political economy towards holistic analysis began to 
change with Ricardo, as the laws that Smith had referred to were taken out 
of cultural and ethical context (Deane 1978). The insatiability of homo 
economicus was assumed instead of historically or philosophically situated. 
The economic system was studied as just that—a system—not as a type of 
behaviour that should be morally judged (Heilbroner 1996). Importantly, 
as Deane (1978) explains, Ricardo’s methodology “was mathematical 
rather than historical or philosophical,” and his “technique of abstracting 
reasoning from a priori postulates … had important implications for the 
methodology of orthodox economic theory,” in that “it helped to draw 
theoretical economics away from the real world” and “permitted eco-
nomic theory to develop independently of other social sciences” (82–84). 
With Ricardo, classical political economy began to undertake a momen-
tous shift that would eventually result in the dropping of the adjective 
“political” from the moniker, the pushing aside of ethics, and the expul-
sion of any concept of culture from its purview.
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John Stuart Mill
This was not to happen immediately, however. J.S. Mill, widely regarded 
as the last of the great classical political economists, actually straddled 
thinking in the style of the classical school while prefiguring the coming 
marginalist revolution in economic thought—a revolution which would 
mark the end of the classical era. In keeping with the classical school, Mill 
importantly retained the labour theory of value from Smith and Ricardo, 
admitted political factors into his analysis, incorporated ethics (impor-
tantly, of a particular kind) into his analysis, and even left a bit of room for 
culture to seep in.
For Mill (1909), political economy was the study of “the nature of 
Wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution” (PR.2). One of 
the most important of these laws was encapsulated in the labour theory of 
value. For Mill, like Smith and Ricardo, the value of a good is ultimately 
“determined by the amount of labour needed to produce the good,” and 
this, in turn, determines the “natural price” towards which market valua-
tion will tend (III.15.11). The incorporation of the labour theory of value 
had consistently led earlier economists to insert a notion of conflict in their 
thinking of market—as the labouring class as makers of value were con-
fronted by capitalists who, due to their negligible contribution to value, 
would need to take from the labouring class for their own material benefit 
(Hunt 2002, pp. 189–191). This inherent class conflict was downplayed 
by Mill, however, through his insistence that the provision of capital was a 
service provided by the capitalist and that this service contributed to the 
value of a good as well—an assertion he imported from Say (1863). Action 
in a market system, then, became a more cooperative affair, with both 
great classes contributing to the value of the goods created, but not one 
of assured social harmony. There existed a danger of class-based conflict 
within a capitalist system, but this tendency was eased by a need for coop-
eration between classes (Mill 1909, III.III–III.V).
Culture was admitted into Mills’ (1909) analysis in some ways, and 
excluded in others. In order for a good to be ascribed a value in a market, 
for example, Mill argues that, “the thing must not only have some utility, 
there must also be some difficulty in its attainment” (III.2.1). The bulk of 
the text in Mills’ Principles, is dedicated to the supply side of this equation. 
Of the origin of the utility values that are placed on goods—a topic that 
might well require a cultural analysis—Mill has nothing to say, choosing 
like Smith and Ricardo before him to limit the purview of political 
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economy so as not to have to question the origin of desires. On the other 
hand, in his preliminary remarks to Principles, Mill suggests that culture 
and economy are linked together in a dialectic fashion as, “the creed and 
laws of a people act powerfully upon their economical condition; and this 
again, by its influence on their mental development and social relations, 
reacts upon their creed and laws” (pr.3). Other aspects of the institutional 
structure of a society, it seems, can also impact the internal constitution of 
its members. For example, when,
all real initiative and direction resides in the government, and individuals 
habitually feel and act as under its perpetual tutelage, popular institutions 
develop in them not the desire of freedom, but an unmeasured appetite for 
place and power: diverting the intelligence and activity of the country from 
its principal business to a wretched competition for the selfish prizes and the 
petty vanities of office. (V.11.15)
Further, as Hunt (2002) explains,
Mill … did not believe that all actions were motivated by self-interest. He 
believed only that most people whose personalities were moulded by a 
competitive capitalist culture acted out of self-interest in their economic 
behaviour. He looked forward, however, to a future, when, in a social-
ist or communist society, people would act from “higher” or “nobler” 
motives. (188)
Indeed, Mill suggested that although there are natural laws of production, 
no such laws exist relating to exchange or distribution of wealth. These 
things, such as markets and the institution of private property, result from 
“the existing state of knowledge and experience, and the existing condi-
tion of social institutions and intellectual and moral culture” (II.1.3). So, 
although culture is excluded from his theory of value, a fairly sophisticated 
dialectical and institutional version of the concept enters into his analysis 
in other places.
Mill, like Smith, incorporated a wider discussion of ethics within his 
economic analysis. It is this, along with his use of the labour theory of 
value, and his scattered cultural musings that make it fitting to call him a 
classical political economist. Mill incorporated and then expanded upon 
Bentham’s (1781/2000) utilitarianism in his treatment of ethics. Bentham 
had argued that mankind acts under the impulse “of two sovereign mas-
ters, pain and pleasure,” which “govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all 
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we think” (p. 14). For Bentham, the use or utility of any object or action 
is determined by the extent to which “it tends to produce benefit, advan-
tage, pleasure, good, or happiness, … or … to prevent the happening of 
mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is consid-
ered” (14–15). Bentham argued that the impulse to maximize utility takes 
the form of an indisputable natural law, as it is dictated “by the natural 
constitution of the human frame” (16). He also thought of it as an ethi-
cally correct impulse. Since action that is “comfortable to the principle of 
utility” is by definition one that intends the increase of pleasure (or the 
decrease of pain), it is an action that “ought to be done” (15).
Unlike Say (1821/1863), Bastiat (1850/1964), Senior (1836/1928), 
and the many neoclassical economists that would come, Mill augmented 
Bentham’s utilitarianism substantially. He asserted that although natural 
laws are present in production, in the sphere of distribution, humans obey 
the laws and customs of society. This implied that utilitarianism need only 
apply in one limited sphere and may be transcended as humans move fur-
ther from the necessities of production. Principles of private property and 
even of utility maximization were denied the status of inevitable, natural, 
or even just by Mill in the socially mediated sphere of distribution. For 
Mill, human behaviour was tempered by human social institutions, and 
some acts could be judged as more ethical than others in the sphere of 
distribution (Hunt 2002, pp. 187–188).
Mill’s use of the labour theory of value, his modification of Benthamite 
ethics, and his musings about culture-like phenomena could only con-
found those who wished to make a Newtonian-style science of political 
economy. A formal linear scientific model of economy required a particle 
(homo economicus) with clear natural propensities which, in the acting 
out of these propensities, would interact with a few natural laws in the 
production of a predictable equilibrium condition. The labour theory of 
value seemed always to inspire a sense of conflict—or disequilibrium—in 
models. His musings about culture and separation of production and dis-
tribution implied that homo economicus did not behave according to any 
immutable rules, but would change according to circumstance, and, in 
turn, would change those very circumstances—a very nonlinear concept 
that could never yield equilibrium in the Newtonian sense.
Mill was an ardent libertarian, however. The “business of life,” he 
insisted, “is better performed when those who have an immediate interest 
in it are left to take their own course, uncontrolled either by the mandate 
of the law or by the meddling of any public functionary” (V.11.22). He 
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held that the liberty of the individual “ought to include all that part which 
concerns only the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, and 
does not affect the interests of others” (V.11.4). “In sum,” he argued, 
“laisser-faire … should be the general practice: every departure from it, 
unless required by some great good, is a certain evil” (V.11.16). This lib-
ertarianism, mixed with positivist scientism and use of the concept of util-
ity, prefigured much of the neoclassical economics that would emerge 
shortly after Mill’s death. But, as we will see, for classical political economy 
to be transformed into the pseudo-science of neoclassical economics, eth-
ics, history, culture, and the labour theory of value would all need to be 
ejected from the core of economic theory.
nEoClassiCal EConomiCs
The Marginalists
The tension between the libertarian elegance of the self-regulating market 
and the conflict implied by the postulate that all value is produced by 
human labour would not do for those who would wish to make a 
Newtonian science of economics. The natural laws of the physical sciences 
at the time had no such conflict—only equilibria. No historical inquiry was 
required to predict the trajectory that an apple might choose in falling 
from a tree. The tendency of classical political economists to historically 
and socially situate their analyses and to shroud talk of the efficacy of the 
invisible hand with discussions of its failures could only distance econom-
ics from the status of pure science. Near the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, the marginalist movement managed to change the study of eco-
nomics substantially. To Jevons, Walras, and later Marshall, this accom-
plishment represented a substantial move towards the perfection of the 
science of economics. It involved the permanent transformation of the 
historically situated social science that was classical political economy into 
the ahistorical mathematical pure science of neoclassical economics. In this 
transition, however, as much was lost as was gained. Among the gains were 
parsimony, elegance, and stature within the (social)scientific community. 
Among the losses were any engagement with the ideas of politics, culture, 
or development.
An important change that marked this revolution was made to the the-
ory of value. Jevons (1871/1882) adamantly opposed the “prevailing 
opinions” that “make labour rather than utility the origin of value” and 
asserted instead that “value depends entirely on utility” (I.2). For 
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marginalists, there must exist, a priori, a human want, or there can be no 
value. Humans would engage in exchange in order to maximize their util-
ity by satisfying pre-existing wants and, in doing so, would establish, 
through the laws of supply and demand, the market price for all goods 
(Walras 1892/1996). The trick here is that it is not the total utility gained 
through consumption that is important in determining whether an 
exchange will take place at a particular price—it is the utility gained from 
the consumption of the last amount of commodity exchanged (the “mar-
ginal” utility). Furthermore, the utility gained through consumption 
decreases as the same commodity is consumed successive times (the mar-
ginal utility is diminishing). I may be willing to pay $5 for a glass of milk 
if I am really thirsty, for example, but not so much for my second glass, 
and I may refuse to purchase the tenth glass even if it is offered for free. 
Notice that the value of the milk does not depend on how much labour 
was used in its production here—it changes depending on the utility the 
consumer can expect to gain.
There is a lower bound to this price, of course, and it is determined by 
the marginal cost of production—the cost of producing the last unit. The 
price of labour would be included in this, as would the price of capital and 
land, but it is not the process of production that is thought to be the 
determinant of value—rather, it is the price for which labourers, capitalists, 
and landowners are willing to exchange their services in a competitive 
market. Given that the marginalists assumed that exchanges were entered 
into by free individuals who simply calculated utility gained minus utility 
lost for any given action, it seemed fair to Marshall (1890) to claim that 
“by far the greater number of events with which economics deals affect in 
about equal proportions all the different classes of society” (I.II.15). In a 
state of equilibrium (which is presumed to hold), all inputs are paid their 
proper price, and the proper price is presumed to be the equilibrium price. 
In this tautology, economics moved from being concerned with the study 
of the spheres of production and distribution with the aim of increasing 
national wealth, to being concerned only with the act of exchange which 
Walras (1892/1996) claimed, “constitutes the very foundation of the 
whole edifice of economics” (p. 44). Economics, as a result, was depoliti-
cized—since value was presumed not to be the result of labour exerted but 
the act of free exchange, tensions between labouring and capitalist classes 
over the product of labour were removed from economic theory. This 
move from intrinsic conflict to harmonious exchange precipitated the 




Besides the depoliticization that resulted from the marginalist revolu-
tion, ideas related to culture were dropped as well. For either general 
(Walras 1892) or partial (Marshall 1890) equilibrium to hold, it was nec-
essary to presume economic actors to have stable, unchanging preferences. 
As Jevons (1871/1882) asserted, “anything which an individual is found 
to desire … must be assumed to possess for him utility,” and the impulse 
that drives the action of this individual is “to satisfy … wants to the utmost 
with the least effort” (III.2). The “utility” that each actor derives from his 
or her action, Walras (1892/1996) claims, “remains fixed for each party” 
(p.  117). This assumption of stable preferences precluded any idea of 
socially organized beliefs and values, unless these were presumed to be 
pre-formed and immutable. Thus, culture either did not exist, or existed 
outside of the purview of exchange, and therefore outside of the purview 
of economics.
Inquiries into wealth, development, or progress were set aside as well. 
At least since the publication of The Wealth of Nations, political economy 
had been given the central goal examining the mysteries of national eco-
nomic development. This goal became secondary after the neoclassical 
turn. Economics became the science of exchange, and equilibrium models 
presumed that free exchange in competitive markets was, by definition, 
efficient in that it would only occur if the end result increased the utilities 
of all involved. The efficiency of markets implied that the maximum pos-
sible utility would be attained in the aggregate, given the current state of 
technology. Questions regarding the causes of technological change were 
set aside. Wealth, then, was assumed to be maximized as the result of free 
exchange, and economists, as a result, had no need to be worried directly 
about the laws of its production (Heilbroner 1999, pp. 197–228; Hunt 
2002, pp. 372–395).
The ejection of politics, culture, and development from the purview of 
economics was part of the neoclassical turn from a methodological holism 
to methodological individualism. The former had looked at the actions, 
motives, positions, incentives, and beliefs of groups of people in its analy-
sis. Methodological individualism mixed with marginalism tended to deny 
the significance of groups and conflict between them and focus analysis on 
individuals who engaged in free and harmonious trade. Importantly, 
humans are assumed in this model not to communicate directly with other 
humans. Homo economicus can communicate only through prices. The 
type of non-price communication that might lead to the social develop-
ment of understandings and values cannot exist in a neoclassical world, 
2 CLASSIC IDEAS OF MODERNITY, CULTURE, AND PROGRESS 
28
since it would imply changeable, negotiable utility functions. This would 
introduce a nonlinearity into equations, which would make it impossible 
to claim that markets function efficiently, and would make the application 
of linear calculus impossible as well.
Basing analysis on the marginal unit, and combining this with the 
assumption that economic action was conducted by rational, atomistic 
individuals with stable preferences, was methodologically expedient in 
that it allowed “the application of differential calculus” to the concepts of 
“utility, value, demand, supply, capital, interest, labour, and all of the other 
quantitative notions belonging to the daily operations of industry” (Jevons 
1871/1882, I.4). This mathematization finally gave economics the look 
of Newtonian physics, as “the pure theory of economics or the theory of 
exchange and value in exchange” became, as Walras (1892/1996) 
emphatically claims, “a physico-mathmatical science like mechanics or 
hydrodynamics” (p. 224). Such mathematical theory-building was to be 
the basis of a deductive, apolitical science of economics that focussed on 
the idea of efficiency at the expense of virtually all other concepts.
Despite the claims of the marginalists that theirs was an objective sci-
ence rooted in laws of nature, neoclassical economics was endowed from 
the beginning with an ethical bias. Theory and mathematical exposition, 
as Walrus explained, was to come first in neoclassical methodology, fol-
lowed by empirical observation which economists should use “not to con-
firm but to apply their conclusions” (qtd in Heilbroner 1999, p. 225). 
The assumption that economic life was rooted in the action of free indi-
viduals, then, was not to be questioned, but assumed, and historical or 
social data would not be permitted to show otherwise in analysis. This 
tended to lend itself to the scientific fortification of liberal ideals. Following 
in the libertarian tradition of Say and Mill, for example, Menger 
(1871/1950) used neoclassical assumptions regarding human nature to 
make a case for the sanctity of private property:
Human economy and property have a joint economic origin since both 
have, as the ultimate reason for their existence, the fact that goods exist 
whose available quantities are smaller than the requirements of men. 
Property, therefore, like human economy, is not an arbitrary invention but 
rather the only practically possible solution of the problem that is, in the 
nature of things, imposed upon us by the disparity between requirements 
for, and the available quantities of, all economic goods. (p. 97)
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Similarly, Walras (1892/1996) touted the inevitability, naturalness, and 
optimality of equilibria established in free-market transaction, arguing that 
“any value in exchange, once established, partakes of the character of a 
natural phenomenon, natural in its origins, natural in its manifestations 
and natural in essence” (p. 69), and that “the equations we have devel-
oped do show freedom of production to the superior general rule” 
(p. 256). More precisely, Walras believed that his equations showed that 
“exchange of several commodities for one another in a market ruled by 
free competition is an operation by which all holders of one, several or all 
of the commodities exchanged can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction 
of their wants” (p. 173).1
By depicting the economy as nothing more than a simple aggregate of 
rational, egoistic, autonomous individuals, by restricting the study of eco-
nomics to the study of exchange, by jettisoning the labour theory of value 
for one based entirely on utility, and by formalizing their claims in math-
ematics (other than Menger), early neoclassical economists were able to 
add a strong discursive force to the argument for liaises faire—one that 
did not have to be validated by, or situated in, a study of history. In fact, 
to do the latter would, according to the proponents of the new science, be 
purely inductive and therefore ascientific. As a result, pure neoclassical 
economics is ultimately conservative and avoids any questioning of this 
ethic, as Hunt (2002) explains:
Neoclassical welfare economics accepts as the ultimate ethical criteria of 
social value the existing personal desires, generated by the institutions, val-
ues, and social processes of existing society, and weighted by the existing 
distributions of income, wealth and power. Thus the theory becomes inca-
pable of asking questions about the nature of an ethically good society and 
the ethically good person that would be its product. (p. 396)
The Keynesian Challenge
A major revision of neoclassical economics did not occur until the mid- 
twentieth century, in the writings of John Maynard Keynes. Although the 
1 Walras was never, in fact, able to show this to hold true even mathematically. Later 
Vilfredo Pareto would improve on Walras’ exposition, and this work would be formalized by 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) but with similarly incomplete results.
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extent to which Keynes’ work represents a substantive challenge to neo-
classical economics, as opposed to a mild revision, is debatable, Keynes 
did, at least in rhetoric, take issue with much of the core of neoclassicalism. 
For Keynes (1936/2006), economics was a human science—a social sci-
ence—and it followed that attempts to mimic the physical sciences were 
misguided:
The classical [and neoclassical] theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a 
non-Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience straight lines 
apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight—as 
the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which were occurring. (p. 15)
This was a direct reproach of the neoclassical insistence on deductive 
methodology. Contrary to this, Keynes chose to build his theory from 
empirical observation first—inductively. He set out primarily to explain 
the existence of the violent economic waves of high economic output and 
low that were business cycles—those which seemed arbitrarily to either call 
on the great populations of the Western countries to employ their indus-
triousness nearly completely, or to cast them in the thousands on the 
streets as vagabonds (Deane 1978).
His methodological break with mainstream neoclassical economics, 
however, did not represent a substantial break with neoclassical technique. 
In his General Theory (1936/2006), Keynes maintained the important 
neoclassical convention that wages were equal to the marginal productiv-
ity of labour. This generally led to the assertion that there was no such 
thing as involuntary unemployment—just that there were many workers 
who would not agree to work unless they were paid at a rate higher than 
the value of the extra output their labour created. He explained the obvi-
ous existence of intra-war involuntary unemployment as the result, ironi-
cally, of affluence combined with diminishing propensity to consume 
relative to wealth. The wealthy, Keynes argued, simply did not consume 
enough output to justify the employment of the entire labour force—this 
would produce both a glut of goods and high unemployment. The remain-
der of wealth in the hands of the more affluent was generally saved since, 
in absence of effective demand, there was little opportunity to undertake 
in employment-inducing investment.
Other than this assertion, and his accompanying insistence that mone-
tary policy can have an impact on the general output of an economy, 
Keynes adopted virtually every neoclassical principal in his General Theory. 
 T. MACNEILL
31
Importantly, this included the maintenance of the theoretical construct of 
homo economicus. He took, for example, “the tastes and habits of the 
consumer [and] the disutility of different intensities of labour” as “given” 
(p. 221). He also assumed that this creature was involved in calculations 
regarding how best to maximize his or her utility function—although 
restricted by an inability to accurately predict the future or know com-
pletely the nature of the current economic universe.
Changing the postulates that he did, however, yielded some important 
revisions in economic thought. The most important implication of Keynes’ 
work was that the economy was not self-correcting. The problem of 
unemployment and stagnation amidst glut could not work itself out, and 
would instead result in a permanent downward spiral in absence of sub-
stantial countervailing external shock or government intervention. Keynes, 
therefore, called for the extensive use of monetary policy coupled with 
substantial government spending that would be designed to replace the 
lost consumption that affluence had created. Abhorring communism and 
highly disrespectful of Marxism, Keynes believed this to be the only way of 
saving the capitalist system from self-induced collapse.
The need for intervention made it necessary for an evaluation of ends 
and means by policy analysts. This, for Keynes, meant that ethics were a 
necessary part of economic thought. He wrote in a letter to Harrod in 
1938 that economics “is essentially a moral science and not a natural sci-
ence.” He continued,
I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I might 
have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertain-
ties…. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the 
apple’s motives on whether it is worthwhile falling to the ground, and 
whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on the mistaken calcula-
tions on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the 
earth. (Keynes 1994, pp. 297–300)
Whether this quotation represents an allusion to something resembling 
the idea of culture, is unclear. This is the case with the bulk of Keynes’ 
writing. In his earlier work (1920), he alluded to the idea that propensities 
to save could be impacted by public policy, for example, but his General 
Theory (1936/2006) treats humans very much like neoclassical automa-
tons. Humans do interact and communicate in Keynes’ depiction, but 
only with the inclination to guess the intentions of others in conditions of 
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uncertainty based on incomplete information—the underlying tastes of 
economic actors remain stable, and they are therefore expected to react in 
more or less expected manner when government policy is exerted.
Although Keynes was emphatically not a Marxist, he did touch on the 
idea of ideology, which, as we will discuss, is central to the Marxian con-
cept of culture. For Keynes, however, ideas, it seems, had impact by chang-
ing people’s conception of the way in which the world and economy work. 
This does not necessarily imply an ideological influence on the tastes, pro-
pensities, and attitudes of human actors, rather the power of ideas to influ-
ence perceptions (in conditions of imperfect information) regarding the 
complexities of economic life. Furthermore, Keynes (1936) comes to dif-
ferent conclusions regarding the independence of these ideas from vested 
material interests compared with the Marxian conception:
The Ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly under-
stood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually 
the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a 
few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exagger-
ated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. (p. 351)
The idea of development exists only in seed form in Keynes’ work. 
Developmentalism—the idea that “less developed countries” could be 
reformed in the image of capitalist Europe via government intervention—
would be strongly influenced by Keynes’ General Theory. He was instru-
mental in the founding of the Bretton Woods Institutions, including the 
World Bank—whose role it would become to oversee development proj-
ects in the Western-influenced post-WWII world (Martinussen 1997, 
p. 25). His General Theory, however, was more concerned with problems 
of unemployment and instability inherent in a capitalist system than with 
development per se. Nonetheless, he did realize that these phenomena 
impacted the “growth of wealth” in economies and the general well-being 
of populations (1936, p. 342).
The Austrian School
Another stream of economic though that is closely related to the neoclas-
sical school should be discussed here, as it will influence post-WWII 
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development theory substantially. This is the Austrian school of marginal-
ist economics. It is not clear if this school should properly be thought of 
as a stream of marginalist economics that is to be distinguished from the 
neoclassical school of Walras, Jevons, Marshall, and Keynes, for example 
(de Soto 2008, pp. 2–4), or if Austrian economics is, in fact, neoclassical 
itself, and should be differentiated from the latter in terms of mainstream 
versus Austrian streams (Hunt 2002, pp. 264–276). If neoclassical eco-
nomics is to be defined simply as a mode of analysis that uses marginal 
theory, assumes an actor with stable preferences, and tends towards the 
laissez faire, then the Austrian school is neoclassical. If it insisted that neo-
classical economics must engage in mathematical exposition based on 
static equilibrium models, then Austrian economics is not neoclassical.
From its inception with the early marginalist work of Menger 
(1871/1950), the Austrian school has shunned mathematical exposition, 
since the latter is presumed to unsatisfactorily restrict the descriptive capa-
bilities of the discipline. Other than this aversion to mathematics, three 
distinguishing features emerged through the evolution of Austrian think-
ing, via notable contributions from von Mises (1949/1996), von Böhm- 
Bawerk (1895), von Weiser (1911/1994), Hayek (1945), and Schumpeter 
(1942/1976).2 These three distinguishing features are based around the 
idea of the entrepreneur, the way in which information is understood, and 
the treatment of time. Unlike mainstream neoclassical economics, the 
human actor in the Austrian conception is not just a docile calculator who 
tends to choose the easiest of a number of choices in maximizing his or 
her utility. According to Austrian theorists, the economic actor is moti-
vated by an innate desire to create and discover his or her own world—of 
which there is always imperfect information—in the pursuit of increased 
utility. As opposed to the reacting atom of homo economicus, then, the 
Austrians have conceived an active, adventurous economic agent: the 
entrepreneur.
Austrian economists depict this entrepreneur as an engine that propels 
the ever-changing, ever-advancing economic system through time. This 
characterization of human nature allows the Austrians, unlike mainstream 
neoclassical theorists, to explain technological change. Through his or her 
2 Although a student of Weiser and Böhm-Bawerk at the University of Vienna, Schumpeter 
is only loosely affiliated with the Austrian school. This may be due to his lack of complete 
aversion to communism, his inconsistent methodology, his reluctance to credit his own 
teachers, or simply his arrogance. He did, however, maintain the centrality of the entrepre-
neur in driving a dynamic economy, which, despite his own accolades to Walras, positions 
him closer to the Austrians than to any other school.
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creativity and inquisitiveness, the Austrians argue, the entrepreneur dis-
covers and creates new information in an economy where information 
about the world is dispersed and subjective. Discovered or created infor-
mation is then transmitted through price signals which ripple through the 
economy as the action taken by an entrepreneur with new information 
impacts his or her valuation of particular goods, thus provoking price 
changes. The progressive change this inspires in the pricing scheme of an 
economy in effect reorders the economic system—changing the economic 
landscape for all entrepreneurs. This inspires others to change their actions 
and create or discover new information—inciting further change. This, 
unlike the static depiction of mainstream neoclassicism, is a story of an 
economy that is constantly changing, and never quite in equilibrium, as it 
advances through time.
This is also a story of development. And development has a clear hero: 
the entrepreneur—whose action should not be interfered with. Menger 
(1871/1950) had insisted that the process of “development” begins with 
the entrepreneurial discovery of the division of labour, which “signifies a 
considerable step forward in economy and comfort” (p. 238). Schumpeter 
(1942/1976) lauded the gales of “creative destruction” unleashed by the 
capitalist businesses, as new opportunities and information are continually 
discovered by entrepreneurs which provided temporary advantage—yield-
ing profits—and continual change and improvement. Entrepreneurs, for 
the Austrians, can create such innovation because they are masters of 
knowledge regarding their particular situation. Much of this knowledge is 
tacit and virtually unknowable to others. The portion of his or her knowl-
edge that is pertinent to others, however, is transmitted through market 
prices. Austrian economists claim that it would be ludicrous for any indi-
vidual, government, or other agency to presume to be able to apprehend 
all information, since information is nearly infinite, is constantly being 
invented or changing, is subjective, and is dispersed. No agent, then, 
should be allowed to constrain the action of the entrepreneur or the func-
tioning of the price system. To do so would be to stifle efficiency, suppress 
entrepreneurial energy, distort price information, and consequently retard 
progress—perhaps precipitating economic crises. This, combined with an 
entrenched fear of overly powerful government, led Hayek (1944) to con-
clude that the strict economic controls and public works projects advo-
cated by Keynes would lead countries down “the road to serfdom.” 
“Development,” for the Austrians, needs the entrepreneur, and regulation 
inhibits his or her heroic creativity, and misdirects his or her energy.
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Culture is not a prevalent theme in Austrian thought. We are all entre-
preneurs in this thinking. Some of us simply prefer current consumption 
to future discovery, or may not have the talent necessary to be successful. 
People have set interests, they,
tend to discover that which interests them and, hence, if they are free to 
accomplish their ends and promote their interests both of these [ends and 
interests] will act as incentives to motivate them in the exercise of entrepre-
neurship. (de Soto 2008, p. 24)
Culture has not crept in here to impact these interests. Insufficient infor-
mation about the world has, as Menger (1871/1950) argues, caused tra-
ditional peoples to misinterpret the “causal connection with the satisfaction 
of human needs” connected with certain objects and therefore to falsely 
value things such as “charms,” “divining rods,” and “love potions” 
(p. 53). But these are informational problems, not differences in cultural 
value systems. Traditional societies consist of individuals with specific 
interests just as do modern capitalistic ones. People’s preferences, it seems, 
remain stable for Austrian economists—it is the constellation of prices, 
information, and institutions that changes, resulting in different behav-
iours (Menger 1871/1950).
ConClusion
As this chapter has hopefully revealed, classic liberal political economy is a 
more diverse and sometimes critical field than has been often admitted. 
Adam Smith’s work stands as the most obvious example of this complexity 
of thought. Although his defining work abstracted from this, Smith repeat-
edly held space for both culture and ethics to enter political economic 
analysis. Similarly, Smith was concerned with the tendency of market-
based economies to generate extremities of inequality, which would ulti-
mately corrupt democratic systems if left unchecked.
These substantive complexities within liberal economic thought were 
slowly replaced by simplified mathematics as the discipline continued fol-
lowing Smith’s death. The idea of development moved away from human 
flourishing and towards economic growth. Markets were increasingly 
viewed as ideal forms, and humans were increasingly viewed as insatiable 
units of consumption whose only important communication was per-
formed through price-based market interactions. Eventually, instead of 
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being the communicative act that continually re-formed desires and pro-
clivities, culture became thought of as unimportant at best. At worst, cul-
ture was viewed as a traditionalist trap that locked primordial, 
change-resistant groups into enduring states of poverty. As the next chap-
ter will show, many of these enduring assumptions would be challenged by 
critical political economists and sociologists, who would introduce con-
cepts such as ideology while returning to Smith’s concerns with inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
Culture in Critical and Sociological Thought
Marxian Political EconoMy
Marx was a contemporary of Mill, but it is not clear that the latter had ever 
heard of the former or read his work (Hunt 2002, p. 204). Marx, on the 
other hand, thought of himself as a rival of Mill in that he was offering a 
radical revision of classical political economy to counterpoise Mill’s bour-
geois liberalism (Deane 1978). The men did have much in common intel-
lectually, however. From classical political economy, both Marx and Mill 
imported the labour theory of value, belief in the falling rate of profit in 
capitalist industry, ideas about technologically induced unemployment, 
and the tendency to begin the analysis of economy with the assumption of 
three groups: landlords, capitalists (bourgeoisie), and labourers (proletar-
iat). Marx, like all the classical political economists, was a holistic social 
scientist of the economy, as explained by Deane (1978),
The salient characteristic that Marx shared with Adam Smith, Jeremy 
Bentham, and JS Mill and which distinguished him from Ricardo … was 
that he was a philosopher first and an economist second—a social scientist 
rather than a ‘pure’ economist. For Marx, political economy was merely one 
branch … in the study of human social behaviour. (p. 126)
Perhaps, then, it is more useful to note the strong division between Marx 
and the neoclassical economists that would appear after his death, than to 
overly emphasize a schism between him and the classical political 
40
economists. The ahistorical, reductionist, methodological individualism of 
the neoclassical economists seems much more at odds with Marxian 
method than is the historically, politically, and ethically infused method of 
the political economists.
Despite his aversion to Ricardian economic reductionism, the theoreti-
cal cornerstone of Marx’s work—the labour theory of value—was imported 
from Ricardo. He then mixed this theory of value with the Hegelian con-
cept that history is propelled by conflict. The result was a materialist con-
cept of history. Whereas Hegel’s dialectic posited that social change 
stemmed from a conflict over ideas as the world was apprehended in dif-
ferent ways, Marx created a dialectic method that assumed the opposite—
that history is driven by inherent conflict within the mode of material 
production, and that ideas emerge essentially as reflections of this material 
arrangement.
For Marx, “development” in Europe had been a process of historical 
change that was rooted in the social mode of production. In The German 
Ideology (2001), he argued that history passed through a number of 
phases. The first was a tribal phase—where production and consumption 
were based on kinship relationships and “the natural division of labour 
existing in the family” (p. 44). Population growth, however, intensified 
the aggregate “growth of wants,” providing an impulse for increased trade 
and the establishment of a system of slavery (p. 44). Complexity, class divi-
sions, conquest, slavery, and serfdom were intensified as European societ-
ies passed through periods of “primitive communism” and feudalism 
(pp. 44–46). The seeds for the transition to capitalism were planted in the 
feudal period—and this transition was largely made possible by the exploi-
tation of colonial territories and the people that inhabited them. As Marx 
expressed in Das Kapital:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement 
and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of 
the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a war-
ren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy dawn of 
the era of capitalist production. (Marx 1867/1961, p. 751)
The bulk of the wealth expropriated through colonization was amassed by 
a merchant class. This process of amassing private wealth, along with the 
creation of a class of landless labourers, was called by Marx, the process of 
“primitive accumulation” (Marx 1867/1961, Part VIII). The warlike 
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feudal aristocracy became increasingly indebted to the merchant class, 
and, as a result, the latter experienced increased political power. This, 
according to Marx, culminated in multiple revolutions that sought to 
replace the feudal system with one based on private property during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The resultant privatization of feudal 
lands required the displacement of serfs who had no means left for survival 
beyond the sale of their own labour power—serfs, then, were transformed 
into a class of landless labourers:
The spoliation of the Church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the 
state domains, the robbery of common lands, the usurpation of feudal and 
clan property, and its transformation into private property under the cir-
cumstance of reckless terrorism, were just so many idyllic methods of primi-
tive accumulation. They conquered the field for capitalist agriculture, made 
the soil part and parcel of capital, and created for the town industries the 
necessary supply of a “free” … proletariat. (Marx 1867/1961, pp. 732–733)
For Marx, the existence of this landless labour force, the sanctification of 
private property, the accumulation of wealth from colonial pillage, and the 
productive technological innovations of the industrial revolution were the 
necessary preconditions for the existence of a capitalist society. Due largely 
to his adoption of the labour theory of value, however, Marx predicted 
that this system would end in a culmination of repeated crises that were 
rooted in its own internal contradictions. The culmination of these crises 
would see the marginalized, impoverished, and numerous proletariat 
expropriate capitalist industry, thus ushering in an era of socialism which 
would eventually transform itself into communism (Marx 1867/1961, 
Part VIII).
Starkly brandishing the enlightenment positivism that he, along with 
his contemporaries, was immersed in, Marx explained of his major contri-
bution, Das Kapital, “it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the 
economic law of motion of modern society” (p. 10). This method is evi-
dent in the teleology presented earlier. Marx’s positivism did not, how-
ever, begin with an unqualified assumption about human nature similar to 
that which is embodied in homo economicus. Quite the reverse, he 
assumed that human activity was conditioned extensively by the material 
environment in which he existed, and that this material environment 
resulted from the technological method with which society produced the 
goods that it consumed. Deane (1978) explains regarding the seeming 
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veracious greed of the capitalist; in the Marxian model, “accumulation is 
stimulated not by an innate psychological propensity on part of entrepre-
neurs, but by the social pressures of competitive society” (139). As Marx 
argued, the capitalist “shares with the miser the passion for wealth. But 
that which in the miser is a mere idiosyncrasy, is in the capitalist the effect 
of the social mechanism of which he is but one of the wheels” (1867/1961, 
pp. 236). Furthermore, regarding both the working class and the capitalist 
class, Marx and Engels assert in The Communist Manifesto (1848/1965) 
that the capitalist system made possible,
no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 
“cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious 
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy 
water of egotistical calculation. (p. 15)
For Marx, then, self-interested behaviour was a cultural expression of capi-
talist relations of production.
Culture entered Marx’s theory in two additional but interrelated 
ways—through the concept of ideology and the concept of fetishism. For 
Marx (1846/1968), ideology represented,
ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class 
which puts itself on the place of the ruling class before it is compelled, 
merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the com-
mon interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it 
has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only 
rational, universally valid ones. (chpt 1A, para. 21)
Which ideas would become dominant in such a way depended entirely on 
the social structure of production in a given society. Since, “the class which 
has the means of mental production at its disposal, consequently also con-
trols the means of mental production,” it follows that “the ideas of the 
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (ibid., para. 1). In such a 
way, Marx argued, the sanctity of private property, and liberal values in 
general, became part of the “hegemony of the spirit” that existed in capi-
talist society. These ideas were naturalized—rendered unquestionable—
even though they so obviously (for Marx) benefitted only one class at the 
expense of another (ibid., para. 25). Ideology, then, was an image of soci-
ety that was produced by the powerful and internalized by all (except for 
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critical thinkers such as Marx himself apparently). It presented a mythical 
conception of reality that obscured to the proletariat the true nature of the 
exploitation that it was suffering, and called upon the working class to act 
voluntarily in the interest of the bourgeoisie and therefore against its own 
interest. Escape from this mystical snare was not possible through thought, 
due to Marx’s assumption that it was the economic base that dictated 
through itself. The end of this delusion would be assured, however, as the 
contradiction in the material relations of production yielded the system’s 
inevitable collapse (Marx 1867/1961).
Marx’s concept of fetishism is also important if we are to explore the 
nature of culture in development theory. The period of high capitalist 
development that is to precede socialism, as we have noted, is typified in 
Marxian thought by an unprecedented capacity for the industrial produc-
tion of commodities. These commodities, however, take on a mystical 
form, according to Marx, when they enter the sphere of exchange. 
Regarding the commodity:
So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it … It is clear 
as noon-day that, that man, by his industry, changes the forms of the materi-
als furnished by nature, in such a way as to make them useful to him … But, 
so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something tran-
scendent. It no longer stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to 
all other commodities. (Qtd in Heilbroner 1999, p. 165)
Upon encountering a commodity, a consumer is estranged from any 
knowledge of the nature of its production, and importantly, from the 
labour involved in its creation. Since Marx assumes all use value to be the 
measure of the labour used up in a commodity’s production, it follows 
that the consumer has no means with which to judge the true value of the 
good. The commodity, then, has no obvious relation to the materiality of 
its production and becomes suspended in a relative system in which its 
value becomes arbitrarily designated. The exchange value which emerges 
is a “fetish”—a phantasm that is disconnected from the tangible reality of 
use value. Furthermore, since humans in a capitalist society come to relate 
to one another more and more solely through the purchase of commodi-
ties, they increasingly live life in relation to the sphere of exchange, with 
little understanding of the realm of production. As a result, they come to 
see their existence falsely as a competition with others for a limited supply 
of goods (Marx 1867/1961, Chpt. 1, Sct. 4).
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To summarize Marx’s ideas as they relate to our present topic, he sees 
development as a unidirectional ascent from tribal society through feudal 
and capitalist epochs, finally to socialism and then to communism. All this 
movement is propelled by contradiction inherent in each stage. This tran-
sition is typified, at least until the socialist period, with the expansion of 
industrial output, but the change to capitalism that made this possible in 
Europe was predicated on the exploitation of colonized territories and 
peoples. Culture appears in Marx’s thought as a form of “false conscious-
ness,” to use Engels’ term (qtd in Eagleton 1991, p. 89). It is a natural-
ized worldview that supports the maintenance of a system of exploitation, 
it is a natural-seeming selfish form of action that is in fact the result of the 
conditioning of a system of production, and finally it is an imaginary rela-
tion to commodities which serves to obscure their true values of com-
modities. Culture, in Marx’s thought, appears to us either as a mere 
reflection of an underlying power relation which compels humans to act 
against their own interests, or as a fanciful cloak which obscures from us a 
view of the hard reality of material production.
Marxian Theories of Imperialism
In The Communist Manifesto, Gundrisse, and Capital, Marx noted the 
tendency for capitalist nations to expand colonial territories in search of 
cheaper resources and to relieve negative pressures related to overproduc-
tion of commodities, through the establishment of new markets. This the-
sis was expanded upon later by Marxist scholars—most notably Hobson, 
Luxemburg, and Lenin. Marx had described the vital role that early colo-
nialism played in providing the means of “primitive accumulation” that 
made European capitalism possible in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early 
8eighteenth centuries. Hunt (2002) explains, however, that this period 
was followed with a cooling of the drive to conquest as capitalist systems 
became entrenched and increasingly concentrated in the colonial centres 
themselves. In the final third of the nineteenth century, however, all of 
that changed as Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Russia, Italy, 
and the United States embarked on intense and violent colonial expansion 
throughout Africa and Asia, and the Americas.
It was within this context that perhaps the three most notable Marxian 
thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century published their 
work on imperialism. The theories of Hobson, Luxemburg, and Lenin are 
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remarkably similar in most respects.1 All claimed that the pressure for colo-
nial expansion was a symptom of the contradictions inherent in the capi-
talism system. Hobson (1965), like Keynes, argued that the extreme 
concentration of wealth that had occurred in capitalist Europe and North 
America created an unstable economic situation. He argued that poor 
workers did not have enough wealth to purchase the commodities that 
were produced, and, since the wealthy could not possibly spend all of their 
huge earnings, there was at once a glut of consumer goods on European 
markets and excess capital available for investment. Hobson argued that 
this pressure led directly to colonialism:
Everywhere appear excessive powers of production, excessive capital in 
search of investment. It is admitted by all businessmen that growth of the 
powers of production in their country exceeds the growth in consumption, 
that more goods can be produced than can be sold for profit, and that more 
capital exists than can find remunerative investment. (p. 81)
As a result, Luxemburg (1972) adds, “capitalism needs … a market for its 
surplus value, a source of supply for its means of production and … a res-
ervoir of labour power for its wage system” (pp.  368–369). Colonial 
expansion serves this purpose, but it is necessarily a culturally and materi-
ally destructive action as Luxemburg explains:
Capital is faced with difficulties because vast tracts of the globe’s surface are 
in the possession of social organizations that have no desire for commodity 
exchange or cannot, because of the entire social structure and the forms of 
ownership, offer for sale the productive forces in which capital is primarily 
interested.… Since the primitive associations of the natives are the strongest 
protection for their social organizations and for their material bases for exis-
tence, capital must begin by planning for the systematic destruction and 
annihilation of all non-capitalist social units which obstruct its development. 
(pp. 370–371)
Wealthy capitalists, argues Hobson (1965), whose economic power and 
political influence put them “in a unique position to manipulate the policy 
of nations” (p. 53), pressure imperial governments to “create new public 
debts, float new companies, and to cause constant considerable 
1 They differ in their opinions on whether capitalism can be tamed through reform, or 
must be dismantled though revolution.
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fluctuations of values” (p. 53), and, finally, to generate “an enthusiasm for 
expansion” (p. 59). Lenin (1967), demonizing the banking industry pri-
marily in this respect, agrees, writing that,
As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilized not 
for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given 
country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for 
the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the back-
ward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for 
capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materi-
als are cheap. (p. 724)
Thus, according to Hobson, Luxemburg, and Lenin, capitalism breeds 
violent colonial expansion, and this, in turn, incites cultural destruction.
Gramsci
Another important expansion on Marxian thought was introduced by 
Gramsci (1957). As we discussed earlier, Marx had assumed that the cul-
tural beliefs, ideas, and moors in a society were more or less a mere reflec-
tion of the power structures in its economic base. Ideology, in this 
perception, served only the dominant class in the maintenance of its 
power. Gramsci certainly agreed that this ideological hegemony tended to 
serve the maintenance of existing structural inequalities, but accorded a 
degree of autonomy to the world of ideas vis-à-vis the economic base. 
Ideological dominance, according to Gramsci, was often necessary for a 
dominant class to maintain its power. The ideological realm could, then, 
become a field in which the subaltern could resist its own marginalization. 
Despite the immense power the “dominant class” has in “maintaining, 
defending and developing the theoretical or ideological ‘front’,” Gramsci 
(1985) argued, an innovative subaltern group could counteract this with 
its own ideological production via the creation of,
The spirit of scission, in other words the progressive acquisition of the con-
sciousness of its own historical personality, a spirit of scission that must aim 
to spread itself from the protagonist class to the classes that are its potential 
allies—all this requires a complex ideological labour. (p. 389)
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Gramsci’s formulation is important because it introduces for us the space 
of “civil society”—a third sector that is interwoven with the state and the 
economy. Ideology and culture are the same things for Gramsci; these 
exist in this third sector, and so do ideological or cultural resistance. 
Resistance in the third sector would become central to many conflict- 
conscious concepts of development that would emerge later in the twen-
tieth century.
Sociological aPProachES
With Compte’s (1856) attempt to establish the discipline of sociology as 
a form of “social physics,” an alternative way of viewing the relationship 
between progress and culture became available. The early sociological 
approaches turned the economistic depiction of human society and econ-
omy on his head. Sociologists tended to refuse the depiction of economy 
as a sphere that was separable from society. They also rejected the idea that 
economy or society was little more than the resultant of the actions of 
individuals or groups which acted to satisfy their own pre-ordained inter-
ests. Ideas of progress remained deep-rooted in these arguments, but cul-
ture was given a leading role in its actualization. The most important 
amongst these early sociological thinkers were Emile Durkheim and 
Max Weber.
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim speaks of culture in terms of the “moral” or “social” forces 
which actively shape each member of society. As a result, the existence of 
an asocial individual such as the homo economicus of neoclassical thought 
is considered to be a misnomer. “Our tendencies,” writes Durkheim 
(1895/2003), “are not developed by ourselves but come to us from with-
out” (p. 128). The set of needs, tastes, and wants that would be inter-
preted by economists as a stable utility function of the individual is, for 
Durkheim, “a group condition repeated in the individual because imposed 
on him. It is found in each part because it exists in the whole, rather than 
in the whole because it exists in the parts” (p. 130). Durkheim (1893/2000) 
holds that, if there is a dominant tendency in human nature, it is a predis-
position to build solidarity between members of a society—a solidarity 
which gives form and meaning to the world. Individuals, their values, 
tastes, beliefs, and habits are the product of this solidarity (p. 43).
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Durkheim (1893/2000) discusses two important types of solidarity 
which link the idea of culture directly to the idea of progress. “Mechanical 
solidarity” exists in “traditional” or primitive” societies. This solidarity is 
based on sameness, as each member carries out more or less the same 
social roles as all others. As “population is continually becoming more 
concentrated,” resulting from the “the formation and development of 
towns” and an increase in “the number and speed of the means of com-
munication,” a new, more intense type of solidarity becomes possible 
(ibid., pp. 48–49). With this newly emergent “organic solidarity,” a divi-
sion of labour occurs. This division does not, however, imply a diminish-
ment of solidarity in general—rather the opposite. The division of labour, 
Durkheim argues, has as its main purpose a deepening of social solidarity, 
for it allows individuals and groups of individuals to act as separate special-
ized organs within a greater social organism. This organic form of solidar-
ity, which is established most completely in modern Europe and North 
America, is, for Durkheim, the evolutionary end to which human societies 
progress. He argued that “to struggle against nature,” as human density 
increases, “we need to possess more vigorous faculties, deploy more pro-
ductive energies” (p.  38). The division of labour, therefore, becomes 
unavoidable as human societies progress. With all biological life forms, 
“an organism occupies the more exalted place in the animal hierarchy the 
more specialized its functions are” (p. 38). “The division of labour in soci-
ety” then,
appears no more than a specialized form of this general development. In 
conforming to this law societies apparently yield to a movement that arose 
long before they existed and which sweeps in the same direction the whole 
of the living world. (Ibid.)
Social progress as depicted by Durkheim (1893/2000), then, is a natural 
evolutionary move from simple (traditional) to complex (modern) society. 
Spurred by demographic growth, society advances into a kind of super- 
organism with an increasing number of specialized organs, and deepening 
interdependence. Economic growth and increased industrialization result 
from this change, but are not the goal of it. These things are secondary 
effects—positive symptoms of the social need to increase solidarity. Since 
needs and wants, for Durkheim, are set by society, an innate drive to 
acquire more material goods cannot possibly drive or define social prog-
ress. This, for Durkheim, is the point on which the political economists 
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tended to err. Their resultant analyses have been misconstrued as a result. 
The discipline of sociology must, therefore, be established as the preemi-
nent social science in providing the policy prescriptions that will guide 
social progress according to Durkheim.
Max Weber
In the work of Weber, one does not find mention of a natural and inevi-
table historical progression from a less desirable state to a more desirable 
one. The word “progress,” in fact, usually appears in quotation marks in 
his work (1919, p. 78). One does, however, find a detailed historical inter-
pretation of the way in which modern capitalist bureaucratic society came 
to exist. Certainly, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Weber (1905) concedes that the appropriation of material means of pro-
duction, free markets, mechanization, and a particular legal regime all 
contributed causally to the rise of capitalist society, but he holds that these 
were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions. Many civilizations had 
existed before with these traits, he argued, and yet they did not develop 
into modern capitalist states. The key input into the rise of capitalism, for 
Weber, was a particular cultural manifestation—a capitalistic spirit.
This spirit was rooted originally in religion. In the Old Testament, 
Weber (1905) reminds us that “wealth” in itself was considered “morally 
suspect” (p. 68). With the rise of Protestantism which preceded the indus-
trial revolution, however, this association was subtly changed. With 
Protestantism it was believed that a man was assigned a calling by God—
labour in His service. It was believed, specifically for the Calvinists and 
Puritans, that individual ascendance into heaven was preordained. Success 
in a calling came to stand as proof of predestination. “Wealth,” Weber 
suggested, came to be understood as “bad ethically only in so far as it is a 
temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life, and its acquisition is 
bad only when it is the purpose of later living merrily without care” 
(p. 70). “But as a performance of duty in a calling,” Weber continues, “it 
is not only morally permissible, but actually enjoined” (ibid.). “Favour in 
the sight of God” became demonstrable in “private profitableness,” for if 
God “shows one of His elect a chance of profit, he must do it with a pur-
pose. Hence the faithful Christian must follow the calling by taking advan-
tage of the opportunity” (ibid.).
At the same time, however, frugality was religiously encouraged. 
“Protestant asceticism,” Weber (1905) continued, “acted powerfully 
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against the spontaneous enjoyment of possession; it restricted consump-
tion, especially of luxuries” (p.  72). This religiously initiated frugality 
mixed with industriousness, Weber argues, provided the conditions for the 
inception of the capitalist order:
When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release of acquis-
itive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumulation of capi-
tal through ascetic compulsion to save. The restraints which were imposed 
upon the consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by making 
possible the productive investment of capital. (Ibid.)
Modern rationalistic-secular capitalist society proceeded from the cultural 
prerequisite of Protestantism. “The Puritan outlook,” Weber argued, 
“stood at the cradle of economic man” (ibid.). “Today the spirit of reli-
gious asceticism,” he continued, “has escaped from the cage. But victori-
ous capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support 
no longer” (p. 73). This secular capitalism was a snare, according to Weber 
(1919). The human creature, usually fantastically engaged with mutable 
culture, became subdued by a capitalist bureaucratic system. Weber 
lamented that mankind had become trapped in a bureaucratic rationalized 
intellectualism which,
means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come 
into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calcula-
tion. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have 
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did 
the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and 
calculations perform the service. (p. 78)
As we will see, this sudden disappearance of culture in the magical hands 
of capitalist scientific modernity, although lamented by Weber, would 
become central to early forms of developmentalist theory in the mid- 
twentieth century.
Veblen and the Institutional Economists
It may count to some as somewhat of a heresy to list the institutional 
economists here under the heading of “sociological approaches to devel-
opment.” Indeed, the institutionalists, from the school’s founder Thorstein 
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Veblen to later proponents of “old” institutionalism such as Robert Frank, 
were and are all trained as economists who worked/work in economics 
departments. It is their theoretical assumptions, however, that set them 
apart from orthodox economists and placed them within the realm of 
sociology. All economic action, for institutionalists, is conditioned, even 
determined, by the place of the actor within institutions. An institution, 
according to Commons (1931),
ranges all the way from unorganized custom to the many organized going 
concerns, such as the family, the corporation, the trade association, the trade 
union, the reserve system, the state. (p. 649)
As a result of this thinking, the institutionalists condone a shift in eco-
nomic thinking. As Commons explains,
It is this shift from commodities and individuals to transactions and working 
rules of collective action that marks the transition from the classical and 
hedonic schools to the institutional schools of economic thinking. The shift 
is a change in the ultimate unit of economic investigation. The classic and 
hedonic economists, with their communistic and anarchistic offshoots, 
founded their theories on the relation of man to nature, but institutionalism 
is a relation of man to man. (p. 652)
The problem for many is that to formulate economic theories as social 
relations between human beings is to do sociology. It is for this reason that 
Talcot Parsons (1937) would denounce institutional economics as a field. 
In fact, most institutional economists, when pressed, have had difficulty 
differentiating their field from the economic sociology that was initiated 
by Weber and Durkheim, and vice versa. The fields remain quite insulated 
from one another, regardless (Velthuis, 1999). Perhaps the placement of 
this entry will go some small way towards the erosion of this unneces-
sary divide.
Culture is the fundamental institution for institutional economists. 
This is evident in Veblen’s (1899/1994) foundational work on modern 
consumer society. Such a society, argued Veblen (not unlike Adam Smith), 
is based on emulative action in which the object of the economic actor is 
to demonstrate success in life through the consumption of goods and ser-
vices of a quality and quantity equal to or greater than other members of 
the social group. Quality of such good is socially defined, or “canonized” 
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as often as it is an objective feature. Human action, for Veblen, was pro-
pelled not by an insatiable set of stable wants as the neoclassical econo-
mists insisted, but by a positional game whose goal was status and 
belonging in a particular type of society.
The particular society that Veblen was concerned with emerged from a 
“predatory,” competitive, “barbarian” culture, as it achieved technology 
that allowed for the production of goods in excess of the amount required 
for survival (pp. 1–6). Veblen argued that to display status, it was neces-
sary to show the absence of a need to work in order to acquire the means 
of subsistence. Occupations, such as lawyer or professor, correspondingly 
gained prestige, and those such as farmer or factory worker lost it. In fact, 
the former were not so much occupations for Veblen, as shows of “con-
spicuous leisure” (p. 23). Similarly, the famous phrase “conspicuous con-
sumption” was coined by Veblen in order to describe the use of goods and 
services with the intent of displaying their non-necessary nature (for sub-
sistence) and, in so doing, to display one’s place in a social structure 
(p. 43).
Development, defined as an increase in material production, is con-
stant, yet largely unexplained in the account—its advance is accorded to 
technological change (which is unexplained). Because of emulative effects, 
however, development that has the aim to satisfy human needs through 
increased production has little use for Veblen. “Evidently” he argues,
a satiation of the average or general desire for wealth is out of the ques-
tion…. [N]o general increase of the community’s wealth can make any 
approach to satiating this need, the ground of which is the desire of every-
one to excel everyone else in the accumulation of goods. (p. 39)
Later, Dusenberry (1949) would argue that an egalitarian redistribution 
of income would quell competitive consumption, decrease waste, and 
increase contentment. This would reduce what he called the “demonstra-
tion effect” that caused unhappiness as one individual witnessed and 
wished to emulate the consumption practices of others. Later, Nurkse 
(1957) would relate this directly to the development of formerly colo-
nized nations by introducing the “international demonstration effect,” 
arguing that,
when people come into contact with superior goods or superior patterns of 
consumption, with new articles or new ways of meeting old wants they are 
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apt to feel after a while a certain restlessness and dissatisfaction. Their knowl-
edge is extended, their imagination stimulated; new desires are 
aroused. (p. 112)
Nurkse’s thesis was presented as an analysis of a phenomenon he believed 
to be blocking capital accumulation, and therefore material production. It 
should be noted however that Nurkse’s, Duesenberry’s, and Veblen’s 
work introduced an uncertainty in economic theory regarding the mean-
ing of progress. This was perhaps an unavoidable result of the insistence 
that human wants are culturally conditioned, since it begs the question: is 
it more prudent to increase production to increase well-being, or to 
change wants? This kind of critical questioning of the use of material pro-
duction was not present in Marxism, nor neoclassicalism, nor even in the 
sociology of Weber or Durkheim.
The institutionalist critique would lose force quickly, however. Although 
it was actually the most prominent school in the field of economics in the 
early twentieth century, institutionalism would virtually disappear until 
the end of that century.2 This fall from grace was likely initiated by both 
the rise of neoclassicalism in economics departments and by Parson’s chas-
tising of the institutionalists for overstepping the bounds of economics 
and wandering into the sociological realm (Velthuis 1999).
concluSion
It was the purpose of Chaps. 2 and 3 to explore the rich intellectual tradi-
tions that underlie the post-WWII development thinking, which will be 
discussed in the next two chapters. Particular attention was paid to the 
ways in which the concepts of culture and development appeared in these 
traditions. This pre-WWII thought was divided into four major groups for 
the purpose of this exposition: classical political economy, neoclassical eco-
nomics, (the topic of Chap. 2), critical political economy, and sociological 
approaches (the topic of the current chapter). For the classical political 
economists, development clearly implied an increase in material wealth, 
but this was a quest that was to be tempered with ethics, and the 
2 This is thought to generally be true as economics departments became satiated with neo-
classicalism. But the very notable prevalence of institutional economists such as John Kenneth 
Galbraith and Robert Heilbroner, throughout the twentieth century, must be noted as 
exceptions to this rule.
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knowledge that social conflict may emerge from divergent class interests. 
Human behaviour was depicted as atomistic and self-interested in the eco-
nomic realm, but this was realized to be an abstraction from the cultural 
situation of human values, and this cultural situation was actively explored 
by the classical political economists themselves.
The marginal revolution, Marx’s critique, and the inception of the sci-
ence of sociology emerged at approximately the same time. This may be 
viewed as the splitting of the older holistic study of political economy into 
three different traditions. To the neoclassical economists went the classical 
political economist’s appreciation for the market and the tendency to sever 
economic action from culture and ethics. To the Marxists went the labour 
theory of value and the social conflict that was implied. To the sociologists 
went the larger questions of the ways in which social interaction and cul-
tural situation formed human values and economic action. All inherited 
the concept that human societies progress as they gain material wealth 
through technological innovation (although this was qualified substan-
tially by the institutionalists). Not to do so was, for all, to be stuck in a 
“barbarian,” “primal,” or “traditional” form of existence. In this form of 
society, it was assumed humans were subject to the whims of nature instead 
of dominating it to their own ends. Such a life had been described to all of 
these thinkers by one of their most notable intellectual forbearers, Thomas 
Hobbes (1651), as being “nasty, brutish and short” (p. 52). There is little 
wonder, then, that each if the theorists discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3 tacitly 
or explicitly defined progress as any movement away from this condition. 
As we will see in the next chapter, this definition will be refined substan-
tially by the post-WWII development theorists.
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During the early- and mid-twentieth century, strong nationalist struggles 
in the colonial territories of the European powers gained increasing 
strength. By the 1960s, as a result, most former colonies of Africa and Asia 
had gained official independence (Chamberlain 1999). Amidst the hope-
ful energy of the postcolonial world, intellectuals, primarily in the former 
colonial powers, took on the task of designing plans which would assist 
the newly emergent nations to achieve the levels of affluence that had been 
attained in Europe and the United States. A worldview that consisted of 
colonies and colonizers was replaced by a worldview that was based on the 
premise that there existed “developed” nations and correspondingly 
“underdeveloped” ones. In the mid-twentieth century, it became increas-
ingly the task of the great technocratic minds in the governments and 
universities of the former colonial powers to help the “underdeveloped” 
to become “developed” (Escobar 1994; Tucker 1999). The purpose of 
this chapter is to locate the idea of culture in the development theory that 
emerged in this period, and that which followed it into the twenty-first 
century.
The overall purpose of this undertaking, you will remember, was to 
search for the source of the uncomfortable silence I experienced when try-
ing to communicate with a professor of neoclassical development econom-
ics about the idea of culture. I suggested that this silence was but a singular 
example of the many such silences that pervade, and impede, development 
thinking in general. Proposing that this silence had something to do with 
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the evolution of disciplinary thinking regarding development and its rela-
tion to culture, I set out to explore this thought as it evolved in from the 
late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. The story began with classical 
political economy and its holistic treatment of questions regarding wealth 
creation in national economies. We then saw what I suggested to be a 
splitting of this great discipline into three schools—neoclassical econom-
ics, critical political economy, and sociology. This taxonomic classification 
will be retained in the work of the current chapter with the exception of 
the last school of thought in the list.
The category of sociology will no longer be useful in creating the dis-
tinctions necessary for discussing post-WWII development theory. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the field of sociology had changed so much 
by the postwar period that any general characterization would be futile. 
Some sociologists, instead of being sceptical of neoclassical economic 
methods, conspired with neoclassical economists in the postwar period in 
the creation of modernization theory (Parsons 1937, 1935a, b), or, later, 
through the adoption of rational action theory (Coleman 1973). 
Furthermore, after the fall of classical political economy, Marxian theory 
was incorporated into sociological thought to the extent that Marx is now 
considered one of the three classical sociologists along with Durkheim 
and Weber.
Although postwar development thinking, as we will see, fluctuated 
from being interdisciplinary to disciplinary, it did move roughly around 
three axes. Neoclassical Economics would prove to be the most powerful of 
these (in the hegemonic sense). Critical Political Economy would maintain 
a Marxian scepticism of the liberal view. Finally, Cultural Approaches arose 
from multiple disciplines, asserting the importance, if not the primacy, of 
culture in human existence. I will use these headings as classificatory tools 
throughout the following two chapters. It should be noted, however, that 
due to the range, complexity, and quantity of work in the field of develop-
ment studies in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies, no classification could be perfect. Nonetheless, these categories are 
useful in emphasizing the place of culture in development theory, and 
therefore serve the present undertaking particularly well.
That undertaking, of course, is to pinpoint the source of the uncom-
fortable silence that arose between myself and my neoclassically trained 
professor, as I attempted to hand him a culture-based critique of an eco-
nomic study. Part of the answer is apparent if we consider the work of the 
previous chapter. The splitting of the holistic study of classical political 
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economy into the three relatively insulated fields of Neoclassical Economics, 
Critical Political Economy, and Sociology could have curtailed conversa-
tion. But it is also possible that such a division of labour could have yielded 
a Durkheimian organic solidarity amongst the social sciences—one in 
which economies of scale, due to specialization, were made accessible via 
cross-disciplinary communication and cooperation. I will suggest that the 
latter did not occur, and that the gap in conversation between myself and 
my professor stands as a symptom of the inability of these Durkheimian 
disciplinary organs to speak effectively to one another.
What I hope to show in this chapter is that although a great deal of 
communication and interaction has been possible—especially of late—
between Cultural Theory and Critical Political Economy approaches to 
development, the neoclassical school remains relatively insular. Critical 
Marxian approaches tend to bleed into cultural approaches, for example, 
making any clear distinction between the two somewhat arbitrary. 
Ontological, epistemological, and methodological differences between 
neoclassical economics and the other two fields, on the other hand, have 
pre-empted meaningful conversation. These differences stem from the 
rigidity of the enduring Newtonian method in neoclassical economics on 
one side, and the inability of the other approaches to accept such a simplis-
tic depiction of human life on the other. In conversation with other social 
scientists, the methodological individualism of the neoclassical economist 
meets a “big intangible something” that does not optimize properly. The 
“big intangible something” meets, in the methodological individualism of 




Economists, of course, have not always had such a difficult time convers-
ing with other social scientists. As we saw in the first chapter, the classical 
political economists combined cultural, ethical, and political insights with 
their economic analyses while retaining a linear Newtonian-Cartesian 
method. They did this, however, by holding the social apart from the eco-
nomic. Smith, for example, allowed his Theory of Moral Sentiments to 
sneak into his Wealth of Nations only in a vague footnote. A similar uneasy 
interaction of methods occurred in the postwar period in development 
4 CULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
60
thinking, within the surprisingly interdisciplinary approach of moderniza-
tion theory. This stream of thought—the most prominent in the postwar 
era—combined skillfully the sociological approaches of Durkheim and 
Weber with Keynesian and Austrian economics.
The thinking behind modernization theory is fairly straightforward: 
Keynesian neoclassical economists had shown that markets inhabited by 
rational individuals can achieve allocative optimality when these markets 
are guided properly by governments. Durkheimian and Weberian sociolo-
gists, on the other hand, had discovered the sociological secrets by which 
humans had shed their traditional ways and become rational and entrepre-
neurial. Effective development policy would therefore seek to install mar-
ket systems in developing countries while helping their citizens to become 
rational and business-like, that is, to become a mixture of the homo eco-
nomicus of the mainstream neoclassicalists and the entrepreneur of the 
Austrian school. In this concept, we see cooperation between neoclassical 
and sociological approaches. It was as if the Weberian and Durkheimian 
sociologists were embarking on the task of creating rational economic 
actors out of traditional peoples in the former colonies so that they could 
deliver them, fully formed, to the neoclassical economists. The latter 
would then submit these properly behaving actors to the invisible hand of 
the market, intervening from time-to-time with the benevolent hand of 
the state. The result would be development—defined as increased eco-
nomic output. The only thing missing in this mixture was critical thought 
(in the Marxian sense).
One of the prominent features of modernization theory was a claim 
that human societies tend to pass through a number of stages as they 
evolve historically. Parsons (1964) had suggested, for example, that this 
involved a passage from the traditional, to the archaic, to the modern—the 
latter representing the apex of human social achievement. Following 
Durkheim’s lead, Parsons implied that the modernization of human soci-
ety was an extension of evolutionary tendencies in the biological world. 
The physiological innovations of the human brain and human hands, 
Parsons argued, endowed the species with a “biological potential for social 
and cultural evolution” (p. 84). This capacity, he continues, improves the 
“mastery, or the ability to change the environment to meet the needs of 
the [social] system” (p. 85).
Once endowed with the physical ability to make culture and to manipu-
late its own environment, Parsons (1964) argues, societies pass through a 
number of “evolutionary universals” on their road to modernity. The first 
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of these is “social stratification” which “tends to exert a pressure to gener-
alized hierarchization” (pp. 89–90). This propensity, combined with its 
“cultural legitimation,” stimulates the existence of “prestige” positions 
which are the “prerequisite for responsible concentration of leadership” 
(ibid.). These advents, for Parsons, “are closely related to the “breaking 
out” of what might be called the “primitive” stage of societal evolution 
(p. 87). Next, the evolutionary universal of “bureaucratic organization” is 
developed “in societies that have moved considerably past the primitive 
stage” (p. 92). This “authority of office” is found primarily in govern-
ment, but also “within money and markets” (ibid.). The “system of money 
and markets,” another evolutionary universal, provides a similar organiza-
tional function as a bureaucratic system, but is more adaptable. It follows 
for Parsons that “those who restrict [the market] too drastically are likely 
to suffer from severe adaptive disadvantages in the long run” (p.  95). 
Excessive state control of economies, then, will impede evolution.
The next evolutionary universal that Parsons (1964) proposes is a ubiq-
uity of “generalized universalistic norms”—the erasure of cultural differ-
ence, which was a “distinctive” step that “more than the industrial 
revolution itself, ushered in the modern era of social evolution” in Europe 
(p. 95). Parsons argues that such cultural homogeneity allows a legal order 
to be established on universally held principles and clears the ways for the 
institution of the final evolutionary universal of “democratic association” 
(p. 96). This generalized universality and democratic association, along 
with the advent of markets and bureaucracies, exerts a social pressure on 
the human actor that stimulates a “formal rationality” (ibid.). That is, a 
type of rationality in which human actors are endowed with more or less 
homogenous beliefs and tastes, and go about pursuing the satisfaction of 
these within a “general type of legal order” typified by bureaucratic gov-
ernments, markets, and democratic association (pp. 96–97). In this stage, 
homo economicus is at long last fully evolved and may present himself to 
the neoclassical economist—perfectly amenable to his calculus.
The most commonly noted articulation of modernization theory, fol-
lowing Parsons’ general framework, is to be found in economic historian 
W.W. Rostow’s (1960/2000) The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Rostow suggested that societies pass through five stages on 
their journey to maturity. First, “traditional society” develops “within lim-
ited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technol-
ogy, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world” (p. 100). 
Rostow uses Newton “as a symbol for that watershed in history when men 
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came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few know-
able laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation” 
(ibid.). In the traditional period, productivity was greatly limited due to 
technology and the “value system … was generally geared to what might 
be called a long-run fatalism,” typified by the belief that “the range of pos-
sibilities open to one’s grandchildren would be just about what it had been 
for one’s grandparents” (p. 101).
In the second phase, “the Preconditions for Take-Off,” Rostow 
(1960/2000) argues that “the insights of modern science began to be 
translated into new production functions both in agriculture and indus-
try” and that these processes are “given dynamism by the lateral expansion 
of world markets” (p. 102). In this environment, “the idea spreads not 
merely that economic progress is possible, but that economic progress is a 
necessary condition” (ibid.). We see the emergence of the entrepreneur as 
“new types of enterprising men come forward … willing to mobilize sav-
ings and to take risks in the pursuit of profit” (ibid.). Quite often, the 
emergence of this epoch was motivated externally, “from some external 
intrusion by more advanced societies,” such as colonial intrusions, which 
“shocked the traditional society [and] set in motion ideas and sentiments 
which initiated the process” (ibid.). Even so, Rostow argues that this 
period is often finalized by “the building of an effective centralized nation 
state” and sentiments of nationalism in opposition to colonial powers 
(p. 103).
According to Rostow’s argument, the seeds for the transformations in 
the last three phases were planted in the first two. It is in the period of 
“Take-Off” that,
the old blocks and resistances of steady growth are finally overcome. The 
forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and 
enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society. 
Growth becomes its normal condition. (p. 103)
Following this period, the “Drive to Maturity” is epitomized by “a long 
interval of sustained if fluctuating progress” (p. 104). Finally, in the “Age 
of High Mass Consumption,” the “leading sectors shift towards durable 
consumers’ goods and services” (p.  105). This is the age that Rostow 
believed the American people were at his time emerging into. The con-
sumerist ethic of this period, Rostow argued further, was accompanied by 
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the emergence of the welfare state—a symbiosis of modern democratic 
state and capitalist market.
Rostow’s model and the work of Parsons stand as typical examples of 
modernization theory. There also have been more economistic versions of 
the theory, based on neoclassical theory—focusing on moves from tradi-
tional agriculture to modern manufacturing as a source of growth (Lewis 
1955). Some studies have focused more on political aspects, regarding the 
formation of modern institutions and cultures of political participation 
(Huntington 1968). Some have stressed the importance of the dissemina-
tion of knowledge, creation of new imaginations, and consequently entre-
preneurial and politically active subjects via the increased communication 
and understanding that come first with urbanization, then with literacy, 
then with mass media (Lerner 1958). There have also been attempts to 
designate exact behavioural traits that are typical of modernity, and there-
fore conducive to development (Inkeles and Smith 1974).
There are important commonalities in these works. Each tends to 
define underdevelopment as a lack of productive capacity. Each of these 
works represents an attempt to locate the source of underdevelopment in 
a set of “primitive” institutions, cultural, economic, or social practices. 
Each of these tends to cast the solution to the problem of underdevelop-
ment as the adoption of European or North American-style norms, insti-
tutions, and technologies. Consequently, each of these various 
modernization theories tends to blame the poor for their own poverty and 
prescribe more contact with, and diffusion of, the culture and technical 
knowledge of Western civilization as the remedy. Rational homo eco-
nomicus looms in the background of each theory as the ideal type of 
human actor towards the creation of which policy should be directed—
perhaps with a bit of the entrepreneur sprinkled in for good measure.
Modernization theory undergirded the development policy that ema-
nated from the United Nations institutions—especially UNESCO and the 
World Bank—as well as all the official aid agencies of the Western powers 
in the postwar period. Policies encouraged the proliferation of global mar-
kets under the Bretton Woods system—presided over by the IMF, World 
Bank, and GATT. National democratic governments based on a Western- 
style state, active political participation, and strong national identities were 
encouraged in the former colonies (Martinelli 2005; Thussu 2000). Large 
infrastructure projects were initiated, typically funded through interna-
tional loans and encouraged by the World Bank (McMichael 1996, p. 31).
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Finally, the diffusion of Western ideas, culture, and technologies was 
encouraged via the expansion of open markets, the imposition of develop-
ment projects that were designed by the Western powers, and the inser-
tion of organizations such as the US Peace Corp into the former colonies 
(Webster 1984, pp. 53–56; Dube 1988, p. 4; Thussu 2000). This was a 
deliberate homogenizing process which was bolstered greatly by the inter-
national expansion of American and European mass media conglomerates. 
This mass communication system was to be used, as Thussu (2000) 
explains, “to spread the message of modernity and transfer the economic 
and political models of the West to the newly independent countries of the 
South” (p.  56). The largely American-produced content of these mass 
media networks “championed the Western way of life and its values of 
capitalism and individualism,” in an attempt not only to incite cultural 
change for development, but also to create foreign consumers for Western- 
made goods and services. All of this—the building of markets, dissemina-
tion of knowledge, and creation of national identities—would be guided 
nationally by states, and internationally by the Bretton Woods system. All 
of this was accompanied by Keynes’ general theory which advocated state 
intervention in market-based societies towards the universal institution of 
modern welfare states (ibid.).
New Classical Economics and the Washington Consensus
In 1947, Friedrich von Hayek organized a meeting of thirty-six of the top 
free-market scholars in the world—mostly economists—at Mont Pélerin, 
Switzerland. Hayek and the other attendees had great misgivings about 
the Keynesian turn towards the state-led economic development that 
accompanied modernization theory. They also lamented the persistence of 
planned economies in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. The purpose of the 
Mont Pélerin meeting was to begin work on an intellectual counter to 
these ideas, as participant Milton Friedman (2000) explains:
The point of the meeting was very clear. It was Hayek’s belief, and the belief 
of other people who joined him there, that freedom was in serious danger. 
During the war, every country had relied heavily on government to organize 
the economy, to shift all production toward armaments and military pur-
poses. And you came out of the war with the widespread belief that the war 
had demonstrated that central planning would work…. Hayek and others 
felt that freedom was very much imperilled, that the world was turning 
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toward planning and that somehow we had to develop an intellectual cur-
rent that would offset that movement. … Essentially, the Mont Pelerin 
Society was an attempt … to start a movement, a road to freedom as it were. 
(para. #3)
This project more or less involved a cooperation of neoclassical econo-
mists from the Austrian tradition and those, such as Friedman, George 
Stigler, and Frank Knight, from the Chicago school of economics to for-
ward the cause of a free-market-based opposition to the state-led model 
(ibid.). Hayek ended this meeting with a plea for all those involved to 
work towards this end, warning that it may take twenty years or more, but 
that the ideal would eventually prevail (Harris 2000). Hayek and his work 
would remain greatly involved in this process until his death—his (1944) 
Road to Serfdom served as a great inspiration to both Margret Thatcher 
and Ronald Reagan in their push for market deregulation in the 1980s 
(Harris 2000). The bulk of the heavy-lifting in this project, however, 
would be carried out by Chicago school economists—primarily by Milton 
Friedman.
“Friedman,” writes Van Overtveldt (2007), was “probably one of the 
most enthusiastic and articulate supporters of a free-market economy that 
has ever lived” (p. 91). One could only imagine, then, that he was more 
than willing to take up the challenge posed by Hayek. Keynes’ General 
Theory, as Hazlitt (1977) explains, “constitutes the most subtle and mis-
chievous assault on orthodox capitalism and free enterprise that has 
appeared in the English language” (345). To dismantle the prevailing ide-
ology of state-led economy, then, Friedman would have to directly attack 
Keynes’ ideas. Since Keynes’ General Theory was an integral part of mod-
ernization theory, this meant as substantial attack on mainstream develop-
ment theory as well.
Friedman chose first to challenge the core Keynesian (and Marxian) 
idea that the propensity to save increased with income. This, we should 
remember, was used by Keynes to predict crises of underconsumption that 
would occur in the event that free markets produced high degrees of 
income inequality. Keynes had used this assertion to justify government 
intervention both to redistribute income and to undertake spending to 
offset the lack of private expenditure. Marxian theorists, as was discussed 
in Chap. 2, used a similar assumption in their theories of imperialism. 
Friedman forcefully dislodged the Keynesian claim regarding the propen-
sity to consume by arguing that it did not fit historical data. He then 
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presented his own permanent income hypothesis that entrenched in main-
stream economics the idea that savings rates remain constant regardless of 
income levels, and therefore that there is simply no such thing as a crisis of 
overproduction. Friedman’s seemingly small technical refutation about 
savings rates, in effect, denied the Keynesian claim that fiscal policy could 
be used by governments to any positive effect—and, he believed, showed 
that this market interference could in fact harm economic performance.
Key to the Keynesian advocacy for fiscal policy was a claim that the 
other economic policy choice available to governments—monetary pol-
icy—was not effective. Basing their argument on empirical data, Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) showed that monetary policy can have a devastating 
impact. In fact, they claimed their data to show that monetary mismanage-
ment in the early twentieth century, leading to a monetary contraction, 
had caused the Great Depression. This would lead Friedman (1998) to 
comment later that, “far from the great depression being a failure of the 
free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government” (p.  233). 
Expansionary monetary policy was similarly dissuaded by Friedman 
(1968), as he insisted that an increase in the money supply would cause 
inflation, which would, in turn, cause unemployment and recession. As a 
result of these insights, Friedman (1962/1982) proposed the Monetarist 
Rule—that the money supply should be expanded only at a rate equal to 
long-run growth. Through his arguments, then, Friedman made the case 
for a severe curtailment of government activity in both monetary policy 
and fiscal policy.
Other Chicago school economists attacked interventionist policy just as 
vehemently. Stigler (1988) used empirical testing to show that competi-
tion existed amongst large companies, and that prices were flexible to mar-
ket conditions. Implying that markets function competitively even under 
oligopolistic conditions, he maintained that “competition is a tough weed, 
not a delicate flower” (p. 104). Lucas (1997) used the idea of rational 
expectations to argue that government policy is often ineffective anyway, 
and that tax cuts are the best way to induce economic growth. The effort 
of both these economists worked to dissuade the government interven-
tion in markets, the restriction of monopoly power, and progressive 
taxation.
Finally, in Friedman’s (1962/1982) Capitalism and Freedom, these 
economic theorems were linked with an ideal of political freedom. In the 
text, Friedman argued that economic freedom is important in its own 
right—regardless of impact on economic growth. He also argued, 
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however, that economic freedom is a necessary condition for the existence 
of political freedom. Economic control, he insisted, is always accompanied 
by political repression, and free markets are more difficult to coerce than 
are government production and distribution systems.
These neoclassical economic arguments had an incredibly strong impact 
on economic development policy. The first experiment in extreme free- 
market economics was orchestrated by Chicago-trained economists in 
Chile in the early 1970s, then other Latin American countries, and later 
former Soviet Bloc nations. In all instances, these policies were instituted 
with the help of severe political repression (Klein 2007). The height of 
Chicago School’s impact on development policy would be achieved later, 
in the 1980s and 1990s, with the reformulation of development policy as 
enacted by the World Bank, IMF, and bilateral agencies. During this 
period, policy measures in these institutions were changed from 
modernization- theory inspired state-mediated-market-based strategies to 
state-minimizing market-centric ones. The institution of these policies was 
forced through conditionalities that were attached to World Bank and 
IMF loans. These structural adjustment programs (SAPs), as they were 
called, contained measures to reduce budget deficits and government sub-
sidies, cut marginal tax rates, deregulate interest rates, devalue currencies, 
reduce tariffs, encourage foreign direct investment through the deregula-
tion of the national economy, privatize state-owned enterprises, and estab-
lish and reinforce private property rights (Van Waeyenberge 2006). 
Resultantly, by the end of the 1990s, most of the world was arguably 
embedded in a neoliberal world system that relied on Chicago School’s 
neoclassical economics for scientific justification.
Culture has little place in neoliberal economic analysis. Since, as with all 
neoclassical method, stable preferences are prefigured, there is no room 
for social action to have an impact on these preferences. Tyler Cowen 
(2002) has presented what is probably the most complete new classical 
treatment of culture available. Cowen argues that a diversity of choice in 
cultural products is encouraged by the proliferation of free markets across 
the globe. Gains from trade encourage niche markets to form for “mar-
ginal” cultural expressions such as Inuit art. Specialization and economies 
of scale allow high-cost, high-quality productions to be made available 
cheaply to all—as he argues is the case with Hollywood film. The global 
free-market production of culture, Cowen argues, expands the “menu of 
choices” available to all. On final analysis, he claims, “just as trade typically 
makes countries richer in material terms, it tends to make them culturally 
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richer as well” (pp. 12–13). Cowen purposely restricts his analysis to mar-
kets for cultural products here, however, leaving no room for discussion of 
the impact that this or other forms of human communicative interaction 
may have on preference sets. Culture, in the hands of New Classical eco-
nomics, has become just another commodity.
New iNstitutioNal ecoNomics
Old institutional economics, as we discussed in Chap. 2, presumed human 
behaviour and tastes to be conditioned and formed by social institutions 
such as culture. New institutional economics, however, emerged largely 
out of the new classical school. It begins, therefore, with the assumption 
of individuals endowed with pre-existing and stable preference sets. 
Institutions are assumed to be constructed as rational actors seek to cor-
rect for market failures that they encounter in their attempts to maximize 
utility. These market failures are generally associated with incomplete 
information, transaction costs, or spillover effects from the action of oth-
ers (Hodgson 1998).
Although not always explicitly associated with new institutionalism, 
much of the work of Gary Becker exhibits the main qualities of the school. 
I will focus here on the parts of Becker’s work that are consistent with 
New Institutionalism. His analysis begins almost fanatically with the 
assumption of a pre-formed rational individual and explains idiosyncrasies 
in human behaviour as a result of incomplete information and spillover 
effects. George Stigler (1982) had distilled the Chicago School’s credo 
down to one simple statement: “people act efficiently in their own inter-
ests” (pp. 11–12). Gary Becker ran with this idea, attempting to apply it 
to nearly any imaginable human phenomenon. As Nobel laureate George 
Akerlof (1990) would describe it, it was as if Becker had learned how to 
spell the word “banana,” but didn’t know when to stop. Knowledge of 
this approach is important for the purpose of this book, since Becker’s 
method at once represents the most purified and far-reaching form of neo-
classical economics and perhaps a vehicle within which that discipline 
could begin to engage with the idea of culture.
Beckers (1976) approach begins with four major assumptions:
 1. Human agents always engage in utility maximizing behaviour
 2. Human agents are rational, in that they choose one action over 
another by calculating costs of each option and weighing them 
against benefits. This may be done consciously or subconsciously.
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 3. Markets are ubiquitous in all facets of human life.
 4. All human agents have a stable set of tastes (preferences), which are 
“assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very dif-
ferent between wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons 
in different societies and cultures” (p. 5).
The definition of “preference” is important here. The preferences to 
which Becker refers are “underlying objects of choice that are produced by 
each household [or individual] using market goods and services, their own 
time, and other inputs” (ibid.). These “underlying preferences” are bio-
logically determined and “are defined over aspects of life such as health, 
prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy” (ibid.).
If I were to consider telephoning my mother, for example, I would 
consider rapidly and subconsciously all the benefits—potential bequests of 
money and emotional benefits of familial contact. The emotional benefits 
may contribute directly to an underlying preference for social contact with 
others, but financial bequests may only serve as an input in a production 
process within which I use my time and mental capacity with the financial 
bequest to produce goods corresponding to underlying preferences such 
as prestige and health. In deciding to call my mother, I would weigh these 
benefits against costs—energy required to remember her number and find 
the telephone, opportunity costs of the time spent on the phone call, and 
of course the long-distance charges involved, would be some of the costs 
implied. With this information, I make my final decision. According to the 
Beckerian approach, a similar set of preferences, prices, and cost con-
straints exists for every choice or action undertaken by a human being.
Becker’s (1964) concept of human capital provides an important aug-
mentation to this framework. Human capital is a stock of skills and knowl-
edge that assists in the efficiency of a person or household in producing 
the commodities that satisfy underlying preferences. Human capital is also 
knowledge gained in order to increase the efficiency of a person’s or 
household’s internal production function—their ability to use goods in 
the satisfaction of underlying preferences. If I learn to speak English, for 
example, it could increase the value of the social interaction I have with my 
mother—especially if this interaction occurs over the telephone. My lan-
guage education increases my efficiency in producing the fundamental 
commodity “social interaction.” Similarly, if I had decided to sacrifice time 
earlier to memorize her telephone number, the time-related costs of tele-
phoning my mother would be reduced because I do not have to search for 
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the number. Knowing how to use a telephone allows me to utilize the 
technology to deliver my mother’s voice to my home and to export mine 
to hers. In Becker’s terms, my acquisition of human capital by learning a 
language, remembering my mother’s phone number, and learning to 
operate a telephone have decreased the shadow prices associated with the 
satiation of my underlying preferences.
The exact delineation of underlying preferences is never clearly under-
taken in this school of thought. Since Becker insists that a universal stable 
set of underlying preferences must exist, it may have made sense for him 
to present the contents of this set when he established his theory. This was 
not done, and as a result, underlying preferences are assumed in an ad hoc 
manner in Beckerian-style studies. Even in Becker’s (1976) authoritative 
book on his own method, he, seemingly without question, includes 
power-steering, inter-city visits, higher education, wheel-base, altruism, 
income, profits, power, prestige, genetic transfer, acceptance, and distinc-
tion in a universal preference set. Obviously, tautology is the great risk of 
the economic approach to human behaviour, unless a universal set of 
underlying preferences may one day be delineated.
It could be conceived that culture enters into this formulation through 
the idea of human capital. If the act of creating and learning languages in 
order to satisfy underlying preferences can be called culture, then we have 
a cultural argument here. Indeed, this is the purpose of language in 
Becker’s (1990) opinion—a classification system that is a public good in 
that it must be shared in order to allow self-interested actors to coordinate 
actions. This, however, does not fit with our broad guiding definition of 
culture as an extra-individual social force that is presumed to impact the 
preferences, habits, motives, values, and valuations of actors. Underlying 
human preferences are assumed to be fixed in Becker’s framework; lan-
guage and other forms of human capital are used instrumentally to achieve 
the maximization of pre-figured utility functions. Culture, then, is far 
from fundamental in Beckerian economics—it is a secondary phenome-
non which has no impact on underlying preferences. As we will see later, 
all institutions are treated in a similar manner in new institutional 
economics.
Another important feature that emerges from Becker’s (1976, 1996a, 
b) work is the claim that human action is path-dependent. Since informa-
tion is limited, and substantial costs must be incurred in gathering it, it is 
less costly for individuals to utilize information they already have, than to 
acquire new information. If I have an underlying preference for music, for 
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example, and I have spent a great deal of time learning to appreciate jazz—
thus lowering the shadow price for appreciation of that form of music—it 
is more efficient for me to satisfy my need for music by listening to more 
jazz than to expend energy in acquiring the knowledge required to appre-
ciate hip-hop. As I listen to jazz subsequent times, it only serves to increase 
my understanding of the form—locking me further into my penchant for 
that style of music. Note that my underlying preference for music has not 
changed here. What has changed is my ability to produce that underlying 
commodity “intelligible music,” which satiates my demand.
In his later work, Becker (1996a) substantially revises his definitions in 
a way that allows for the greater inclusion of the social in analysis. Personal 
capital replaces human capital in the consumption function. The former 
comes to include “the relevant past consumption and other personal expe-
riences that affect current and future utilities” (p. 4). The concept of social 
capital is also introduced. This “incorporates the influence of past actions 
by peers and others in an individual’s social network and control system” 
(ibid.). Human capital comes to signify a person’s “stock of personal and 
social capital” as well as a person’s stock of knowledge and skills. The over-
arching component human capital, then, has been broken down into three 
constituent parts—personal, social, and (confusingly) human capital. For 
Becker, “the utility function at any moment depends not only on the dif-
ferent goods consumed but also on the stock of personal and social capital 
at that moment” (p. 5), as well as human capital (meaning knowledge and 
skills).
Because the idea of social capital is central to both development and 
cultural theory, it is important to understand Becker’s (1996b) use of the 
term. “The effects of the social milieu,” he argues, are synonymous with 
“an individual’s stock of social capital” (pp.  49–50). And this stock 
“depends not primarily on [a person’s] own choices, but on the choices of 
peers in the relevant network of interactions” (ibid.), although a person 
can take actions to impact their own social capital (p. 165). As Fine (2001) 
has argued, the term “social capital” has become for Becker, “a catch-all 
for anything that improves life but that has not already been covered by 
those elements of personal capital” (p. 41). For example, a reduction in 
racial discrimination can be seen as an increase in social capital for the vic-
tim of discrimination, and this reduction will increase opportunities, such 
as acquiring education and work, to increase overall utility (Becker 1996a, 
pp. 140–145). Further, Becker (1996b) argues that people have an under-
lying preference for sociality, and this can mix with underlying preferences 
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for other goods, making some restaurants and types of music more popu-
lar, just because they are more popular (pp. 195–202). Individuals who act 
particular ways are rewarded with social capital and may invest in it them-
selves. For example, Becker argues that a person,
can avoid social opprobrium and perhaps ostracism by not engaging in crim-
inal activities; achieve distinction by working diligently at his occupation, 
giving to charities, or having a beautiful house; or relieve his envy and jeal-
ousy by talking meanly about or even physically harming his neigh-
bours. (p. 165)
The concept of social capital is integral to the new institutional economics 
of development. Although the term has an embattled meaning, it is usu-
ally defined more precisely than it is in Becker’s catch-all depiction. New 
institutionalists generally see social capital as a communal resource that is 
mobilized in the solving of social dilemmas—especially in the presence of 
market failures. As Bates (1995) explains,
A social dilemma arises when radical individualism becomes inconsistent 
with social welfare, namely when choices made by rational individuals yield 
outcomes that are socially irrational. The core argument of new institution-
alism is that institutions provide the mechanisms whereby rational individu-
als can transcend social dilemmas… Market failures yield social dilemmas 
and thereby elicit the innovation of institutions. (p. 29)
The classic example of a social dilemma is the common pool resource. 
When private property rights are not assigned to a stand of trees, for exam-
ple, each individual in a community has an incentive to cut as much timber 
as possible without replenishing the stock. Left to itself, this dynamic 
would result in the total depletion of the resource. Communities may 
develop means to abate this problem such as the evolution of a norm that 
regulates tree-cutting practices—perhaps via a religious reverence to the 
forest. This norm represents a form of social capital. Such institutions can 
arise in a variety of other situations. To compensate for failing or non- 
existing capital markets, for example, Bates argues that people,
Mobilize family ties, religious groups or ethnic associations in support of 
commerce and trade; the richness of information in such environments facil-
itates calculations of the appropriate level of trust and the density of social 
ties increases the cost of the loss of reputation, rendering probity of greater 
value than opportunism in economic transactions. (p. 36)
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It is argued that market failures exist in all economies, but that “the econ-
omies of the developing world are characterized by pervasive market fail-
ure” (Bates 1995, p.  36). Since incomplete information and common 
pool resource problems (and similar public goods provision problems) 
exist in all countries, an enormous literature has emerged with the intent 
of scouring both micro- and macro-level data for indicators of trust, social 
cohesion, civic participation, and other informal institutions that are pre-
sumed to constitute social capital. In such studies, a lack of any of these 
key indicators is assumed to be a deficiency in social capital, and therefore 
to contribute to the problem of underdevelopment in any given locale 
(Munshi 2006; Morduch 1991; Dayton-Johnson 2001).
Path-dependency provides a complicating factor for these arguments, 
however. Since human behaviour and institutional evolution are presumed 
to be path-dependent, outmoded institutions may remain when external 
technological and political situations have changed. As a result, enduring 
institutions may be inefficient in that they block the maximization of total 
productive output. According to North (1995), for example, human 
actors create “mental models” of the world in order to cope with limits to 
knowledge and mental capacity for processing information about the 
actual nature of things. These mental models are “used to interpret the 
world” and are “in part, culturally derived” (p.  18). They are cultural 
institutions. North explains the rise of these institutions as follows:
As tribes evolved in different physical environments they developed differ-
ent languages and, with different experiences, different mental models to 
explain the world around them. To the extent that experiences were com-
mon to different tribes the mental models provided common explanations. 
The language and mental models formed the informal constraints that 
defined the institutional framework of the tribe and were passed down inter-
generationally as the customs, taboos, myths that provided the continuity of 
culture and forms part of the key to path dependence. (p. 20)
With new technological advances, however, “human beings became 
increasingly interdependent, and more complex institutional structures 
were necessary to capture potential gains from trade” (pp. 2–21). North 
continues,
to the extent that ‘local experience’ had produced diverse mental models 
and institutions with respect to the gains from such cooperation, the likeli-
hood of creating the necessary institutions to capture the gains from trade 
of more complex contracting varied. (p. 21)
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Some cultures, this implies, were just not designed to be successful in 
generating income in a modern global economy. Just as with moderniza-
tion theory, traditional culture is thought to impede development.
For North and others, it was not simply the path-dependent nature of 
culture that prevented institutional change. Internal power structures also 
have their determining impacts, as local elites were perceived to be pre-
venting positive evolution in poor societies due to their stake in the cur-
rent state of affairs. This, combined with cultural path-dependent 
arguments, has spurred an alignment of new institutional economics with 
a brand of social science that has been dubbed “hypermodernism” by Rao 
and Walton (2004). Key hypermodernist theorists include Francis 
Fukuyama (2000), who labels some cultures deficient in trust and social 
capital in general; Robert Putnam (1993), who has produced a number of 
studies, placing the blame for underdevelopment on a lacking of civic cul-
ture; and Harrison and Huntington (2000), who published the principal 
anthology in the school. In the Harrison and Huntington text, one finds 
a taxonomy of good and bad cultures, all measured according to their 
alleged ability to facilitate a tacitly assumed underlying social preference 
for increased productivity and therefore income—aggregated to gross 
national product. The new institutional economics, it seems, is a return to 
modernization theory. This is all built on the presumption of homo eco-
nomicus endowed with one universal preference set, and the apparent 
assumption that the universal preference that matters is for something 
called “income” and is measurable by gross national product.
An extension of this approach appears in cultural economics literature; 
the most prominent of which appears in the work of Throsby (2001). 
Here, the new institutionalist idea is clearly adhered to. Throsby claims 
that, in an economy, “collective action may occur,” and that if “markets 
fail or do not exist, voluntary or coercive collective action may be required 
in order for optimal social outcomes to be achieved” (p. 13). But Throsby 
insists that there is another type of human impulse that is distinct from the 
economic—the cultural impulse—and that this “desire for group experi-
ence” mixes with the economic only where strictly defined cultural goods 
are concerned (ibid.). Such goods may be musical, artistic, or even related 
to sports, and the behaviour around their production and consumption 
“reflects collective as distinct from individualistic goals, and derives from 
the nature of culture as expressing beliefs, aspirations and identification of 
a group” (ibid.). As a result, it seems that cultural economists are at once 
new institutionalists and old institutionalists. They are the former when 
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discussing the bulk of economic activity; they are the latter when they 
discuss a strictly quarantined set of ‘cultural’ goods—such as sound record-
ings or works of art.
This is not entirely an accurate description, however. Cultural goods are 
treated by Throsby (2001) as normal economic goods that happen to have 
a particular penchant for causing market failures. This is a thoroughly new 
institutional approach which sets cultural goods aside as a brand of misbe-
having commodities—a curious exception that must be treated delicately 
and requires institutional intervention to sustain properly functioning 
markets. At other times, however, Throsby treats preferences as mutable. 
This mutability, unaccompanied by a tiering of levels of preferences as 
appears in Becker’s work, violates core neoclassical presumptions (p. 68). 
This methodological inconsistency is a direct by-product of Throsby’s 
dichotomization of culture and economy. It allows for useful insights, 
such as the insistence that culture may change “what economic develop-
ment means” from place to place, culture to culture (p. 66). But Throsby’s 
dichotomy implies that such insights must be only applied to cultural 
goods which are confined to one part of the total economy. It is likely for 
this reason that cultural economics has not impacted economic analysis 
outside of the treatment of strictly defined cultural goods. The remainder 
of Throsby’s analysis, such as the claim that consideration of cultural fac-
tors may imply that there are different paths to development (p. 67), is 
decidedly new institutional since it treats culture as a resource to pro-
duce income.
An important insight that emerges from the work of cultural economist 
such as Throsby’s (2001) is that tastes themselves can be path-dependent. 
A similar argument is integral to Becker’s (1996b) analyses of tastes. The 
argument here suggests that a certain amount of knowledge is required in 
the consumption of cultural goods. The act of consumption is therefore at 
once an act of learning. The more jazz we listen too, the more we tend to 
appreciate the genre. Our tastes seem to have changed, but really we have 
simply made the consumption of jazz easier by acquiring skills that facili-
tate its consumption. Our enjoyment of a particular good becomes depen-
dent on the amount of that good that we have consumed in the past. For 
Throsby, this tendency is noted only in relation to strictly delineated cul-
tural goods. Becker allows this path-dependency to apply to a broader 
range of goods.
Generally, new institutionalism has provided some welcome theoretical 
relief from the market utopianism of the new classical school. Work by new 
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institutionalists has allowed for substantial a reinvigoration of interven-
tionist arguments. This has resulted in a post-Washington Consensus 
regarding policy prescriptions of the major development institutions. As 
Stiglitz (1998) has suggested, this new development economics is much 
more holistic as it concentrates more on state–society–economy partner-
ships as opposed to casting these spheres as oppositional. But if new insti-
tutionalism has ejected one form of economic reductionism, it has replaced 
it with another. New classical economics may have concentrated its effort 
too much on the economic aspects of development. New institutionalists 
have corrected for this by suggesting that all action is economic. The 
social, political, and cultural may be combined in the new institutional 
approach because they are all presumed to be economic phenomena. 
These three spheres of human activity are furthermore cast as subservient 
and epiphenomenal vis-à-vis the economic. Furthermore, the presumed 
objective-scientific technicians of the new development economics are 
given extraordinary power to define and adjudicate between social capital 
and bad tradition—or, in more technical terms, between rational collective 
corrections for failing markets, and path-dependent suboptimal equilibria. 
An unqualified trust in markets has been replaced with an unsubstantiated 
trust in technocrats. And these technocrats, more often than not, presume 
the measure of the quality on an institution to be its impact on productiv-
ity or income. Culture, by definition, is in service of the market.
Another powerful mode of thought exists, which is related to new insti-
tutionalism. This capabilities approach is usually associated with Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen (1993, 1999), but substantial contributions have 
also been made by Nussbaum (2000), Alkire (2004), and Max-Neef 
(1993). The model starts with the assertion that there exists a set of core 
human functionings which are deemed valuable for human existence. Sen 
has resisted an explicit delineation of these functionings because he feels 
that they should be prioritized and named only through deliberative par-
ticipatory discussion amongst the group of people in question. Others 
have attempted to create lists of core funtionings. Nussbaum (2000), for 
example, includes “life” and “bodily health,” amongst the most funda-
mental of human functionings. It is argued that humans have differing 
capabilities in the production of these functionings, and that this depends 
on material and non-material resources (including things like knowledge 
and community standing) that they have access to. The similarities to 
Becker’s approach are striking, but the main difference lies in the meaning 
Sen and others apply to “functionings” compared to “preferences” as used 
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in the Beckerian approach. Whereas preferences stand for a stable set of 
likes and dislikes internal to each human actor—the satiation of which 
attributes utility to the individual, functionings are a set of socially held 
goals that are agreed to contribute to a good life. Where development in 
the Beckerian tradition comes to mean the expansion of utilities through 
the consumption of material and non-material goods, in the capabilities 
approach, it implies the expansion of capabilities to produce functionings, 
and the removal of “non-freedoms” that impede that production process 
for the most marginalized groups.
Culture sits in the capability approach in three ways. First, as with other 
new institutionalist approaches, culture can impact the ability of actors to 
perform development goals—in this case, the achievement of function-
ings. Secondly, culture in the form of arts or participation in religious ritu-
als may be a valuable functioning in its own right. Third—and this is where 
the approach breaks most dramatically with most new institutionalism—
culture is assumed to frame what counts as a valuable functioning 
(Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999).
In this third respect, however, the capability approach is underdevel-
oped, and this leads to ambiguities and internal inconsistencies. It also 
seems to contradict the new institutional claim that human agents have 
stable preference sets. Sen, for example, asserts that deliberative democ-
racy is important in that it allows communities to not only discover their 
priorities, but critically reflect on their values in the creation of new priori-
ties in a way that seems to impact preferences themselves:
[A] proper understanding of what economic needs are—their content and 
their force—requires discussion and exchange. Political and civil rights, 
especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criti-
cism, and dissent, are central to the processes of generating informed and 
reflected choices. These processes are crucial to the formation of values and 
priorities, and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given  independently 
of public discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open debates and inter-
changes are permitted or not. (1999, p. 153)
Although it might appear that Sen considers preferences to be culturally 
determined and malleable through communication, in reality, he has 
implied otherwise—that culture simply acts to augment the weight 
attached to particular preferences, as if a social set of preferences were 
interacting with an individual one (1977). Resultantly, the way in which 
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the economic actor is constituted is left up in the air for capability theo-
rists. They never seem to address this issue directly. Although deliberative 
democracy is advocated, and power imbalances related to participation in 
discussion are noted, the exact nature of participation or the space in 
which it is to be carried out is not delineated. Finally, although Sen con-
sistently refuses to explicitly create a list of functionings, he often asserts 
that markets tend to expand capabilities and that “freedom of exchange 
and transaction is itself part and parcel of the basic liberties that people 
have reason to value” (1999, p. 6)—that, in other words, market partici-
pation is a valuable functioning in itself.
Such diverse and divergent assertions have led many to critique the 
approach for tending towards both ambiguity and uncritical liberalism. 
The virtues of the model should not, however, be overlooked. The capa-
bility theorists have delicately placed issues of participation and decentral-
ized, non-technocratic policy analysis within the peripheral vision of 
neoclassical development economists. Perhaps due to its unclear relation 
to neoclassical method, however, the model has been adopted most enthu-
siastically by heterodox economists and other social scientists instead of 
neoclassical economists. Resultantly, the glimmer of hope that a meaning-
ful incorporation of culture into neoclassical thought might be brought by 
the capability school has yet to intensify into a measurable quantity of 
light. Often mainstream new institutional- based policy tends to ignore 
material and structural inequalities and blame the poor for their own pov-
erty by pointing to a lack of civic organization in impoverished communi-
ties as the root cause of their poverty.
This is apparent in a fairly recent and ambitious attempt by the World 
Bank to bring economists and anthropologists together to formulate cul-
ture and development policy under a broad capability approach. The result 
was a plea to theorists and practitioners to focus on a “capacity to aspire” 
which could be diminished by undue cultural disruption, and a related 
insistence to pursue a policy trajectory guided by the principle of “equality 
of agency,” which is thought of as a cultural capacity (Rao & Walton 
2004). On close reading, this sits uncomfortably close to the standard 
“hypermodernist” approach that the contributors sought to displace. 
Some cultural arrangements are maintained as being more conducive to 
development, with the caveat that unduly rapid cultural disruption could 
induce a stagnancy that is “beyond poverty” (Douglas 2004, p. 108), and 
that participatory methods might help to quell this tendency. The 
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theorization of culture is as haphazard and contradictory as it is generally 
with the capability approach, and only one neoclassical economist was 
inspired by the concepts introduced by the conference and book to work 
on one conceptual model, published years later in an abbreviated form 
(Ray 2006). The Rao and Walton (2004) publication and its singular spin-
off do represent a useful incursion into the murky territory of culture and 
development economics. Its limited impact, especially amongst neoclassi-
cal economists, may, however, be testimony to the lack of theoretical 
coherence endemic to the capability approach.
coNclusioN
Culture is not used in any consistent way in mainstream development the-
ory. Some, such as the new classical economists, tended to ignore it out-
right. When not being ignored, culture was sometimes contorted to fit 
within neoclassical economic models. New institutional economics allows 
for this contortion by treating culture as a rational social corrective for 
market failures based on information imperfections or externalities.
The ethnocentric biases of early modernization theory and its later iter-
ations of hypermodernism have not been successfully avoided via the capa-
bility approach. Modernization theory in its early and hyper forms features 
culture as a traditional curse that subsumes the rationality that is assumed 
to be necessary for individuals and communities to transcend development 
problems. These concepts cannot be expected to sit well with indigenous 
peoples that insist that culture is valuable for its own sake and that it con-
stitutes the human ontological relation with the world—and that it creates 
ideas of the good life that are the end-point of development.
The capability approach does go some way towards remedying this. 
Despite notable attempts to reconcile the ideas of culture and develop-
ment through that approach, however, the combination remains underde-
veloped. The concept of “capacity to aspire” is illustrative of this. Within 
this framework, culture is said to define individual goals, and therefore 
concepts of development. Culture also provides an ontological roadmap 
of the world—providing actors with the understandings necessary to navi-
gate from underdeveloped to developed states (both of which can be cul-
turally defined). There is an admission that things such as top-down 
development projects and natural disasters can disrupt the “capacity to 
aspire” by creating a mismatch between culturally defined modes of behav-
iour and knowledge-systems on one side, and the goals of development on 
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the other. The model is unable, however, to distinguish between content-
ment and apathy, however. In its current form, this mode of thinking, 
therefore, asks the development expert to mediate between the two states. 
This brings the idea perilously close to the kind of ethnocentric judgement 
that was indicative of modernization theory.
There may be a way in which indigenous thought can be expressed in 
terms of the capabilities approach and capacities to aspire, but this fusion 
has not yet been achieved. Three things are likely important if this fusion 
is to ever be successful. First, the habit of presuming economic growth to 
be essential for development must be abandoned. Second, the habit of 
assuming markets to be natural and ubiquitous, albeit sometimes malfunc-
tioning, entities must be replaced with ideas that view markets as some-
times useful but non-essential. Third, the capabilities approach must 
meaningfully incorporate critical ideas that examine multiple forms of 
inequity.
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CHAPTER 5
Culture in Critical Development Theory
The previous chapter described the place of culture in many strains of 
functionalist development thought. Although much of this thought has 
been hegemonic, especially throughout the twentieth century, it may be 
critiqued as largely Eurocentric, econocentric, linear, and relatively blind 
to multiple forms of inequality. These traits, although useful in statistical 
analysis and economic modelling, are unlikely to match well with the 
indigenous cultural visions of sustainable development emerging from 
Latin America and other regions of the world. There is a possibility that 
fruitful theoretical innovation could occur between indigenous develop-
ment ideas and the capabilities approach, but this has not yet occurred.
This chapter examines the idea of culture from within more critical 
schools of development thought. Much like many current ideas of indig-
enous sustainable development, many of these theoretical frames have 
emerged from Latin America and other parts of the Global South. As 
such, they should provide a more amenable set of standpoints with which 
indigenous development ideas can interact.
CritiCal PolitiCal EConomy
Critical theories emerged largely from the Marxist tradition in the early 
postwar period. Led by the structuralists (Prebisch 1950; Furtado 1964; 
Myrdal 1968), followed by dependency theorists (Amin 1976; Frank 
1966; Cardoso 1972), and then world systems theorists (Wallerstein 
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1974; Amin 1992; Frank 1981), these approaches tended to replace the 
functionalism of neoclassical theory with explanations of underdevelop-
ment that were based in exploitation and unequal exchange. For theorists 
in the neoclassical tradition, markets—despite their occasional dysfunc-
tion—were thought to bring opportunity, foreign exchange, benefits from 
trade, investment, technology, and positive cultural influences to less 
developed countries. Critical theorists, however, argued that markets tend 
to bring subordination, exploitation, and homogenization to these 
countries.
The Structuralist School
Structuralist thought emerged largely in post-WWII Latin America and 
emphasized the importance of expanding the industrial sector for achiev-
ing economic growth. In this, structuralist thinking reflected that of the 
modernization theorists. Where the structuralists differed, however, was 
in their assistance that more was required in this process than the simple 
access to markets, foreign direct investment, knowledge, advanced tech-
nologies, and cultural change.
Furtado (1964) argued that structural limitations prevented successful 
market-based industrialization in the developing world. First, he believed 
that small domestic markets in many countries were not large enough to 
sustain the process of industrialization. Domestic industry of small econo-
mies, however, was also too weak to compete in global markets with com-
panies from highly industrialized economies. Attempts at free-market-based 
industrial development, then, would leave domestic business mired in a 
structural trap that assures domination by stronger, more established, 
companies from larger economies.
Prebisch (1950) argued that difficulties in industrialization were exac-
erbated by a legacy of primary commodity production in former colonies. 
Colonial economies, he claimed, were structured to promote the export of 
raw materials, while advanced economies were proficient in industrial pro-
duction. Because of the power of labour unions in industrial countries, 
and the ongoing technological development of substitutes for primary 
commodities, Prebisch argued that the value of primary exports compared 
to industrial imports was constantly decreasing—primary commodity pro-
ducers in less developed countries faced declining terms of trade. Myrdal 
(1968) similarly argued that highly industrialized countries could capture 
asymmetrical benefits from trade because their economies were more 
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internally integrated via forward and backward linkages. Realizing this, 
structuralists claimed that there existed a tendency for the highly industri-
alized economies of the core or centre to absorb the surplus value pro-
duced in the primary-commodity-producing periphery. This became 
known as the centre–periphery model (Kay 1989, pp. 29–31).
Inspired by the centre–periphery model, Prebisch (1950), Myrdal 
(1968), and other structuralists concluded that industrialization in the 
periphery was necessary in order to combat this problem. However, since 
they believed industrialization to be impossible in free markets, structural-
ists advocated for strong management of the process by the state. First, 
they argued in favour of import substitution industrialization (ISI)—
which required trade barriers to be erected which would protect 
government- supported businesses from international competition. When 
this programme was found wanting—particularly due to difficulties in 
higher levels of industrialization—the strategy was changed in favour of 
export promotion (Martinussen 1997).
Structuralist theory was generally economistic, apolitical, and acultural. 
An exception to this was the work of Myrdal (1968). Like the moderniza-
tion theorists, Myrdal cited different cultural traits and institutional forms 
that existed in poorer economies and were not perceived to be conducive 
to development. Attitudinal problems cited by Myrdal included lack of 
work ethic, lack of punctuality, lack of orderliness, irrationality, supersti-
tion, inadaptability, submissiveness to authority, and fatalism. Among the 
most problematic institutional structures was the “soft state” which, 
Myrdal argued, was unable to uphold the rule of law and could easily be 
exploited by powerful individuals and groups. Myrdal’s work spurred a 
move away from pristine economism in structural analysis and towards a 
more complex consideration of internal cultural and political conditions.
Dependency Theory
Perhaps inspired by Myrdal’s interdisciplinary analysis, dependency theo-
rists continued the critical tradition and pushed structuralism to encom-
pass more non-economic factors. This expansion of purview was achieved 
initially by incorporating theories of internal colonialism and marginality 
into structuralist economism. The internal colonialism thesis took special 
note of the racial and cultural character of structurization, noting that 
subordinate status often corresponded to membership in a particular eth-
nic group. This seemed to be especially true in Latin American countries 
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with large indigenous populations, such as Ecuador or Guatemala. The 
argument here was that, contrary to what Myrdal or the modernization 
theorists might say, the underdevelopment of particular ethnic groups is 
not due to cultural pathologies. Instead, this condition is actually a class- 
based domination that is simply more visible in particular populations 
because those groups have historically been subject to abnormal levels of 
exploitation. This exploitation has come because of internal unequal 
exchange relations with national elites, usually of European or mixed lin-
eage, as well as from unequal exchange in the international market system 
(Kay 1989, pp. 59–87; González-Casanova 1965, p. 33; Johnson 1972). 
The marginalization thesis similarly posited that modernization policies, 
whether free market or ISI, tended to marginalize particular populations 
within a country—excluding them from the benefits of development and 
exploiting them for the benefit of others (Kay 1989, pp. 88–125; Quijano 
1977; Germani 1972).
Andre Gunter Frank (1966) was the first dependency theorist to write 
in English and therefore presented the view from the South to Western 
development theorists for the first time. He challenged the modernization 
view that the development of underdeveloped countries “must and will be 
generated or stimulated by diffusing capital, institutions, values etc., to 
them from the international and national capitalist metropoles” (p. 18). 
Frank augmented centre–periphery theory by instead framing relations in 
terms of satellite and metropole. Metropoles include the advanced indus-
trial centres of Europe and North America, which establish major trading 
and industrial centres in less developed countries. Through unequal rela-
tionships of exchange, the latter are perpetually subordinated to the for-
mer. Just as was the case in the centre–periphery model, the consequence 
of this relationship is that “metropoles tend to develop and the satellites to 
underdevelop” (p. 22). Frank incorporates internal factors into his analysis 
by insisting that each of these satellites, in turn, acts as a regional metro-
pole. As he explains using the case of Latin America,
The metropolis-satellite relations are not limited to the imperial or interna-
tional level but penetrate and structure the very economic, political, and 
social life of the Latin American colonies and countries. Just as the colonial 
and national capital and its export sector become a satellite of the Iberian 
(and later of other) metropoles of the world economic system, this satellite 
immediately becomes a colonial and then a national metropolis with respect 
to the productive sectors and population of the interior. Furthermore, the 
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provincial capitals, which are themselves satellites of the metropolis … are in 
turn provincial centres around which their own local satellites orbit … 
[E]ach of the satellites … serves as an instrument to suck capital or eco-
nomic surplus out of its own satellites. (p. 19)
This thinking leads Frank, along with other dependency theorists, to 
some stark conclusions. First, he asserts that “underdevelopment is not 
due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital short-
age in regions that have remained isolate from world history” (p. 22). To 
the contrary, he argues, “underdevelopment was and still is generated by 
the very same historical process which also generated economic develop-
ment: the development of capitalism itself” (ibid.). Through historical 
analysis, Frank made the case that “the regions which are the most under-
developed and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest 
ties to the metropolis in the past” (p. 26). Conversely, “the satellites expe-
rience their greatest economic development … if and when their ties to 
the metropolis are the weakest” (p. 23). This, and similar analyses, led 
Frank and other of the more radical dependency theorists (Dos Santos 
1971; Amin 1976; Quijano 1977; Marini 1972; García 1972) to conclude 
that development could only occur with a delinking of the satellite from 
the metropole. More moderate dependency theorists such as Cardoso 
(1972), Sunkel (1969), and Furtado (1971) did not disagree with this 
basic framework, but nuanced it with a focus on internal conditions and 
insisted that development could occur while maintaining such links—
although this development will be characterized by a continuing inequal-
ity between the various satellites and metropoles.
Perhaps best thought of as an updated augmentation of dependency 
theory, world systems theory emerged as an increasingly dominant form of 
critical political economy by the end of the twentieth century. This theory 
is commonly associated with the work of Wallerstein (1974), and although 
it did not evolve explicitly out of dependency theory, key theorists such as 
Amin (1992) and Frank (1981) have adopted its mantle in their later 
work. Wallerstein (1974) argued that all economies since the sixteenth 
century must be analysed in relation to their position in a totalizing capi-
talist world system—to which there is no outside. To the structuralist 
dichotomy of centre–periphery, he added a semi-periphery, in describing 
the three relative positions in this system. The latter is useful to the func-
tion of the system because it divided the exploited—thus preventing large- 
scale revolt. Various political and social forms that are often interpreted as 
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being non-capitalist, are, he argued, expressions that represent the differ-
ent positions that each occupies within the world capitalist system. Even 
the socialist states of the Soviet Union, he claimed, were institutional reac-
tions designed to make the best of these countries’ relative positions.
Cardoso (1972) insists that colonial and neocolonial links had been 
forged with peoples who “were culturally independent and structurally 
did not have links with the Western world” (p. 172). For most depen-
dency theorists and world-systems theorists, it is these links, and not cul-
tural factors, that are the cause of underdevelopment. Indeed, this is the 
core claim in their critique of the cultural explanation inherent in modern-
ization theory. Gereffi (1994/2000), for example, follows Frank and 
Cardoso in downplaying cultural explanations, insisting that “the impact 
of cultural variables is most important in outlining an acceptable range of 
solutions to development problems, rather than in determining specific 
economic outcomes” (p.  233). Wallerstein (1979/2000) characterizes 
culture as epiphenomenal—explaining that “ethnic groups, or status 
groups, or ethno-nations are phenomena of world economies” (p. 201). 
As a result of the materialist bent that dependency and world-systems the-
ories inherited from Marxism then, culture is often either discounted as a 
factor and subsequently ignored altogether or characterized as epiphe-
nomenal—to be read-off of economic structures (Kapoor 2002).
There is, however, a substantial tradition of communication research 
that has drawn from dependency and world-systems perspectives. This lit-
erature is neo-Marxist in the critical political economy tradition and 
focuses on issues such as media imperialism (often generalized as cultural 
imperialism) and cultural homogenization (Tomlinson 1991). Schiller 
(1979), for example, argues that the massive media conglomerates of the 
industrialized countries provide the infrastructure that disseminates a 
global culture of capitalism. This media network encourages through its 
programming, a capitalist lifestyle of high consumption, and glorifies the 
trappings of capitalist modernity. In true Marxian form, Schiller argues 
that these media serve to encourage a commodity fetishism which serves 
the interest of capitalist production and blinds its victims to the true nature 
of their oppression. International media, he claims, act as “inseparable ele-
ments in a worldwide system of resource allocation generally regarded as 
capitalistic” (p.  30). These media, he continues, “create and reinforce 
their audiences’ attachment to the way things are in the world system 
overall” (ibid.). This involves the creation of audiences “whose loyalties 
are tied to brand named products and whose understanding of social 
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reality is mediated through a scale of commodity satisfaction” (p. 123). 
The end result is the formation of colonial subjects who venerate “the 
capitalist road to development” (p. 31). “The media,” he continues,
now many times more powerful and penetrative than in an earlier time, are 
the means that entice and instruct their audiences along this path, while at 
the same time concealing the deeper reality and the long term consequences 
that the course produces. (Ibid.)
Dorfman and Metellart (1975) claim that this represents a severe form 
of dependency—one in which former colonies become “exporters of raw 
materials and importers of superstructural and cultural goods” (p. 97). 
Dorfman and Mettelart offer the standard dependency critique by holding 
that, “to service our ‘monoproduct’ economies and provide urban para-
phernalia, we send copper, and they send the machines to extract copper” 
(ibid.). But the industrialized economies also send Coca-Cola—which 
Dorfman and Mettelart consider a cultural good. This makes dependency 
all the more insidious since, as they argue, “behind Coca-Cola stands a 
whole superstructure of expectations and models of behaviour, and with 
it, a particular kind of present and future society and an interpretation of 
the past” (ibid.). Consequently, cultural imports such as Coca-Cola and 
Disney cartoons are ingested by audiences in the developing world “as 
instruction in the way they are supposed to live and relate to the foreign 
power centre” (p. 98).
Salinas and Paldán (1979) reinforce the Marxist argument that cultural 
imperialism represents the imposition of a hegemonic ideology that pro-
motes the continued domination of those in the peripheral economies by 
those in the capitalist core. They argue that the cultural institutions such 
as education and media systems of dependent countries are modelled to 
serve “the requirements of dependent industrialization” (p. 92). Since this 
dependent industrialization requires obedient consumers and masses of 
poor to ensure low labour costs, cultural imperialism can amplify suffering 
in the Third World by offering a modern lifestyle and denying it at the 
same time. As some more affluent citizens of less developed countries may 
be able to live the life offered by the media, “others are submitted to levels 
of existence that prevent them from exercising minimal cultural rights” 
(p.  91). They experience “a poverty of culture” (ibid.). Furthermore, 
argue Salinas and Paládan, the imported culture tends to dominate the 
indigenous to the point that the latter is pushed to extinction—resulting 
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in cultural homogenization. Hamelink (1983) concurs with this homog-
enization thesis, offering that,
In the second half of the twentieth century, a destructive process … threat-
ens the diversity of cultural systems. Never before has the synchronization 
with one particular cultural pattern been of such global dimensions and so 
comprehensive. (p. 4)
As Salinas and Paldán (1979) have implied, many in the Third World 
have seen their culturally ascribed system of meaning eliminated by the 
power of international capital, only to be replaced by one that they cannot 
afford to participate in. So, it follows, they work in the factories and plan-
tations that are owned by transnational industrial capital, with the hopes 
that they will one day earn enough to participate in the new culture from 
which they are excluded. All the while, the dependency relationship is 
maintained—the businesses of the centre accrue increasing profits brought 
by unequal relations of material exchange mixed with asymmetrical cul-
tural power. Breaking this material structural relationship of exploitation 
is, in the end, largely thought to be a material practice. One who is hope-
ful for systemic change must wait in orthodox Marxism for the material 
relations of production to become unstable due to internal contradictions 
in the economic base. Culture, in the rigidly delineated Marxian tradition, 
often seems to be depicted as an epiphenomenon, a fetish, and an ideol-
ogy. This may be an artefact of strict delineation, however. Inspired by 
adventurous Marxian cultural thinkers such as Gramsci (1957/1971), 
Althusser (1971), and Williams (1977), for example, critical political 
economy approaches and cultural approaches have come to share an 
ambiguous and porous border.
Cultural aPProaChEs
Postcolonialism
Although much thinking in the critical political economy perspective 
accords most of the responsibility for the propulsion of history to the eco-
nomic base, Marxism did produce a significant strand that attributed a 
large amount of power to the ideological. As we discussed in the first 
chapter, Antonio Gramsci was perhaps the first Marxian thinker to suggest 
that social change may be incited via interventions in the ideological 
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realm—that cultural change could force systemic change. This insight was 
taken up with revolutionary fervour, first in anti-colonial struggle by 
Senghor (1956), Césaire (1953/1972), and Fanon (1952/1967), and 
then in opposition to forms of neocolonialism by Freire (1970), Said 
(1979), Bhabha (1986), and Spivak (1988), amongst others. The key 
tenet of this thought is as follows: “that representations and modes of per-
ception are used as fundamental weapons of colonial power to keep colo-
nized peoples subservient to colonial rule” (McLeod 2000, p. 17).
Perhaps the most thorough treatment of culture and its relation to 
human subjectivities in early postcolonialism appears in Frantz Fanon’s 
(1952/1967) Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon was primarily concerned 
with racism, which he perceived to be “a cultural element” (1967, 
p. 32). Racism, however, was the product of an entire colonial world-
view which was produced by the colonizer via language, and then inter-
nalized and reproduced by the colonized. Within the colonies, Fanon 
(1952/1967) argues,
there is a constellation of postulates, a series of propositions that slowly and 
subtly, with the help of books, newspapers, schools and their texts, adver-
tisements, films, radio, penetrate and individual—constituting the world- 
view of the group to which one belongs … that world-view is white because 
no black voice exists. (p. 152)
As the quotation suggests, Fanon utilizes a model in which human con-
sciousness, propensities, thoughts, and tastes are produced from without 
through the communicative innovation of language. Fanon (1952/1967) 
argues that the production of the human mind, with its beliefs, wants, and 
desires, “is not dependent on cerebral heredity; it is the result of … the 
unreflected imposition of culture” (p. 191). Once subsumed by the world-
view of the European, the colonial subject holds “the same fantasies as a 
European” (ibid.). This is not due to some stable and universal set of 
attitudes and wants endowed to every human; rather, it is because the 
colonial subject “partakes in the same collective unconscious as the 
European” (ibid.).
A psychoanalyst by training, Fanon broke with the tradition of Jung 
and Freud who tended to accord internal causes to psychological prob-
lems. Drawing more on Lacan, Fanon insisted that any neurosis experi-
enced by the colonized was cultural in origin. For him, there was no 
internal tension or conflict that was not a social one as well. As the 
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colonized subject internalized the values of liberal twentieth-century 
France, he internalized tension. Lifestyle promises and liberal ideals of 
equality were delivered with the message of racism. At the same time, 
colonized peoples became the receivers of culture—being robbed of the 
confidence and power to create and change it. Thus, the colonized culture 
“becomes closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yoke of oppres-
sion” (1967, p. 34). This runs contrary to the natural character of culture, 
“to be open, permeated by spontaneous, generous, fertile lines of force” 
(ibid.). Fanon claimed that the eventual result of this tension and rigidity 
would be a violent break that would result in both the decolonization of 
colonized territories and of colonized minds. Fanon advocated that new 
nations be formed which would be based on true equality and cultural 
creativity—in which colonial racist binaries would be dismantled.
Similarly, Paulo Freire (1970) holds that human consciousness and 
unconsciousness are produced communicatively through language. In this 
way, the economic domination of particular groups is conjoined with a 
cultural domination. As he argues,
The oppressor consciousness tends to transform everything surrounding it 
into an object of its domination. The Earth, property, production, the cre-
ations of people, people themselves—everything is reduced to the status of 
objects at its disposal… [A]t a certain point in their existential experience 
the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressors and their 
way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In 
their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, 
to imitate them, to follow them. (pp. 58–62)
This infusion of the tastes, beliefs, and ideas of the oppressor is deliv-
ered through multiple media, but Freire is most concerned with formal 
education. The “pedagogy of the oppressed,” which creates colonial sub-
jects, must, he argues, be replaced by a “pedagogy of liberation,” which 
involves the creation of a critical space in which the “reality” of this subju-
gation is “unveiled” and both student and teacher embark on the re- 
creation of knowledge (p. 69). In this way, the oppressed may chart their 
own emancipatory course from the domination of capitalist-liberal ideol-
ogy and racism, towards the regaining of their “humanity” (p. 44). Freire, 
Like Fanon, posits this humanity as a natural state of man, based in cul-
tural and material equality. The ideology of the oppressor is painted as a 
false consciousness, a fetish, a dominating ideology, as would be expected 
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with critical Marxist approaches. The difference here—the nuance that 
makes this a cultural approach—is that cultural relations based in racism 
and other forms of colonial domination are thought to be injurious in 
their own right, irrespective of material dependency. Furthermore, Both 
Freire and Fanon insist that colonialism and neocolonialism can be over-
turned by interventions in the cultural, even suggesting that such inter-
ventions are prerequisites to material emancipation.
The next stage in postcolonial thought was, in many ways, prefigured 
by the cultural analysis of Freire and Fanon. This was a turn to a post- 
structuralism which turned on the insistence that all meaningful human 
experience was made intelligible through language, and consequently, that 
tastes, thoughts, “material” needs, and ideas are collectively determined 
through culture. The autonomous self—the economic agent—was for the 
post-structuralists a decentred subject; a hollow space that is continuously 
colonized and given substance by multiple discourses that define what 
liberal philosophers had previously called “the individual.”
The form of post-structuralism that was imported into postcolonialism 
was based around the work of Michel Foucault (1980).1 Very similar to 
the Lacanian vision used by Fanon, the cultural world that is produced by 
language is thought by Foucault to structure the cognitive world of the 
individual, giving shape to his or her tastes, logics, and desires. Discourse, 
for Foucault, makes the world apprehendable by imbuing it with meaning. 
By making the world understandable in particular ways, discourse moti-
vates the actions and choices of individuals. Discourse itself is simultane-
ously discursively constructed, however, as Hall (2002, p. 60) explains:
Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But it is 
itself produced by a practice: “discursive practice”—the practice of produc-
ing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a 
discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social prac-
tices. (60)
These discourses, for both Hall and Foucault, are co-produced by many 
individuals—although the extent of an individual contribution to this pro-
duction is tightly correlated with power. Discourses, however, are not 
1 It should be noted that both Foucault and Derrida were heavily influenced by their expe-
riences during the Algerian War of Independence, which would have inevitably brought 
them into close contact with much early postcolonial thought—especially that of Fanon—as 
they formulated their ideas regarding the human experience (Alhassan 2007).
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thought to be closed systems (they are always adjusting to influences from 
without) and are relatively cohesive (never random), although they need 
not be completely internally consistent or conflict-free. The post- 
structuralist preoccupation with discourse differs from the use of culture 
by Fanon and Freire in that the latter maintains an underlying notion that 
colonial discourses serve to obscure a particular “truth” regarding subju-
gation. This is consistent with the Marxian concept of ideology. Post- 
structuralists argue, on the other hand, that, since the world can be given 
multiple meanings via discourse, a “fact” can be construed in different 
ways. The task of the social scientist, grassroots revolutionary, or the pol-
icy analyst, then, moves away from “deciding which social discourses are 
true or scientific, and which false or ideological” (Hall 2002, p. 62). What 
things come to count as true, for Foucault, is the outcome of a struggle 
for meaning that is weighted by power:
We should admit that power produces knowledge…. That power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation with-
out the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute … power relations.” (1980, p. 27)
Perhaps the most prominent post-structural work regarding colonial 
thought is Edward Said’s (1979) Orientalism. Said draws on Gramsci, 
Fanon, Foucault, and Lacan in arguing that the lived experience of Western 
subjects is produced partially by a discourse of Orientalism—a textually 
produced depiction of the world in which the peoples of the Global South 
are depicted as degenerate, traditional, and irrational. Said is careful to 
make clear that this discourse is not to be “mistaken as merely decorative 
or ‘superstructural’,” as is the case with the Marxian–Gramscian ideas of 
hegemony and ideology (p. 25); rather, that the authority it exudes “estab-
lishes canons of taste and value” (p. 19). The discourses of Orientalism 
help to produce the Western individual, complete with his or her prefer-
ences and assumptions about the world. Orientalism is tied to political 
interest for certain, but “it was the culture that created that interest,” not 
the interest that created the culture (p.  12). Said includes all forms of 
Western writing about the orient in this discourse, but also the messages 
included in the seemingly objective Western social sciences, such as 
economics.
Arguments related to postcolonialism are diverse and complex, and 
they do not suit the current purpose to delve deeply into this literature. 
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The post-structural insights discussed earlier, however, are important for 
our interest in culture, since they claim the individual to be a collective 
construct. Debates regarding the possibility of the subaltern to resist the 
totality of such discourses pertain to our interest in the concept of devel-
opment as well. This is the case, as it could be argued that since discourse 
can provoke feelings of diminishment while validating forms of material 
subjugation, moves to counter such discourses might be thought to rep-
resent development. Resistance is generally thought to imply development 
in the broadest sense in postcolonial works, and arguments run the gamut 
between those insisting that resistance is possible (Bhabha 1986; Appadurai 
2000; Banerjee 2002) or even ubiquitous, and those who suggest that it 
may be exceedingly difficult to break from such omnipresent discourses, if 
not impossible (Spivak 1988; Gates 1992).
Post-Development
If postcolonialism represents a critique of the cultural power exerted over 
the peoples of Global South through the discursive construction of 
weighted binaries such as West/rest and primitive/modern, post- 
development may be thought of as a refined strand of that critique. The 
linguistically constructed colonial binary at stake in post-development 
theory is that of developed/underdeveloped. Although much attention is 
given to Arturo Escobar’s (1994) doctoral dissertation Encountering 
Development as a founding text in the field, the discursive force of post- 
development thought was largely centred on edited readers by Sachs 
(1991) and by Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) as well.
In these works, the idea of development is attacked as a colonial dis-
course. Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) reprint a classic work by Sahlins 
in making the fundamental post-development argument that, in 
Sahlins’ words,
The world’s most primitive people have few possessions, but they are not 
poor. Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, not is it just a relation 
between means and ends; above all, it is a relation between people. Poverty 
is a social status. (p. 19)
Using this logic and basing his argument on historical interpretation, 
Sahlins argued that the assumptions of the nature of man and poverty that 
pervade Western thought—Marxist and especially liberal economic—make 
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little sense. When discussing an apparent indifference to poverty amongst 
hunters and gatherers, Sahlins holds,
[I]t seems wrong to say that wants are ‘restricted’, desires ‘restrained’, or 
even that the notion of wealth is ‘limited’. Such phrasings imply in advance 
an Economic Man and a struggle of the hunger against ones own worst 
nature, which is finally then substituted by a cultural vow of poverty…. 
[Rather], economic man is a bourgeois construction…. It is not that hunt-
ers and gatherers have curbed their materialistic ‘impulses’: they simply 
never made an institution of them. (p. 10)
Post-development theorists argue that development “experts” entered 
this milieu, propelled by and propelling the Eurocentric discourse of 
development. These experts, hailing from the West and privileged castes 
of the former colonies, began by using discourse to imply “abnormalities” 
such as “underdeveloped,” “malnourished,” “poor,” and illiterate” 
(Escobar 1999b, p. 322). To be “developed” came to imply “being like 
the West.” To be “underdeveloped” was to live in any other way. 
“Traditional” knowledges and ways of life were in this way devalued. 
Development discourse was internalized by many of the newly defined 
“poor” under the weight of the authoritative discursive power of Western- 
trained experts. These ideas of non-Western inferiority were institutional-
ized through the “professionalization” and “technification” of 
development. University departments and academic disciplines were 
established throughout the developed world, where experts sought to,
Establish the nature of Third World countries, to classify their problems and 
formulate policies, to pass judgement on them and visualize their future—to 
produce, in short, a regime of truth and norms about development…[;] a 
field of control of knowledge, through which truth (and, so, power) was 
produced. (Ibid., pp. 322–323)
With many similarities to Polanyi’s (1944) work, Escobar (1999a) 
argues that the discipline of development economics sits at the core of this 
discursive machine which,
must be analyzed within the context of the establishment of economics as a 
“positive,” “objective,” science, thanks in part to the development—during 
the past 200 years—of a culture in which a specific economic rationality … 
became dominant. This process, which one can perhaps call the 
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 “economization of life,” was intimately linked to the development of capi-
talism; it entailed as necessary prerequisites the establishment of the norma-
tive discourse of classical political economy. (Ibid., p. 323)
Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) describe development discourse as a cul-
tural viral infection. This virus, he argues, “penetrates into peoples’ 
minds,” propelled by “the school system, the production of addictive 
needs, and the dis-valuation of indigenous know-how” (p. 119). In human 
history, he argues, “‘economic’ man represents a novelty.”
He developed, indeed, in the womb of early capitalism, and his identity card 
could have been stamped with the words ‘white’, ‘European’ and ‘male’. Yet 
he took pride in proclaiming his ‘freedom’ from belonging to any particular 
tribe or community, roots or culture, village or oasis. He was an a-cultured, 
uniform and substitutable person. He perceived himself as an ‘individual’ 
rather than a ‘member of the community’. (p. 116)
Rahnema argues that the cultural beast, economic man, invaded colo-
nial and postcolonial societies, destroying “the basic institutions of local 
populations,” and that he did this “under the banner of development” 
(p. 118). It is through development discourse that,
homo economicus transforms all his prey into ‘economic men’, like himself, 
substituting their motives of subsistence and their sense of belonging to the 
community with those of gain and of full ‘individual freedom’. (p. 119)
Those who critique post-development thought often insist that it tends 
to romanticize poverty and tradition, or that it is hopelessly relativistic. 
Although it is not true that post-development theorists, or the post- 
structural theorists they based their work on (Foucault, Derrida), acted 
without ethics, it does seem that their theoretical construct left little space 
within which to formulate one. The strength of the post-development cri-
tique of cultural and material imperialism, it seems, may have been bought, 
at least initially, at the expense of any sense of progress. Post- structural 
assertions that humans engage the world through a largely self- referential, 
ever-evolving, system of symbols leave themselves open to a critique of 
cultural reductionism that denies a real material world. The assertion that 
human values are based in such symbolic systems, similarly, has led to cri-
tiques of relativism. Consequently, caricatures of post-structuralism and 
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post-development conjure a theory in which human reality can be changed 
by pure imagination, even the most atrocious abuses and inequalities can 
be justified through appeals to culture, and one in which there is simply no 
such thing as development (Rao and Walton 2004; Pieterse 2000).
Cultural PolitiCal EConomy
If it were ever true that post-development theorists failed to transcend 
mere relativistic critique and to forward a substantive ethic with which to 
conceive social progress, this problem did not last long. Conversely, if 
political economy approaches to development tended to be irredeemably 
materially reductionist during the twentieth century, recognition of the 
autonomy and co-determining power of culture became prevalent into the 
twenty-first century. In this section, I propose that, as a result of these 
movements, a meaningful theoretical conversation has taken place between 
cultural and critical political economy approaches in development studies. 
With contributions from both the culturalists and the political economists, 
I suggest that this dialogue represents the emergence of a cultural political 
economy of development.
This is not to deny, for example, that there is a valid and relevant post- 
development school that contains a subtle, non-relativistic critique that is 
not mired in cultural reductionism. Nor is it meant to suggest that the 
political economy of development has not incorporated cultural insights 
meaningfully into its analysis. The category of cultural political economy 
is evoked here to recognize that much of the more sophisticated political 
economy work and more recent permutations of post-development have 
become strikingly similar—that the schools have converged.
Pieterse (2000) perhaps began the move from the culturalist side by 
insisting that the focus of the post-development critique is really on mod-
ernization theory and the system of development that emerged in the 
post-WWII period, instead of against the idea of development itself. He 
also claims that most post-development theorists do not succumb to 
romanticism and relativism, but partake in a “reflexive development, in 
which a critique of science is viewed as part of development politics” 
(2000, p. 343). Consistent with Pieterse’s claims, many post-development 
theorists have advocated the support of grass-roots “new” social move-
ments based on gender and other forms of identity as well as class, and 
participatory forms of development interventions, policy formulation, and 
research, instead of technocratic economistic “top-down” development 
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plans instituted by governments and transnational institutions (Nelson 
and Wright 1995; Alvarez et al. 1998).
Pieterse’s assertions may well be true, but they are based in observa-
tions of the praxis of post-development thinkers, not on any theoretical 
advancement that transcends the relativist trap. Through the advancement 
of what Escobar (2007) calls the “Latin American modernity/coloniality 
(MC) research program” (p.  179), however, it has increasingly been 
argued that a modern-style ethic of equality is not necessarily discordant 
with a cultural approach. Based largely on the writings of Dussel (1980), 
this school insists first that it is arrogant to assume that modernity was 
solely a European construction and therefore has little to do with pristine 
cultures that sit somewhere outside its borders. Second, while Dussel 
claims his theory to be posmodern, and later transmodern (2012), he 
insists that this does not imply an idealist world divorced from material-
ity—rather a cultural world that operates in relation to a material world 
which, nonetheless, must be symbolically interpreted to have meaning to 
human actors.
This theoretical innovation buys post-development theorists much in 
the way of theoretical buttressing for their already existent praxis. 
“Transmodernity” implies first that there is no outside of modernity in 
current global semiotic structures, but there are margins from which cul-
tural innovation can, and does, emerge. This concept is accomplished by 
“locating the origins of modernity with the Conquest of America and the 
control of the Atlantic after 1492, rather than the most commonly 
accepted landmarks such as the Enlightenment or the end of the eigh-
teenth century” (Escobar 2007, p. 184). This allows a “world perspective 
in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a view of modernity as an intra- 
European phenomenon” (ibid.). This process did not occur without 
asymmetries of power, however, as “the domination of others outside the 
European core” and the “subalternization of the knowledge and cultures 
of these other groups” typified the process in which modernity was con-
structed (ibid.). As a result of this line of thought, one can continue to 
prescribe to a post-structuralism, or post-developmentism, while main-
taining a commitment to modern virtues such as equality, human rights, 
and democracy widely construed.
Material and economic dimensions are not diminished in this perspec-
tive. The project, Escobar (2007) argues, has been undertaken with “a 
persistent attention to colonialism and the making of the capitalist world 
as constitutive of modernity” which “includes a determination not to 
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overlook the economy and its concomitant forms of exploitation” (p. 184). 
Modernity, then, was co-built globally by colonizers and colonized, but 
with a Eurocentrism that was underwritten by military and economic 
power. This does not mean, however, that other forms of thought do not 
have interpolating power in this constellation. Development, in fact, 
requires an equalization of this interpolating power via
the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located 
in the South, raises, demanding the right to live, the right to develop their 
own culture, economy, politics, etc. … There is no liberation without ratio-
nality, but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation 
of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of domi-
nation. (Dussel and Mendieta 1996, pp. 31 & 36)
Nearly simultaneous to this theoretical move from relativism and ide-
alism on the part of the post-structuralists has come a meaningful attempt 
by critical political economists of development to move beyond the 
depiction of culture as mere materially determined ideology. Central to 
this is the work of Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum (2001), who embrace “the 
post- disciplinary ‘cultural turn’ for rethinking political economy” 
(p. 92). This involves supplementing Marxism with a “discursive account 
of power” which,
involves the claim that the interests at stake in relations of power are signifi-
cantly shaped by the discursive constitution of identities, modes of calcula-
tion, strategies and tactics and not just by the so-called ‘objective’ position 
of specific agents in a given conjuncture (as if they existed outside of dis-
course); and also [an admission that] that the primary institutional mecha-
nisms in and through which power is exercised, whether directly or indirectly, 
themselves involve a variable mix of discursive and material resources. 
Another key feature [concerns] … emphasis on the social construction of 
knowledge and truth regimes. (p. 93)
This embracing of the cultural is, however, “subject to certain modifi-
cations that re-assert the importance of the materiality of political econ-
omy” (ibid., p. 92). Central to this is an emphasis on “the materiality of 
social relations and the constraints involved in processes that also operate 
‘behind the backs’ of the relevant agents,” as well as on the historically 
contingent evolutionary nature of cultural and other institutions (ibid., 
p. 94). Resultantly, Jessop and Sum claim that this new political economy 
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can “escape the sociological imperialism of pure social constructionism 
and the voluntarist vacuity of certain lines of discourse analysis, which 
seem to imply that one can will anything into existence in and through an 
appropriately articulated discourse” (ibid.).
What I would like to suggest here is that the simultaneous intellectual 
augmentations of the post-structuralists and the critical political econo-
mists described earlier have resulted in the inadvertent cohabitation of a 
new school of development thought cultural political economy.2 This 
school has four main features. First, although it recognizes the discursive 
constitution of meaning, the school emphasizes the path-dependent 
nature of linguistic structure—another world is possible, but any world is 
not possible, since all worlds are only imaginable through the use of 
already existent semiotic tools. Second, a material, natural world exists 
outside of culture, although to be made intelligible, it must be discursively 
interpreted. Third, cultural political economy features a commitment to 
an egalitarian ethic in both cultural and material terms (although it recog-
nizes both these terms to be little more than abstractions since they are 
coterminous). Fourth, cultural political economy is interdisciplinary—this 
has meant engagement with political economy, cultural studies, anthro-
pology, geography, linguistics, and sociology, but not as of yet with neo-
classical economics.
The emergence of cultural political economy (CPE) has not simply 
been an academic pursuit. A cultural political economy approach to devel-
opment has also been championed by indigenous groups at global, 
national, and local scales (Mander and Tauli-Corpuz 2006). As Blaser, 
Feit, and McRae (2004) have elucidated in an edited volume that contains 
contributions from indigenous leaders, such groups have often rejected 
modernizationist, neoliberal, externally devised, as well as state- or 
corporate- led development initiatives. Focus has been placed by indige-
nous peoples on the realization of life projects (as opposed to development 
projects) that emphasize local culturally situated values and goals, solidarity 
and self-governance. Life projects, according to Blaser, Feit, and McRae, 
do not, however, distil to a simple romanticization of imagined traditional 
lifestyles and outright rejection of ideas related to economic growth, 
development, or social progress. Although the culturally situated nature of 
human values and lifestyles is forefronted, indigenous groups also seek 
2 This term is explicitly used by Jessop and Sum and also by Best and Paterson (2007), 
although the latter do not apply the theory specifically to development issues.
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material advancement and the acquisition of productive resources—pri-
marily of land—in a struggle for subsistence. Blaser, Feit, and McRae show 
that assertions related to the primacy of culture coexist in indigenous poli-
tics with appeals to universal rights. Furthermore, locally situated projects 
and politics in indigenous communities are linked inextricably to broader 
international solidarity and environmental movements.
CulturE and sustainablE dEvEloPmEnt
A cultural political economy approach to development brings together 
theoretical understandings with praxis just as it allows the co-determined 
nature of material and cultural elements. One of the areas where CPE can 
be seen most vividly is in the area of sustainable development. Well before 
the Club of Rome’s (Meadows et al. 1972) assertion that there are envi-
ronmental limits to development defined strictly as increasing income per 
capita, a tension between economic development and the natural environ-
ment had been noted. Polanyi (1944) spent much time, for example, 
describing the environmental catastrophe that was apparent in the 
eighteenth- century economy.
The Brundtland et al. (1987) report formalized this dilemma, using the 
term “sustainable development” to describe “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs.” The integration of a CPE approach (along 
with the strong voices of postcolonial and indigenous movements) requires 
us to question just what this “development” is that is to be “sustained.” 
Nurse (2006) produced an insightful contribution by insisting that culture 
be made a “pillar” of sustainable development. By this, he meant that we 
must understand how culture frames both the production and consump-
tion side of development. On the consumption side, we must not assume 
to know what the end point of human flourishing is. This opens the door 
to a grounded redefinition of “the good life” from indigenous and other 
perspectives. On the production side, this suggests that that there are mul-
tiple social practices, actions, and understandings that might produce this 
development.
As Blaser et al. (2004) and others have documented, indigenous peo-
ples have taken a leading role formulating this new form of sustainable 
development. This often involves the evocation of indigenous “life proj-
ects” that break substantively and ontologically from the mainstream con-
cept of “development.” A less radical break from mainstream development 
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is present in the use and valuing of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) 
by mainstream developmental and ecological organizations. For example, 
the International Panel on Climate Change attempts to integrate TEK 
into its analyses and policy prescriptions, and the Canadian government 
proposes the use of the intimate ecological knowledge of indigenous peo-
ples in the service of environmental impact assessment. Such uses of TEK 
are laudable for their admission of the value of indigenous knowledge, but 
tend to view such knowledge as a resource to be used by non- indigenous 
agencies to achieve their policy or measurement goals—not as a valuable 
cultural and ontological contribution to the redefinition of the meaning of 
developmental and human–environment relations.
A CPE approach allows us to engage with grounded struggles for 
meanings and material resources implicated when indigenous groups 
assert their power to redefine the meaning of development itself. It also 
allows an engagement with the breaking of the human–nature binary that 
is implied by indigenous worldviews. The hope embodied in a CPE 
approach is that sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, indige-
nous peoples, and economists may be able to use it as a meeting place 
within which they can form mutual understandings that could lead to 
positive change in collaboration with indigenous peoples. The necessity of 
sustainability mandates that this change be embedded in a flourishing 
ecosystem.
ConClusion
The work undertaken in the last two chapters began with a claim that 
there exists an uncomfortable silence between cultural and political econ-
omy approaches to development on one side, and neoclassical economic 
approaches on the other. After reviewing the intellectual history of devel-
opment thinking from the eighteenth century onwards, it is apparent that 
this failure of communication is the consequence of old disciplinary com-
mitments that have become entrenched due to both methodological expe-
dience and ideological convenience.
For classical political economists beginning with Smith and continuing 
in varying degrees through to Mill, considerations of culture and ethics 
were common. These considerations were held separate from economic 
analysis in all cases, due to a methodological need to assume Smith’s self- 
interested, atomistic personal-gain-maximizing actor—homo eco-
nomicus—as the primal unit for economic analysis. Only with the 
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assumption of homo economicus would Smith’s metaphor of the self- 
regulating market with its invisible hand make analytical sense. Questions 
of culture and ethics, although extremely prevalent in the works of the 
classical political economists, were considered separately so as not to inter-
fere with the elegant functioning of early economic models. It should not 
be forgotten, however, as Polanyi (1944) has argued, that the segregation 
of economic and cultural/ethical realms, and the obfuscation of the latter, 
served the ideological interest of a powerful merchant colonial class whose 
power rested on the institutionalization of private property rights and 
market-based economies in the eighteenth century.
These interests and methodological expediencies continued and became 
solidified through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Especially sig-
nificant in this regard was the marginal revolution which completed the 
amputation of culture from economy. This was achieved via the method-
ological adoption of differential calculus which allowed for the mathema-
tization of economics and the disciplines’ subsequent ascendance to 
become the “queen of the social sciences.” All the while, it must be 
remembered, lingering class interests exerted their ideological pressures 
on the refining of economic thought.
The recognition of cultural difference that accompanied attempts to 
“develop” newly emergent postcolonial nations in the post-WWII period 
posed a particular problem for economic theory. The culturally situated 
actions of peoples of non-European descent did not fit the prerequisites of 
the economic model. Neoclassical economists responded with a proclama-
tion that traditional culture in the former colonies was exerting a pressure 
on economic actors in those regions that caused them to behave irratio-
nally. This prompted a temporary alliance with certain sociologists who 
were enlisted to identify particular cultural pathologies of traditional soci-
eties and to devise plans for the cultural cure. They were to then deliver 
fully formed homo economici to the economists so that the latter could 
finally actualize their technocratic development plans. Although this 
seemed to be a period of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, it could be 
more accurately described as disciplinary specialization which saw sociolo-
gists act in the service of waiting neoclassical economists—subservient 
social scientists paying discursive homage to the “queen.”
With the advent of new classical economics, this interdisciplinary 
arrangement was terminated. For the Chicago School economists of this 
tradition all people were considered rational; culture was therefore largely 
irrelevant, and so was the work of other social scientists. It was 
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(non- cultural) institutional change that was needed to allow the benefits 
of self- interest to fruitfully accrue, not some sort of cultural engineering. 
Free markets were the order of the day. It was presumed that rational 
actors in the Global South would act efficiently within a market-centric 
institutional setting.
New institutional economists went further in the depreciation of cul-
ture vis-à-vis homo economicus as they came to recognize culture as the 
result of the self-interested action of stable (in their preferences) economic 
actors. Culture was one of many possible strategic constructions of maxi-
mizing automatons in the face of market failures caused by the existence 
of public goods and associated externalities. Nonetheless, the idea of path- 
dependency revived modernization theory as it was argued that the once- 
efficient cultural institutions could become suboptimal equilibriums as 
technology and other institutional factors change. New institutionalism 
resultantly invited the intervention of technocrats to legislate between 
good and bad, efficient and inefficient, culture—supporting the former, 
while dissuading the latter.
Critical political economists from Marx in the nineteenth century, 
through to Frank and Wallertstein in the twentieth century, maintained a 
scepticism towards liberal economics. These thinkers deftly brought atten-
tion to the ways in which free-market economies tended to exacerbate 
inequalities and perpetuate class-based and colonial domination. Culture, 
however, became separated from, and marginalized in comparison to, 
what was considered to be a determinant material sphere. This material 
reductionism was countered by postcolonial and post-development cul-
turalism. These theorist tended to err in the other direction, however, 
leaving themselves open to critiques of idealism, cultural reductionism, 
and excessive relativism.
The seemingly incommensurable divide between culturalists and criti-
cal political economists has recently been bridged through the advent of 
various approaches to cultural political economy. By insisting that moder-
nity and the associated ethic of equality were co-produced by colonizers 
and colonized, and that there was no outside of this cultural formation—
just difference at the margins—modernity/coloniality theorists such as 
Dussel and Escobar escaped the relativist trap. This idea has been increas-
ingly referred to a transmodernity. Similarly, through an insistence that a 
material extra-cultural world existed, yet must be interpreted symbolically, 
they countered critiques of idealism. Simultaneously, attempts have been 
made by political economists to take culture seriously by introducing a 
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discursive concept of power and admitting that the cultural and material 
are co-determining. The familiar intellectual quagmire of relativistic ideal-
ism was avoided through an appeal to the path-dependent nature of 
human language, material constructions, and lived experience. Cultural 
political economy, it seems, represents a powerful collaborative project of 
the cultural and critical political economy schools as well as grassroots, 
especially indigenous, movements.
Communication and cooperation between these groups and neoclassical 
economists has been much more problematic. The methodological pre-
sumption of egoistic, atomistic human actors with stable preference sets 
seems to preclude any fruitful exchange between neoclassical economists 
and culturalists. The tendency of neoclassical economists to uncritically val-
orize and reify markets does not sit well with critical political economists. 
The most coherent attempt to contribute to cultural political economy from 
the neoclassical side has come through the capability approach. Perhaps due 
to the difficulty of this theoretical challenge, however, this approach has 
yielded a large portion of ambiguity. As a result, the incentive for academic 
neoclassical economists, as well as those in bilateral and multilateral institu-
tions, has been to borrow from the capability approach piecemeal. This 
implies the use of broader indicators of development—such as the Human 
Development Index—for the measurement of development, or the use of 
participatory approaches to facilitate the implementation of projects that 
have largely been designed by the economists, or other technocrats, them-
selves. As a result, the very parts of the capabilities approach that may reso-
nate with cultural political economists—such as the encouragement of 
genuine grassroots participation, the challenging of power structures, and 
the recognition of multiple definitions of development—tend to be culled 
by neoclassical economists (Bebbington et al. 2004).
This book represents an attempt to breach the communication gap 
between critical political economists and culturalists on the one side, and 
neoclassical development economists on the other. This is to be done via 
an integration of indigenous concepts of sustainable development into 
development theory. The undertaking is not meant to displace or discredit 
the capabilities approach, but to work towards clarifying it. Such work will 
entail a contribution to cultural political economy that begins with the 
neoclassical approach. To be consistent with a cultural political economy 
approach, this would imply an inductive empirically grounded exploration 
which privileges the local knowledge of the marginalized—in this case, 
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CHAPTER 6
Origins of a Maya Sustainable Development 
Movement
Urry (2005) argues that humans and their associated social formations are 
best viewed as “‘transitory hardenings’ in the more basic flows of massive 
amounts of minerals, genes, diseases, energy, information and language” 
(p. 7). To be consistent with the complexity theory to which Urry sub-
scribes, these hardenings, although transitory, are not arbitrary. The human 
and social forms that are constructed of basic material, cultural, and energy 
flows arise from particular histories which cannot be arbitrarily replaced. 
Everything comes from somewhere—the current forms and future trajec-
tories of human and social forms are dependent on their physical and cul-
tural histories (Prigogine 1997; Oldridge 2003; Urry 2005). In order to 
best understand the ideas of “development” that have hardened amongst 
Latin America’s indigenous peoples, it would be helpful to look first at 
their situation amidst a historical sea of discursive and material flows. This 
is the goal of this chapter. By way of entry, I will be describing the work, 
position, and thought of one Maya indigenous organization called El 
Centro Pluricultual para la Democracia. Understanding El Centro is 
important because it is the primary organization in Guatemala that has 
explicitly tasked itself with the creation and promotion of an indigenous 
idea of sustainable development. This development theory is called cultur-
ally sustainable development (CSD) by the practitioners at El Centro. In 
looking at the idea of CSD, and the position of El Centro, we can begin to 
understand the logic of Maya ideas of development in Guatemala, and 
indigenous ideas of sustainable development in Latin America in general.
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Since the idea of development that is utilized by El Centro is communi-
catively produced by its members, however, I would suggest that we must 
not look at the organization as an individual form, but as a Habermasian 
(1984, 1989) public sphere—a conglomeration of human communication 
in which certain ideas of the world are negotiated, argued, and com-
bined—likely amidst certain types of power asymmetries and incomplete 
access to information (Durham-Peters 1993). The constituting flows that 
form the histories of the members of the organization come into contact 
at El Centro, and some of these are favoured, while others are shunned. 
Just as the organization is an actor that produces discourses which reso-
nate with and militate against a larger discursive formation of global 
thought on development and progress, it has its own internal discursive 
negotiating process.
It may be true in many cases that the individuals that make up the orga-
nization arrived as products of similar experience with like minds to pro-
duce a cohesive idea of what development is and how to get it. But ideas 
are formed in this location as well. Maria, one of the central members of 
the organization, serves as a good example in this respect. She was trained 
as a social worker in San Carlos University in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, 
coming into contact with various liberal, Marxian, and anti-modern texts. 
She also takes with her the experience of being an urban indigenous 
woman in the Western Highlands. But her ideas were more fully formed 
by interaction with members of El Centro. As she explains, “here in El 
Centro, there were also many readings and documents of indigenous peo-
ples and this also created [in me] ways of thinking about the problems 
that exist.”
The work to be done in this chapter, then, is to map out the constitut-
ing structures and experiences that help to generate the ideas that are 
expressed at El Centro—to locate it within the tracks of local history and 
culture, but also within a field of international discourse. But throughout 
this process, it is important to remain cognizant of internal dynamics and 
favoured texts as well. The model we must employ here is one in which, 
first, El Centro is created by multiple fields of discourse and experience. 
Second, this discourse and experience is interpreted and reformed inter-
nally through communication. And, third, the ideas generated within El 
Centro are exported in a number of ways as they begin to interact with the 
very fields of discourse and remembered experience that had worked to 
constitute El Centro in the first place. This model will be kept in mind as 
we discuss the importance of Guatemalan national history, recent global 
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tendencies, and the importance of Maya cosmovision in relation to the poli-
tics and ideas of El Centro. There is no space here to discuss all the nuances 
of Guatemalan history or Maya cosmovision. Nor will it be possible to 
address the multiple debates and fissures that appear in literature regard-
ing the global tendencies that will be discussed. The goal here is to simply 
provide enough information to help foster the beginnings of an under-
standing of the situation of El Centro amidst all of these co-causal factors. 
It is hoped that this will assist in the understanding of the Maya theory of 
sustainable development that will be elaborated in the following chapter.
Guatemalan History
Following the categorization put forth by Gere and MacNeill (2008) and 
MacNeill (2014), the history of Guatemala will be divided into five peri-
ods in this discussion. These will be the early colonial period (1518–1821), 
the arguably postcolonial1 period of exclusive nationalism (1821–1945), 
the Ten Years of Spring (1945–1954), La Violenca (1970s–1980s), and the 
postwar period (1990s–present). As with all historical categorizations, 
these periods are somewhat arbitrary. They will do, however, for the cur-
rent purpose of temporally locating the work of El Centro. It also should 
be remembered that although the most current historical periods figure 
the largest in the felt personal experience of the members of the organiza-
tion, older periods are presumed to have their own weight—albeit indi-
rectly—on the constitution of El Centro.
Early Colonialism
One cannot overstate the multiple impacts of early colonization on the 
lives, livelihoods, and cultures of the Americas and of Europe (Galeano 
1973). The most important observation about this period for our current 
purpose, however, is that this was the era in which the peoples of what 
later became called the Americas met their collective Other. Columbus 
first called the collective peoples of the Americas “indio,” quite famously 
and unwittingly in 1492 (Montejo 2005, p. 2). And especially with the 
invasion of Central America by Pedro de Alvarado in 1523, peoples of 
Maya descent, who had previously thought of themselves as Mam, Tzutijil, 
1 Most members of El Centro would argue that Guatemala is still a colonized territory, 
dominated by colonial Iberian culture and by the economic power of transnational capital.
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or K’iche’ amongst others, became collectively referred to as Indio by the 
white-skinned, bearded colonizers (Galeano 1973; Fischer and 
Hendrickson 2003). The native, or Indio, category became at this time 
counterpoised with the Spanish, the European, and this categorization 
became, to various degrees, internalized by the old inhabitants of the New 
World (Montejo 2005). With the dual dynamics of intermarriage and a 
racialized political economy of status, the names attached to this binary 
eventually changed in popular discourse. In Guatemala, ladino—a genetic 
mix of Spanish and “Indio” blood—became the dominant category which 
was juxtaposed with the subservient Indigenous in Guatemala. This rela-
tionship was nuanced by the existence of a very small but extremely eco-
nomically, culturally, and politically powerful third category of virtually 
pure Spanish descent (Montejo 2005; Casaus Arzú 1995).
The racialized domination and exploitation of Latin America, in gen-
eral, and Guatemala in specific, has been well documented (Galeano 
1973). Disease and conquest reduced the population of the Americas by 
up to 90% during the sixteenth century (Diamond 1997), as the content 
was gutted of its natural resources (Galeano 1973). In Guatemala, colo-
nial administration was officially to follow a two republics model, as indig-
enous peoples were allowed their own form of governance alongside an 
imposed Spanish system (Wittman and Geisler 2005). The seeming accep-
tance of indigenous culture and governance structure was, however, hardly 
genuine. As Wittman and Geisler (2005) argue, “the colonial Guatemalan 
government sought to overrule local law and custom and to gain access to 
indigenous lands and forests early on” (p. 64). Much formerly commu-
nally held territory was expropriated in the name of the crown, and much 
of this, in turn, was converted to private ownership (ibid.). Still, more 
than half of the land in Guatemala remained under communal control by 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Davis 1997, pp. 13–15) and, as 
Wittman and Geisler suggest, “much current pressure for indigenous 
community rights in Guatemala is a continuation of the struggle to pro-
tect communal lands from long-standing expropriation, privatization, and 
nationalization” (p. 64).
The complexity of administrative institutions in the Western Highlands 
deserves a more detailed discussion. At the time of conquest, the indige-
nous population was divided into a number of Parcialidades. This was the 
Spanish colonial term for chinamit or molab—which were, “administrative 
units of 300–600 people and varying amounts of associated territory” 
(Hill 1989, p.  173). Each parcialidad was usually administered by an 
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“aristocratic core family assisted by a council of elders and a staff of mes-
sengers” (Ibid.). Since the time of early conquest, argue the members of 
El Centro, these Alcaldias comunales—communal mayorships—have 
become increasingly democratic to the point that their elections now 
involve nearly 100 percent participation rates of men, women, and chil-
dren. Now, the alcaldes comunales (communal mayors), for example, are 
elected for one to two years and are unpaid for the work they do in their 
position. The alcaldia communal of each parcialidad was responsible for 
all political, juridical, and administrative functions in the community 
(Barrios 1988). A higher level of governance—an amaq’ coordinated the 
activities of the alcaldias and worked to resolve disputes between parciali-
dades (Hill 1989).
Despite the official discourse of two republics, the colonizers sought 
almost immediately to replace the parcialidades and alcaldias with a 
Spanish-style system of municipalities (Hill 1989; Wittman and Geisler 
2005). Attempts to combine parcialidades and move populations into 
townships which served as municipal centres were common. The munici-
pal administration was, as could be expected, ultimately designed to serve 
the interest of ladino and Spanish elites and the colonial power (Ibid.). 
Many of these moves were connected with attempts to exert colonial con-
trol over territory as well as juridical control over populations (Ibid.). 
Largely through creative interaction with Spanish colonial law, and the 
increasing sympathies of some colonial administrators, the alcaldias man-
aged to maintain the significance of their institution—perpetuating the 
relevance of the idea of two republics despite colonial intentions (Barrios 
1988; Hill 1989). Not all parcialidades and alcaldias have survived, how-
ever, and those which have, are endowed with varying amounts of legiti-
macy. In some of Guatemala’s 331 municipalities such as Sacapulas and 
Totonicapan, the alcaldia communal remains strong, whereas in Tecpan, 
for example, the institution is virtually non-existent (Hill 1989; Wittman 
and Geisler 2005). As will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, 
the current work of El Centro is an extension of conflict and negotiation 
between modern/colonial administrative power and communal/indige-
nous governance institutions.
Exclusive Nationalism
Attempts of marginalization of indigenous culture and institutions, as well 
as economic domination of indigenous communities, continued through 
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the period of exclusive nationalism (1821–1945). The postcolonial experi-
ence of most former colonies has tended to be typified by national projects 
of development that sought to institute a modern capitalist economy 
mediated by interventions from equally modern nation-state (Tucker 
1999). Especially from the late nineteenth century onwards in Guatemala, 
this implied, “an exclusive nationalism … [that] did not recognize or 
respect the cultural diversity of the country’s Mayan-speaking indigenous 
population” (Davis 2004, p.  330). Economically, the country’s almost 
entirely agrarian economy was typified by a structural dualism which 
involved the exploitation of indigenous land and labour for capitalist agri-
cultural development based on export (Ibid.). During this period, 
Guatemala’s political and military elites ruled the country in tyrannical 
and dictatorial fashion and considered indigenous peoples to represent 
backwardness and superstition. Indigeneity, for the economic, cultural, 
and political powers in the country, was the antonym of progress, and 
therefore indigenous culture, language, and institutions were to be 
absorbed, marginalized, or otherwise eliminated (Ibid.). The attempted 
elimination of such elements included continued attacks on traditional 
social organization around the alcaldia communal and parcialidad 
(Barrios 1988).
Ten Years of Spring
This dynamic was systematically challenged for the first time during the 
Ten Years of Spring (1945–1954). With the ousting from office of President 
Ubico in 1944, constitutional and agrarian reforms were initiated in the 
interest of Guatemala’s indigenous peoples for the first time in history 
(Davis 2004). Political activism was also encouraged amongst the indige-
nous population, and national leadership of all ethnic groups pushed 
towards a more substantive multicultural democracy. The presidents pre-
siding over this transition—Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz—were 
determined to address material equalities and to open up political space 
for dissent and other forms of participation (Davis 2004). Public consulta-
tions were held in a process of drafting a new national constitution which:
outlawed all forms of discrimination (Article 21); called for the providing of 
adequate housing, sanitation and working conditions for “indigenous work-
ers” (Article 67) … and provided for government recognition and protec-




Both the presidents in this period attempted to carry out substantial land 
reforms—redistributing largely unused portions of the holdings of large 
landowners to indigenous populations who generally had holdings that 
were, on average, too small even for subsistence farming (Davis 2004; 
Handy 1984). These political and economic reforms stimulated a blos-
soming of indigenous, worker, and campesino political participation as 
“urban and rural unions abounded; congress pulsated with activity; [and] 
the press criticized freely” (Handy 1984, p.  123). It was in this time, 
Adams (2004) argues, that Guatemala’s indigenous peoples “began to 
recognize that social change was possible” (p. 158).
Not all groups were happy about these changes, however. These mea-
sures were perceived as a threat to both wealthy ladino landowners and 
foreign multinationals. The United Fruit Company (UFCO), in particu-
lar, had been given large tracts of land and government cooperation in 
labour force suppression by the ousted Ubico dictatorship. The company 
viewed the reforms during the Ten Years of Spring as “an assault on free 
enterprise” (CIA 1993, p.  16). The United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) characterized the Guatemalan government as “communist” 
and feared that the country would “become a central point for the dis-
semination of anti-US propaganda” (ibid. p. 18). Eventually, enormous 
countervailing pressure led by ladino elites and UFCO—with substantial 
support from the US government and the CIA—toppled the democratic 
government and rescinded its policies via a military coup which forced the 
resignation of Arbenz in 1954 (Davis 2004). Following this, US President 
Eisenhower triumphantly claimed that, “in Guatemala, the people of the 
region rose up and rejected the communist doctrine” (Immerman 1982, 
p. 178). The truth was that foreign and elite interests had conspired to 
oust a democratically elected centre-left government and replaced it with 
corporatist dictatorship (Ibid.).
The Violence
The thirty-two-year war that followed the 1954 coup—a period com-
monly referred to as La Violencia—was waged between a string of 
American-supported despotic military regimes and the left-wing insur-
gents of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and later the Unidad Nacional 
Revolucionaria Guatemalteca (UNRG). It was the indigenous popula-
tion, however, that bore the brunt of the violence (Warren 1998; Davis 
2004). Caught between the opposing forces of the two European 
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modernizationist ideologies of capitalism and socialism, the indigenous 
population was often—sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly—
associated with the socialist insurgents. As a result, during La Violencia, 
the national army inflicted severe damage on indigenous communities 
(Davis 2004; Warren 1998).
La Violencia was the longest and deadliest civil conflict in the Central 
American region. It took the lives of over 200,000 unarmed civilians, 
most of whom were indigenous, and most (but not all) of these lives were 
taken by national army troops (Treat 2002; Jonas 1996). The anti- 
communist military doctrine of the Guatemalan government increasingly 
became anti-indigenous. This is evident in the 1983 statement of one of 
the last despots, General Mejía Víctores, who bluntly stated, “we must get 
rid of the words ‘Indigenous’and ‘Indian’” (Wilson 1999, p. 27). This was 
attempted systematically as the public sphere was shut down, dissent was 
frozen, social exclusion became a matter of policy, legislative and judicial 
branches became subservient to the military, and repression was used as a 
substitute for law (Gere and MacNeill 2008; Warren 1998, pp.  3–33; 
Fischer 2001).
This period corresponded to what Hale (2004) refers to as “the state 
ideology of mestizaje,” the fundamentals of which he explains;
Latin American states developed a mode of governance based on a unitary 
package of citizenship rights and a tendentious premise that people could 
enjoy these rights only by conforming to a homogenous mestizo cultural 
ideal. This ideal appropriated important aspects of Indian culture … to give 
it “authenticity” and roots, but European stock provided the guarantee that 
it would be modern and forward-looking. This ideology was “progressive” 
in that it contested the 19th century thesis of racial degeneration and 
extended the promise of equity to all; its progressive glimmer, in turn, gave 
the political project—to assimilate Indians and marginalize those who 
refused—its hegemonic appeal. (p. 18)
La Violencia, with its physical and ideological attacks on Maya 
Guatemalans, would have a massive cultural and physical impact on 
Guatemala’s indigenous population. Its force would be felt in the subjec-
tivities of Maya cultural activists in the country (Warren 1998; Gere and 
MacNeill 2008), and in the life experiences of members of El Centro. 
Many indigenous people in the Western Highlands had lost family and/
or friends in the war (Warren 1998), and the members of El Centro were 
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no exception. This experience strongly influenced the ideas internalized 
by those exposed to it, as the experience of Louisa, a field technician at El 
Centro, illustrates:
We were refugees in Mexico from the armed conflict … [I learned] from my 
own experience, my own needs and everything I’ve lived. I was orphaned 
when I was very small … We all felt the need for education, because we all 
came from the same circumstance, we were experiencing a process of con-
flict that was very cruel and then felt the need to change, to be different to 
have other opportunities to grow in another environment and that our chil-
dren can have a very different fate than we did … Even when we were kids 
we had a lot of fear, much fear of war, and we realized how things were, we 
were fleeing, hiding all the time, we all wanted to do different things but if 
we do nothing we’re not changing anything. So we needed to work, to 
make changes. There are many philosophers, great writers … but they did 
not live what I lived. I lived a very different [life than them] and I’ve expe-
rienced, since early childhood unfortunately, those difficult situations. … 
We were persecuted—then you see the need to create change … We no 
longer wanted to offer our children the same we live—fear, terror, to be 
running in another country.
Postwar and Peace Negotiations
This persecution, as we have discussed, was strongly racialized in 
Guatemala. This meant that the terror of the war was experienced and 
understood collectively by indigenous Guatemalans. The relatively safe 
space created by the period of negotiations that preceded the signing of 
the Peace Accords on December 29, 1996, facilitated a collective reasser-
tion of sorts. As many commentators have noted, this environment facili-
tated a Maya cultural “renaissance” in the form of a national social 
movement that sought to revalorize and revitalize indigenous culture 
(Warren 1998; Fischer and McKenna Brown 1996; Montejo 2005). The 
assertion of Maya culture against the ideology of mestizaje, as Hale (2004) 
argues, “has been the first object of indigenous resistance across the 
region” (p. 2). Within the political space that appeared around the time of 
the Peace Accords, a Maya culture that had been blunted for centuries 
asserted itself again just as it had during the Ten Years of Spring. Members 
of El Centro have been deeply involved in this movement through their 
active positioning within the network of Guatemalan indigenous-based 
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civil society. Members often cite the countering of racism and valorization 
of indigenous culture as fundamental goals of their project.
Indigenous involvement in postwar politics was immediate. During the 
Peace Accord negotiations, Maya leaders pressured for the drafting of the 
national Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was 
signed on March 31, 1995 (Warren 1998, p. 56). The work of El Centro, 
members claim, is carried out “in accordance with” this agreement, and it 
is indeed evoked often in writings and workshops. The Accord, although 
not fully legal pending constitutional change that is yet to occur, con-
tained a number of important concessions to indigenous peoples. As 
Warren (1998) outlines, it included,
Recognition of Guatemala’s indigenous people as descendents of an ancient 
people who speak diverse, historically related languages and share a distinctive 
culture and cosmology. Non-Maya Xinca and Garifuna communities were 
accorded equivalent status.
Recognition of the legitimacy of using indigenous languages in schools, 
social services, official communications, and court proceedings.
Recognition and protection of Maya spirituality and spiritual guides and 
the conservation of ceremonial centers and archaeological sites as indigenous 
heritage, which would involve Mayas in their administration.
Commitment to education reform, specifically the integrations of Maya 
materials and educational methods, the involvement of families in all areas of 
education, and the promotion of intercultural programs for all children.
Indigenous representation in administrative bodies at all levels, the region-
alization of government structures, and the recognition of localized customary 
law and community decision-making powers in education, health, and eco-
nomic development.
Recognition of communal lands and the reform of the legal system so Maya 
interests are adequately represented in the adjudication of land disputes. The 
distribution of state lands to communities with insufficient land. (p. 56)
El Centro was founded in the mid-1990s amidst these peace negotiations. 
Founding members took part directly in Indigenous Accord negotiations 
and indirectly as members of a network of indigenous political activism 
and civil society. Initially called the Foundation for Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Development (FUNDADECE), the organization was conceived 
by its five initiating members to serve the purpose of “specifically dealing 
with projects of infrastructure and production for the benefit of those who 
had been internally and externally displaced during the war” and was 
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financed by the Swiss organization Diaconia. Geographically, the work at 
this time was restricted to the Western coastal regions near Champerico 
and Retalhuleu. But involvement in the politics surrounding the peace 
process and associated Maya activism facilitated drastic change in the early 
organization. As Matea explains,
As agreements between the Guerrillas, the Government of Guatemala, and 
civil society were reached for the signing of the peace, we began to structure 
a new organizational profile. Specifically, this was because we saw that the 
people in the Western Highlands had a lot of weakness in participation [in 
politics in general and the peace process]. This, in conjunction with existing 
racism and exclusion was strong enough to exclude much of the Maya popu-
lation. So since the signing of the Peace Accords we began to generate a 
process of forming a new structure.
With the new structure, came a new name—or rather two: El Centro 
Pluricultural para la Democracia and Kemb’al Tinimit—a K’iche’ name 
which implies the weaving of the multiple cultures with which El Centro 
works. These two names—the Spanish and the K’iche’—were used side by 
side to represent the pluricultural focus of the organization. This is also 
evident in the name given to the four-organization social movement 
within which El Centro was encapsulated. The Tzuk Kim Pop Movement 
was named again around an indigenous metaphor for weaving—pop—and 
this was mixed with an acronym meant to stand for the main cultural 
groups in the highlands—Tz’utujil Maya, Kíche Maya, Kakchiquel Maya, 
Mam Maya, and Mestizo (ladino). Tzuk Kim Pop consisted of four main 
indigenous-run organizations that, in concert with El Centro, sought to 
initiate development projects. Each organization was responsible for a dif-
ferent ambit of this—one undertook community economic development, 
one multilingual education, one health, and finally El Centro would 
engage in the political sphere.2 It was to be a holistic concerted effort 
which, at every step, centralized the idea of “culturally sustainable 
development.”
As is evident with its involvement in Tzuk Kim Pop, El Centro should 
not be thought of as a bounded, isolated organization. It is in constant 
communication with other groups, and this interaction impacts 
2 The Members of Tzuk Kim Pop included El Centro Experimental Para Desarollo de la 
Pequeña y Mediana Empresa Rural (CEDEPEM), Asoción para la Promoción, Investicación 
y Educación en Salud (PIES), and Projecto Lingüistico Santa Maria (PLSM).
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subjectivities and policies both within El Centro and within the network at 
large. The organization is an active participant in Guatemalan civil society 
and is changed and changes with this interaction. Besides the member 
organizations of Tzuk Kim Pop, multiple smaller community-level organi-
zations, as well as community, national, and municipal governments, El 
Centro cooperates directly with the following non-governmental 
organizations:
National and Central American Level:
The Collective of Social Organizations
The National Forum for Decentralization in Guatemala
The Interamerican Platform for Human Rights, Democracy & Development
Dialogue for Central America
The Central American Conference for Decentralization and Development
The Guatemalan Conference for Decentralization and Development
Social Forum of the Americas
The National Council of the Peace Accords
Region of the Western Highlands:
Regional Network for Bilingual and Intercultural Education
Departmental Commission of Women
Coordinating Board for Basic Institutes of Cooperation
Organization of Indigenous Women’s Development in the Basin of El 
Rio Samala.
Association of Farmers of the Basin of El Rio Samala.
Association of Mam Indigenous Women.
Forum of Civil Society and Commonwealth of Huehuetenango.
Council of the Peoples of the West
Roundtable of Totonicapán
Members of El Centro also make regular visits to small and large organiza-
tions in communities throughout the highlands, as well as those of national 
scope. These visits are designed to extend knowledge and a spirit of coop-
eration amongst organizations who work in political, economic, cultural, 
agricultural, health, or education-related realms. As a result of this, El 
Centro should be thought as a social subject that is situated within a vast 
and nebulous organic system of civil society—one which is characterized 
by regular flows of information which transform each of its subjects to 
varying degrees. El Centro is constantly transformed by these relationships 
but also helps to transform the whole of civil society. El Centro, therefore, 
can be thought of as a window through which we can see the workings of 
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the entire Maya indigenous rights movement as it constitutes, deliberates, 
and reconstitutes itself. The organization has worked as a node through 
which knowledge and experiences are passed by indigenous campesinos 
and alcaldas tradicionales to the national-level Maya movement, and 
vice versa.
Global Considerations
The culture and rights-based activism that inspired the language of the 
Indigenous Accord as well as the politics and ideas of El Centro must not 
be thought of as the product of only a unique Guatemalan historical 
political- cultural-economy. A number of global tendencies have emerged 
more recently which have had notable impact on the Guatemalan political, 
cultural, and economic climate as well as on the membership of El Centro. 
First, a discourse around human and cultural rights was gaining force 
globally. Second, and connected to this, there was a global indigenous 
movement which had particular force in Latin America. Third, the neolib-
eral policy climate of the major international donors slowly moved to a 
post-neoliberal or post-Washington Consensus model. Fourth, there was rise 
of the global environmental movement. Finally, fifth, there were global 
movements for gender equality. Members of El Centro have combined 
these global phenomena with critical development discourse that stems 
from Marxism, feminism, and environmentalism, and, more importantly, 
with their own felt sense of Maya cosmovision.
Rights Discourse
Indigenous activists in Guatemala, including members of El Centro, have 
been embedding their activism in the language of human and cultural 
rights for at least fifteen years (Warren 1998), and members of El Centro 
are also implicated in this tendency. When asked to depict the essence of 
what it is to be human, for example, members of El Centro insist that 
whatever else a human being is—it is always a citizen with “rights and 
responsibilities.” The instrument most evoked by Guatemalan indige-
nous activists (ibid.) as well members of El Centro is International 
Labour Organization Convention 169—regarding the collective rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. The convention includes protections for 
“traditional life styles,” “culture and a way of life,” “consultation and 
participation,” and the right to,
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decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their 
lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy 
or otherwise use, and to exercise control over their economic, social and 
cultural development. (p. 1)
Guatemala is one of twenty countries to have ratified the Convention 
(ibid.), although its interpretation within Guatemala jurisprudence and 
relation to the National Constitution is contested. Similar language, 
claims, and ambiguities hold true for the Accord on Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples which were negotiated as part of the Peace Accords in 
1995 (Ibid.).
Despite such uncertainties of implementation, Guatemalan indigenous 
activists, including those at El Centro, make heavy use of these agreements 
to assert their collective and cultural rights. Such activists must not be 
thought to be simply reacting to these human rights instruments, how-
ever. That is to say, Maya indigenous activists are not simply the opportu-
nistic products of international convention. Indigenous Guatemalans were 
instrumental in the negotiation of ILO 169 and, of course, the national 
peace accords (Warren 1998). Former members of El Centro were involved 
directly and indirectly in these processes as well.
Marxism and Dependency Theory
Although, they tend to distance themselves from Western modes of 
thought, all of the organization’s members are somewhat familiar with 
Marxist strands of social theory, and especially variants related to Latin 
American dependency theory. As a result of this, and the experience of 
their communities, they are highly critical of capitalism and neoliberal eco-
nomics. In Marxist-inflected terms, Roberto claims that free-market capi-
talism is a “hegemonic” structure that is equated often with imperialism 
and domination for example. He continues,
[Regarding] the theme of the neoliberal theory of development, there is a 
concept of development, perhaps it suggests an individualistic concept of 
development, but it is not a concept of development that benefits the col-
lectivity. For example, when they talk of free markets, the free competition 
benefits those who have the means of production—those who have all the 
capital. However, this does not benefit the economically poor for example—
it does not benefit the indigenous peoples.
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One should not overstate the importance of Marxian political economy 
for members of the organization, however. Such thought is present, and, 
if fact, control over the “means of production” is an important element of 
culturally sustainable development. But there are other intellectual and 
cultural traditions that overshadow that of Marxism for the members of 
the organization. As Juan-Carlos, a Ki’che’ field technician for El Centro, 
told me regarding critical Marxian theory:
I have studied some of Marx’s ideas, but I would say [that my ideas come] 
a bit more from the Maya—from the Maya worldview. I do not want to 
disparage El Senior Marx, but more of my ideas come from the Maya 
Cosmovision.
Global Indigenous Movement
Connected with human and cultural rights discourses, has been the pow-
erful emergence of a global indigenous movement since the 1990s. Some 
have suggested that these movements emerged as a direct result of the 
development of instruments such as ILO 169. This, however, would over-
look the immense involvement of indigenous organizations in the con-
struction and negotiation of those very agreements (Cowan et al. 2001; 
Warren 1998). Yashar (2005) locates the roots of the movement in the 
wave of democratization that occurred globally following the end of the 
Cold War, and on neoliberal reform which eased corporatist restraints on 
assertions of indigenous autonomy while exacerbating the economic woes 
of indigenous communities. Whatever the foundational forces of the 
movement might be, Guatemalan Maya have been central to the move-
ment. The most striking example of this would be the awarding of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchu—a K’iche’ woman from the 
Western Highlands—in 1992. Menchu’s prize was symbolically significant 
to the global indigenous movement, especially since 1992—the 500th year 
anniversary of the conquest of the Americas—had been marked at the First 
Continental Conference on 500  Years of Indian Resistance in Quito, 
Ecuador, in July 1990, to commemorate “continual resistance” and “lib-
eration” on the part of the continent’s indigenous peoples (IAA 1990). 
Members of El Centro are well aware of Menchu of course, and her name 
is evoked in numerous conversations between members. On a less notable 
scale, members of El Centro have been involved in a number of interna-
tional indigenous peoples conferences and meetings and have participated 
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in university exchange programmes such as those offered through the 
Department of Indigenous Studies at the University of Regina, 
Saskatchewan, Canada.
The Post-Washington Consensus
The turn of global donors to a post-neoliberal or post-Washington Consensus 
model has been based on the New Institutional Economics that was dis-
cussed in Chap. 3. Key to this, now the mainstream in development 
thought are ideas such as social capital and human capital mixed with the 
privileging of free markets which are to be mediated occasionally by 
benevolent governments (Fine and Jomo 2006). In this context, ethnicity 
and culture—especially indigenous culture—have come to signify a form 
of social capital and a facilitating agent for the building of human capital. 
This is consistent with the new institutional presumption that cultural 
forms are the manifest result of concerted action by egoistic human actors 
in the presence of market failures based on public goods. As a result, donor 
funding strategies have come to target indigenous groups. As Hale (2004) 
has explained in the case of Guatemala, following the signing of the Peace 
Accords, “the country was soon awash in international aid, with Maya civil 
society as the privileged recipient” (p. 20). In Guatemala, as with much of 
the world, indigenous civil society and rights-based organization are a 
“donor driven” priority (Ibid.).
El Centro has drawn primarily from funding by the European Union, 
the Ford Foundation, and the Soros Foundation—all which target indige-
nous groups explicitly. Donors must be chosen carefully, however. As 
Matea, a founding member of El Centro, argues, at the point of project 
implementation, parameters of funding agreements—especially those of 
the EU—tend to “limit somewhat the actions” of the recipient “in accor-
dance with their policies.” On-the-ground freedom of action is limited in 
such cases, she continues to explain, as “cooperation starts to generate an 
accumulation of policies, a mountain of meetings, of monitoring.”
This is not a benign process. The World Bank website on “Social Capital 
and Ethnicity” offers the following:
Ethnicity can be a powerful tool in the creation of human and social capital, 
but, if politicized, ethnicity can destroy capital. … Ethnic diversity is dys-
functional when it generates conflict. (n.p.)
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This line of thought emerges directly out of new institutional economics 
which lauds the benefits of culture-as-social capital while insisting that 
some cultural formations can become inefficient or destructive. The selec-
tion between the two is, of course, left to the technocrat in government or 
the donor agency. Hale (2004) has argued that such policies have resulted 
in exacerbating the problem of “Indio Permitido” (authorized Indian) in 
Guatemala. This implies that particular kinds of culture-based organiza-
tion—those which facilitate democratic processes, cultural tourism, or 
community public-goods projects—are good. Those which disturb the 
functioning of markets, natural resource exploitation, or capitalist produc-
tion through protest or attempts at territorial control are not acceptable. 
El Centro is very much caught in the politics of Indio Permitido. As a 
result, although the organization has close relations with indigenous activ-
ist groups that seek to disrupt markets and threaten political–economic 
power in such ways, it is careful to distance itself from such practices. As 
Matea explained to me when asked about El Centro’s involvement of such 
political acts,
We don’t organize protests. We have tried to generate the space in which 
[people] can dialogue, discuss, and we have facilitated processes in which 
there is dialogue between two sectors that may have different interests—for 
example, dialogues in which the national organizations of justice meet with 
communal authorities.
As we will see in the next chapter, El Centro’s involvement with more radi-
cal political activism is somewhat more blurry than this. The point for the 
time being, however, is that El Centro is articulated and constrained by a 
national politics of Indio Permitido which is reinforced by a donor climate 
that is informed by new institutional approaches to international develop-
ment policy.
Environmentalism
Also connected with the post-Washington Consensus is the idea of envi-
ronmental sustainability. Members of El Centro have been influenced by 
related discourses as is evidenced by their common use, almost verbatim, of 
the Brundtland Report (WECD 1987) definition of sustainable develop-
ment when addressing environmental issues. The report’s claim that sus-
tainable development “implies meeting the needs of the present without 
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compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
has become an integral part of the mainstream development discourse of 
the post-Washington Consensus (Fine and Jomo 2006). When asked to 
define sustainable development in interviews, Brundtland Report discourse 
was common amongst members of El Centro. So too was the tendency to 
connect the protection of the environment with the protection of indige-
nous culture.
Such a depiction correlates strongly with mainstream post-Washington 
Consensus environmentalism, which depicts indigeneity as a form of social 
capital that serves to mitigate the types of market failures that lead to envi-
ronmental damage. The World Bank page on “Social Capital and 
Environment,” for example, argues that indigeneity is a collective resource 
that allows communities to “address their concerns, such as land scarcity 
and environmental degradation” (para. 2). The Bank’s page on 
“Indigenous Peoples” forwards the argument that “Indigenous Peoples 
are distinct populations in that the land on which they live, and the natural 
resources on which they depend, are inextricably linked to their identities 
and cultures” (para. 5).
Such ideas—common in both indigenous rights and mainstream devel-
opment discourse—appear often in the work of El Centro. “We the 
Indigenous peoples,” claims El Centro in the preamble to a document 
advocating for community participation in the planning of mining proj-
ects, “have our own ways of conceiving development, focused on the 
search for equilibrium with our ecosystem” (CPD no date1, p. 5). In a 
focus group I organized on this topic with members of El Centro, the 
fundamental marker of Maya culture was claimed to be “the relationship 
with nature and the cosmo.” In Guatemala in particular, Matea argues, it 
is only the Maya who have the cultural and organizational (social capital) 
resources to achieve sustainable development:
The population that at the moment has the proposals to make life sustain-
able in the region is the indigenous population—the Maya population. 
Why? Because, for example, the have norms, and they have created acts and 
accords that come from the communities that direct the ways to manage the 
forest, to manage resources like water for example.
Such statements do not provide evidence of a unidirectional causal rela-
tionship between mainstream development discourse, global indigenous 
movements, and El Centro. Given the close relations that the organization 
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has with both these global discourses, however, a certain complex articula-
tion or co-resonance of these ideas might reasonably be assumed to exist. 
That is to say, the Maya relationship with nature has a deep and meaning-
ful history. It may, however, be reinforced by its relation to global dis-
courses of social capital and indigeneity. It must be allowed as well, 
however, that Maya belief systems have a tangible impact on these global 
discourses through sympathetic resonance and articulation.
Discourse on Gender Equality
A similar dynamic can be noted regarding gender equality. Members use 
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which emphasize gender equality, in their work. They utilize more 
so the national Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
which specifically addresses the rights of indigenous women. Section B1 of 
the agreement states:
It is recognized that indigenous women are particularly vulnerable and help-
less, being confronted with twofold discrimination both as women and 
indigenous people, and also having to deal with a social situation character-
ized by intense poverty and exploitation. The Government undertakes to 
take the following measures:
(a)  Promote legislation to classify sexual harassment as a criminal offence, 
considering as an aggravating factor in determining the penalty for 
sexual offences the fact that the offence was committed against an 
indigenous woman;
(b)  Establish an Office for the Defense of Indigenous Women’s Rights, 
with the participation of such women, including legal advice services 
and social services; and
(c)  Promote the dissemination and faithful implementation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.
The impact of such rights discourses on the ideas of those in El Centro is 
likely given the extensive use of these instruments in workshops and infor-
mation sessions. The situation of El Centro in a complex network of 
Guatemalan civil society and the resultant direct and indirect involvement 
of associates in the negotiation of the national agreement particularly 
should caution us on assuming a direct top-down causal relation here, 
however. Indeed, it is a common claim by Maya cultural revivalists that 
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gender equality and complementarity has always been integral to Maya 
culture (Warren 1998). This will be explored more thoroughly in the fol-
lowing section.
maya Cosmovision
As influential as the national history and the various discourses discussed 
earlier have been on thought in El Centro, the strongest influence, accord-
ing to the members interviewed, comes from Maya cosmovision itself. 
Internationally and nationally situated ideas surrounding development 
and rights, however, mix, articulate, and resonate often with deeply held 
cultural beliefs. The structure of Maya cosmovision facilitates the use of 
the concept of the “natural environment” as the central focal point of the 
Maya political subjects that El Centro is interested in nurturing. It also 
imbues a sense of egalitarianism, community cooperation, and gender 
equality. Within El Centro, and the communities with which it works, 
Maya cosmovision is fused with felt local history and international dis-
courses to create a distinctive worldview and idea of development.
Any attempt to represent cultural meaning of perceived “Others” is 
bound to be laden with problems. In order to minimize this, my interpre-
tations of El Centro, its work, and of Maya cosmovision were presented to 
a focus group composed of members of the organization. After I pre-
sented my interpretation of the cosmovision, the necessary question 
emerged—can Maya Cosmovision be understood and properly repre-
sented by a Western academic? The quick answer was “no.” After a short 
period of discussion amongst the members (myself excluded), however, it 
was announced by the group of field technicians, office administrators, 
and Maya spiritual guides that although it would take me years to truly 
understand the cosmovision, my current interpretation was accurate 
enough for the purpose at hand. What follows, then, is an approximate 
representation that will serve reasonably well the task at hand. To limit my 
own interpretive interference, I will rely heavily on direct quotations.
Upon explaining Maya cosmovision to me, Mario, who is a Maya spiri-
tual guide who works with El Centro, made it clear that the universe is to 
be understood as an “indivisible whole.” Any division between concepts 
such as nature, human, man, woman, cosmos, or culture is simply an 
abstraction. The planets, sun, and moon, for example, are interconnected 
with menstrual cycles, harvesting schedules, and human reproduction. 
This interconnectivity, claimed Mario, is central to all aspects of the 
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cosmovision. This can be understood with reference to the concept of 
Ajaw, which is a singularity that is interpretable as a duality. It consists of 
“Heart of Sky”—“an immaterial and incomprehensible energy or force 
and transcendent space” or a “mysterious something [that] precedes 
everything else” (Molesky-Poz 2006, p. 46). But also of “Heart of Earth” 
where “Heart of Sky … abandons the spiritual dimension and enters [cre-
ates] the material world” (Cabrera qtd. In Molesky-Poz 2006, p.  46). 
“Heart of Heaven” and “Heart of Earth” are both equal and one. They 
are connected because they are part of a whole, one representing the mas-
culine, and the latter the feminine—two not-separate, but complimentary 
categories (Ibid.).
Humans, in this conception, as part of Ajaw, are to be “givers of praise, 
givers of respect, providers, and nurturers” (Ibid., p.  38). They live in 
dialectic with the cosmos and natural environment and consequently must 
both give to and receive from nature.
“In this worldview,” explains Molesky-Poz (2006),
a person connects intuitively with the Rhythms and thoughts of the uni-
verse, with ancestors, and takes on a responsibility to others. One navigates 
from cultural and psychological constructions in which one inhabits his or 
her body and experiences it, and perceptions of life, in ways very different 
from those shaped primarily by Western reason and rationality. (p. 74)
“To understand the relationship that the human being has with the land, 
nature and the cosmos,” Roberto suggests, “is profound.” He continues,
Perhaps you are not going to understand me … The life of the human being 
in the perception of the Mayan peoples is connected with the land, nature. 
Conception for example. When a parent conceives a child it says: “Good, 
child, the fetus grows in the belly of the mother—in the body of the 
mother—as one lunar cycle passes, and another.” There are eight moons of 
conception, and it is for this reason that the human being has a relation with 
the moon and it is conceived by many people to be the grandmother of 
everybody.
Roberto offers another example:
To cut a tree down in a community, you must cut when the moon has waxed 
for the wood you cut to be functional, for it to be resistant, to be durable for 
many years. But if I am going to cut a tree down when the moon has waned, 
the wood will not serve me. This wood will only serve me for five or six years.
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The moon, then, must be thought of as being connected to all things 
terrestrial and human. “It is the same with the sun,” explains Roberto: 
“with the sun began all of the ideas around the Mayan calendar, the solar 
calendar—all that can be had can be seen with the solar cycle.”
Members of El Centro explain that these types of connections—or 
rather oneness—should be respected in all human activity according to the 
cosmovision. Roberto offers an example:
when they say “I am going to cut down a tree”—this is for a service that is 
primordial, principal, and fundamental in the community or for the family. 
The people say that [the tree] “is a living being equal to me, therefore I 
must ask the permission of the tree.”
Louisa explains the central logic of this belief system:
In Mayan Cosmovision respect is the most fundamental value. I respect all 
that exists, whether they be people, nature, animals—all of them. … The 
Mayan Cosmovision is based on fundamental values and one of them is 
harmony. I must live in harmony and I cannot destroy that which serves me. 
I have to respect, but I also have to have equilibrium between all that there 
is, in a horizontal system. Nothing above and nothing below, but everything 
in a horizontal system in which equilibrium is important. I must be good 
with God, good with my family, good with nature, good with my surround-
ings because this helps me to be tranquil … If one applies it in their life, they 
can be living very much in harmony with all else.
Sofia conceptualizes this more succinctly, saying that “as indigenous, the 
land is us, it gives us food, and we are the land.” Matea does not believe 
that such beliefs exist in the more Euro-culture saturated ladina or Mestiza 
population of Guatemala. What is lacking in Mestiza culture, she argues, 
“is the theme of the trilogy that exists between the human being, the 
spirit, and the natural world.” This way of seeing, she argues, is part of a 
“distinct form of life” shared by all the different Maya communities in 
Guatemala. Although each of these groups “has its own cosmovision,” all 
share a similar “essence” that requires a “spiritual co-habitation with 
nature and other human beings.”
This “spiritual co-habitation” can be seen in El Centro’s depiction of 




The philosophy of the Mayan peoples [is] the theme of duality. The theme 
of complementarity in this case is the same as talking of a focus on gender 
equality. When we speak of complementarity of men and women, when we 
speak of the duality of men and women, we say, good, the sun and earth are 
dual. They are complimentary. The moon as well. Or when we see as well 
that the man has feminine aspects but also male aspects, this is part of the 
concept of indigenous peoples as well.
Roberto’s position is nuanced by one of El Centro’s publications:
In Maya culture there are philosophies, theories, in relation to the life of 
men and women, such as: the collective work, mutual help … to look for 
council [from both genders] … values that should orient personal life, fam-
ily life, community life, social life and political life. Taking as the base, the 
principle of duality: in Maya thought, differences [in gender] are compli-
mentary. That is to say that opposites (for example day and night, fire and 
water, happiness and sadness, man and woman), cannot exist without the 
other. (CPD no date3, no page number)
The text continues to explain that Maya women have traditionally carried 
out roles inside the family but also played other roles in the public realm, 
such as within the communal mayorship. Consistent with this, when asked 
if Maya culture is patriarchal, Mario insisted that some ancient Maya polit-
ical centres were governed by women. He continues, “when we talk of 
Maya culture, we say that there is mother and father—mother is nature 
and father is heaven” (Heart of Earth; Heart of Heaven). Further, he 
insists that “when patriarchal tendencies emerge,” in indigenous commu-
nities, “it is nothing more than an imposition from Western culture.”
Matea’s comments in this regard are telling. When asked if Maya cul-
ture is patriarchal, she offered the following:
Would you like a political position or a personal position? Because the politi-
cal position that has developed is that throughout the existence of the 
Mayan people there has existed a process that promotes the complementar-
ity or equality in which the human being exists. This belief system promotes 
equality between men and women. And they complement each other 
because one is masculine and the other feminine. One is the day and the 
other is the night. One is life and the other is death and therefore the will 
compliment each other in relation to all that exists.
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“This is the political idea,” Matea continues, “but in reality I believe that 
there has been too much change, and not only in the Mayan culture.” 
When asked to account for this change, she suggests that “the catholic 
religion and evangelism have created the idea of the superiority of men 
over women and this has influenced the relations in the communities.”
Matea’s comments may be thought to place the “truth” about Maya 
cosmovision in doubt. One might ask if the claims regarding gender equal-
ity and environmental harmony that are intrinsic to the cosmovision are 
nothing more than politically expedient constructions. Do Maya peoples 
really believe and feel such things? And if they do not, how can it be 
claimed that these are essential elements of Maya culture?
To ask such questions is to miss the point, however. Maya culture is 
interpreted and reinterpreted. It, like any culture, is forever changing. The 
members of El Centro are interpreting a Maya culture, which does contain 
strong elements of environmental respect and gender harmony. This inter-
pretation is undertaken in resonance with many of the ideas regarding 
gender equality that have emerged internationally—such as those which 
are imbedded in the policy of every funding institution that El Centro 
deals with, ILO 169, the Indigenous Accord, and most international human 
rights instruments. This interpretation of Maya culture has been produced 
under the discursive force of such instruments and in collaboration with 
Western anthropologists as well as the global indigenous movement 
(Molesky-Poz 2006). Such global discourses of equity, indigeneity, and 
environmentalism have resonated with similar pre- Colombian sensibilities 
in the current culture in Maya communities. To encourage such sensibili-
ties, and dissuade others, are part of an environmental- egalitarian ethic 
that has itself resonated with members of El Centro.
Promoting this, as we will see in the next chapter, is central to the con-
ception and implementation of culturally sustainable development. The 
important thing to take from this section, however, is that the cosmovi-
sion—amidst the other things already discussed—has had an important 
impact on the subjectivities of the members of El Centro. “Let me give 
you an example,” says Juan-Carlos,
When I grew up you could never throw away an ear of corn from the time 
it began to grow. Corn cannot be thrown away or people will scoff. This is 
because in the Mayan worldview it is our food, it is our rise, it is our root. 
[You see] I have, not with the clarity we should have, but I have many of the 
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values and principles of the Mayan worldview. For example, I live with my 
parents, and I have been taught that when you salute them you must tip 
your head. For many, this might seem ridiculous, but for us this all makes 
sense from a Mayan worldview. It is a respect for the elderly—for those who 
have not studied but have a wisdom of life. That is most important. I believe 
that all of my ideas, concerns, hopes and all I have is based in this [funda-
mental respect for the wisdom of the elderly]. Thanks to that—thanks to 
all … that I have been taught from the family, I am able to contribute here 
[at El Centro].
As we will see in the next chapter, the concept of culturally sustainable 
development is rooted substantially in such orally transferred cultural 
inheritances of thought. CSD, then, cannot help but be to a large extent 
an expression of Maya cosmology. Certainly, as Juan-Carlos argues, the 
Maya worldview “unfortunately is not given much importance” in global 
discourse surrounding development, equality, rights, environment, and 
gender. But, he argues, “many of these principles, many of these values, 
are right from Maya cosmology.” There is a felt resonance here between 
these international discourses and the orally transmitted Maya worldview.
ConClusion
The goal of this chapter was to situate the Maya idea of sustainable devel-
opment articulated at El Centro vis-à-vis a long history of colonialism, a 
felt cultural heritage, and a number of more recent global discursive ten-
dencies. History and cosmovision are highly important constituting factors 
for the thoughts, ideas, and subsequent policies of the members of the 
organization. So too are the global discursive tendencies of post- 
neoliberalism, the indigenous movement, human and cultural rights, 
Marxism, feminism, and environmentalism. The relationships between El 
Centro and these global discourses are not simply causal, however. They 
are reciprocal. That is to say that it should not be presumed that there is a 
one-way relationship in which these discourses interpolate the organiza-
tion, or cause it to happen. This is not a simple relationship in which a 
number of global dependent variables exert formational pressure on an 
independent variable. Although it could be assumed that Maya cultural 
activism has been impacted more by the global indigenous movement 
than it has impacted that movement, for example, it should not be forgot-
ten that the actions of El Centro have the power to change the 
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international movement as well. El Centro is embedded in a network of 
Guatemalan civil society in which all these variables are again transformed 
and negotiated. It is a discursive sphere through which the national Maya 
movement speaks to indigenous campesinos and alcaldas comunales in the 
creation of a sustainable development project that is rooted in Maya 
cosmovision.
A final thought must be added here regarding internal dynamics of the 
organization. All of the swirling discourses, sedimented histories, and cul-
tural proclivities that were addressed are interpreted, discussed, and reor-
ganized within El Centro. The output of this process is a policy package 
that seeks to achieve what we have been calling “Culturally sustainable 
Development.” The communicative process that creates this output must 
not be presumed to occur in a purely egalitarian public sphere that is 
devoid of power imbalances of its own. From my observations, at meet-
ings with core members, there is a tendency for women to be less vocal, 
and although the organization is “pluricultural,” ladino representation is 
very low in most meetings and workshops. Furthermore, certain members 
of the organization tend to carry more persuasive weight in meetings. 
Beyond this, members of El Centro are often looked upon as experts and 
authorities when they organize meetings with communities, for example.
Every communicative act, Habermas (1984) has reminded us, is in 
danger of being infused with such power differentials. The point, for those 
who seek to implement democratic processes, is to mitigate these as much 
as possible. The structure of El Centro is designed in a non-hierarchical 
fashion. “Directors” and “coordinators” are joined at meetings and work-
shops by “office administrators” and “field technicians”—all who, at least 
officially, have equal weight attached to their utterances. The majority of 
the core 20 members of El Centro are women, and women are just as likely 
to hold key positions as are men. Ladinos are underrepresented but not in 
proportion to their small population in the Western Highlands. 
Furthermore, language of the ladinos—Spanish—is used as the primary 
language at all meetings and in all publications.3
As Matea claimed to me regarding gender power differentials, these 
structures “do not change from night to morning.” But members of the 
organization have made deliberate efforts to address such issues internally. 
Furthermore, as we will see in the following chapter, addressing many of 
these power issues in communities is integral to their development 
3 This is expedient since members do not all speak the same indigenous languages.
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programme. As an observer, I am not in a position to interpret properly 
every nuance of internal communicative democracy, or lack thereof. 
Furthermore, the purpose of this work is to outline the ideas of El Centro, 
not to map internal power dynamics. Despite this, these things must be 
recognized here. As with any organization, there are problems regarding 
internal power structures, and I do respect the efforts put forth organiza-
tionally to address such issues, however. There is a tangible awareness of 
the potential dangers of such inequalities in the organization. As a result, 
there are constant attempts to mitigate them.
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CHAPTER 7
The Maya Idea of Culturally Sustainable 
Development
The concept of culturally sustainable development, as it is articulated by El 
Centro Pluricultural para la Democracia, will be presented in this chapter. 
The method of analysis here will involve the depiction of conceptions that 
have emerged out of my interviews and focus groups, as well as texts of El 
Centro. Specifically, concepts related to the following questions will be 
presented: what is the relationship between humans, nature, and culture? 
What is Mayan culture? What is development? How do you do development? 
The goal here is to depict, as closely as possible, the thinking of El Centro 
regarding these concepts.
Clearly, issues related to the ability of Western trained academics to 
represent the thinking of indigenous activists must be addressed here. A 
multifaceted and participatory methodology was developed in an attempt 
to address these issues. The process of interpretation involved, first, a 
three-month period of participant observation at El Centro; second, a 
thorough reading of all of El Centro’s publications; third, individual inter-
views with members of the organization; fourth, a preliminary interpreta-
tion of the concepts; fifth, a presentation to members of El Centro of this 
preliminary interpretation; and, finally, a focus group discussion of these 
interpretations was held in which members changed, critiqued, and 
approved or disapproved of the author’s representations and interpreta-
tions. The following depiction of the theory of culturally sustainable devel-
opment is the result of this process.
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Human, nature, Culture
When beginning the process of discerning the meaning of culturally sus-
tainable development in the initial phase of fieldwork, it seemed logical to 
first establish the properties of the fundamental unit of development—the 
human being. To do this, it would be necessary to hold the concept of 
culture to the side. It became clear early in the interview process, however, 
that to sever these concepts from one another would be to do violence to 
the idea of CSD.  Of course, in the construction of the categories and 
typologies that are necessary for academic work, we regularly make some-
what arbitrary distinctions. The trick is to know when such distinctions 
cross the line between reasonable categories for analysis and unacceptable 
misrepresentations. In the course of investigation, it became increasingly 
apparent that treating culture and human as separable would be to cross 
that line. The same, it should be understood, could be said for creating a 
false distinction between humans and nature, or culture and nature for 
that matter.
Considering this, it is important to remember the words of Matea when 
she was asked to explain what she thought a human to be. “Everything to 
do with the human being,” she said, “has to do with the spirit; has to do 
with nature.” Similarly important is the example that Mario used to con-
vey the inseparability of natural materials and cultural understandings of 
them. “Take the stone in the vision of the Mayan world,” he suggests,
In the Western world it is a material, a mineral that has no value. In Mayan 
culture, the stone, if it has use, it has use because it is complementary to the 
culture; and it is complimentary to the culture because we use it.
In Mario’s comments, we see a claim that use-value is imbued on an object 
by the virtue that it has cultural value. But it is not presumed to be a uni-
directional relationship. There is dialectic here—the cultural meaning of a 
material thing stems from its usefulness, and its usefulness is culturally 
determined. To speak of one is to speak of the other. As we address issues 
of culture and humanity here, then, we must be cognizant that we are 
speaking at the same time of the hard materiality of the natural world, of 
culture, and, as Matea suggests, of “the spirit.”
Similarly, the division between individual and community is ambigu-
ous. When the members of El Centro speak of human beings in the con-
text of their work, they speak of “social subjects.” True to the sense of 
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ambiguity around the concepts of human and culture, a social subject can 
be a single person or a group of people. Each of the members of El Centro, 
for example, would be considered a social subject, but so too would the 
organization itself. Social subjects are “social” both in the sense that they 
may actually be a group of people, but also in that, as Matea suggests, 
“culture provides the elements for the formation of subjects.” The cul-
ture, community, and person are inseparable. As Sofia understands it,
much of what is a person, of what is a community, is the culture. Therefore 
you cannot separate it. … You cannot say, “good, I am going to leave the 
culture here and develop over there”. This is impossible because the culture 
is part of you; of your ideology; of your form of being. And therefore, if you 
propose ideas of how to generate development in your community, you will 
do it from the place of your culture, because you are there, and you identify 
with it, and it is from this point of view that you have generated an idea of 
how to generate changes that include the culture. You cannot pose ques-
tions that are not in accordance with the reality in which you live. Therefore 
into all of all you propose goes the culture. It is part of you and you cannot 
leave it to one side.
Matea elaborates more on the elements of culture, describing culture as 
“the social organizing processes that are given at the level of the commu-
nity.” These include “expressions that mark differences from other cul-
tures based on the form of life, the form of sustenance, the spirituality, the 
customs,” as well as “traditions and all the organization that you have at 
the level of the villages.”
Cosmovision is an integral part of culture. Whereas culture represents 
the totality of meaning in a locale, cosmovision, Matea continues, is “the 
form of seeing all themes that are given in the world—perception. This 
exists in every part of the world … there is a cosmovision in all places.” 
Cosmovision is a subject’s understanding of the way in which the world 
functions, and it is constructed of the pieces of culture. As Roberto explains, 
your culture is “your language, [and] your clothing,” but also “your way 
of thinking—you have to see with your cosmovision.” And, he continues, 
your cosmovision informs “your own way to conceive of your relation to 
the natural world.”
But to say that subjects are socially formed is not to say that they are 
simply determined by their cultural environment. More than this, as Mario 
explains, subjects,
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are those who act. Who do [things]. … The subject is an element, is a cogni-
tive subject that has experience, has ideas, has thoughts. And a subject is a 
motor. The motor of his or her own development. … The subject is the 
people. [The subject and the culture] are the same thing; subjects are the 
members of a culture.
Similarly, Maria insists that culture is created by “the population”—that it 
is created by subjects with agency. This is done, however, “in accordance 
with [a community’s] thoughts and customs.” It is with cognitive tools 
based on “the practices that have developed,” she continues, “that the 
culture of a community is made.”
For the members of El Centro, such assertions are much more than 
attempts to conceptualize structure and agency problems in academic 
theorizing. Cultural devaluation or cultural loss is necessarily a personal 
imposition. It is personal devaluation. It is a felt personal loss for members 
of communities who hold such cultural practices. Culture, for the mem-
bers of El Centro, is valuable in itself, and must therefore be protected. 
This is evident in Maria’s response when asked why it is important to 
protect culture:
Because the culture forms part of the person, therefore the culture carries 
values, carries principles and this must not be forgotten in the development 
process but must be maintained, and because it forms part of the identity of 
the people, the view of the culture must not be lost.
It would be easy to misinterpret this as an assertion that cultures must not 
change—that they must remain static. This would not be consistent with 
the thinking of members of El Centro, however. Sofia, for example, holds 
that cultures do change—just not “from night until morning.” After evok-
ing the idea that the “essence” of Mayan culture is in the cosmovision, 
Matea draws attention to the tendencies of cultures to change, and what 
she perceives to be the true problem related to this—inequality:
I think that all cultures should have independence. Not that they are going 
to be static or that they will maintain uniformity. But that they will not 
change their essence. When they lose their essence, they become debilitated 
and fall into the other culture. I feel that this should be changed, because at 
the level at which we are working there exists a large culture, but also a small 
culture. And often what happens is that the large culture absorbs the small 
culture. Like ideology, I speak of all the subliminal messages that provoke 
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consumerism in us but also of more radical things that are possessed by 
other cultures. I speak of wars, I speak of impositions through financial 
resources. These things impact the entire country and prevent it from 
advancing. Therefore the cultures do not seem equal. It is this way because 
the one that has greater resources and greater numbers, greater financial 
resources, is often the one that maintains the hegemony. The survival of the 
small one is hard to achieve, and a lot of struggle is required if it is to survive.
Although it is not clear if the “larger” culture Matea refers to is Western 
culture, or ladino culture, or both, the statement draws attention to the 
hard material and cultural realities related to CSD in Guatemala. “Cultures 
are going to change,” she continues, “depending on the moments and the 
processes in which each of these peoples exists.” It is in this way, she 
argues, “that we have had to be learning from other forms.” However, she 
insists that this process of cultural interchange has, “in some cases, done 
much damage to us.”
The cases in which damage has been inflicted have occurred amidst 
great material and hegemonic power imbalances according to Matea. 
Roberto expands on the co-determining nature of material and cultural 
power, and the difficulty of the subordinated to engage in the production 
of culture. An idea of development that is culturally sustainable, he argues, 
must come from the people, but “sadly,” he explains, “we don’t have one 
to tell you about.” Furthermore,
The theory of development from the perception of the indigenous Mayan 
peoples in Guatemala is [non-existent] because there are no conditions, 
resources, or means of production. Otherwise it would be possible in this 
moment to have all the conditions necessary to initiate it.
Such an assertion brings the struggle for development undertaken by El 
Centro not just into the realm of the cultural or ideological, but into the 
material simultaneously, as is evident in the following statement from 
Roberto:
The international economy or free market or international market has its 
own strategy of enrichment, of accumulation of resources. The strategy is to 
generate consumerism in the population. This is not development. If I am 
earning four thousand Quetzales and at the end of the month I buy a big 
television, or a large sound system, or other things, I have already spent my 
paycheck. I think this is a way in which local people spend money on items 
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that are not useful for survival in this society. Survival and achievement of a 
better life do not depend directly on these things. Therefore I think that the 
strategy of consumerism in the population has been generated only for the 
benefit of foreign capital.
In Roberto’s opinion, cultural and material imperialism not only rob indig-
enous Maya of their culture, but of the fundamental sustenance necessary 
to assert their own culture and their own idea of development. A form of 
development is nurtured in such a situation, but it is one in which “I have 
nothing to eat, I have nothing for education, I have nothing for health, 
but I am interested in equipping my house.” In such a situation, members 
argue, the fight for development is lost. Indigenous culture is devalued, 
and indigenous people become subordinately integrated into a global 
economy that is structurally bent on material exploitation and cultural 
domination. Subjects have been nurtured in this situation—but they are of 
the wrong kind. They are not the “political subjects” that CSD requires, 
as Maria explains,
When we speak of political subjects it is when they already have a greater 
capacity—of participation, of decision, of impact. Therefore the culture may 
create subjects, but [not] political subjects, [which] are created at the level 
of leadership.
Both cultural and material domination, then, are thought to undermine 
the creation of subjects which would be endowed with the agency required 
to conceive of, and then direct, their own development. Hegemonic mes-
sages of global consumer culture are presumed to bury and devalue local 
indigenous culture, while diverting material resources away from the 
reinforcement- through-use of local culture and towards the purchase of 
mass-produced consumption goods.
The concept of culture, and the politics that surrounds it, can now be 
more clearly delineated in a way that attempts to depict the meaning 
ascribed to it by members of El Centro. In a publication on culturally sus-
tainable development, culture is described in this way by El Centro:
Culture is a form of life, a manner of being, a way of thinking and feeling, 
and a different style of doing things throughout the day. That is to say, it is 
the solution that every community or group of humans gives to their rela-
tion to one another and with nature. Understood in this manner, culture is 
a social product that unites values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of a 
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society determining its development. Therefore, culture is dynamic, that is 
to say, it changes. (CPD 2008, p. 21)
The appearance of the word solution, and culture’s depiction as a product 
that unites values in a society, thus determining its development, might lead 
one to assume this to be an instrumentalist definition of culture. That is, 
it may look like something akin to new institutional economics. When 
contextualized with the interview materials presented earlier, however, it 
seems more probable that the solution here is not to the problem of “how 
do I get more of what I want?” Rather it is a solution to the questions, 
“how do I make sense of the world?” “how should I act in the world?” and 
“what do I value?” The answers to these questions change, but not “from 
night until morning,” and such changes can most likely be thought of as 
positive if they are undertaken in an environment that is relatively devoid 
of material and discursive inequalities such as income inequality or racial 
prejudice. This is to say that culture and cultural change are judged posi-
tively when the social subjects that are composed of, and compose, culture 
have “equality of agency” in the construction of that culture—to borrow 
a term from Rao and Walton (2004).
The development that is determined in this definition of culture is not a 
quantitative measure such as a level of gross national product or aggre-
gated community income. It is qualitative—culture informs the kind of 
development that is sought. Culture is not subordinate, nor is it separable 
from the material world. There is great concern at El Centro that the urge 
to purchase Western consumer products can cause subjects to misallocate 
their resources away from the provision of healthcare, food, clean water, 
or education, for example. A culture of consumerism is chosen here at the 
expense of what are seen to be the fundamental elements that provide for 
life. Even this, however, does not reduce to a critique of “good” indige-
nous culture versus bad consumer “culture.” Roberto, for example, reluc-
tantly admits that this is “a type of development.” The more fundamental 
issue for members of El Centro is that one of these “cultures” is exorbi-
tantly strong, dominant, hegemonic. In such instances, Matea explains, 
“there is a psychological bombardment on us, therefore we learn another 
distinct form of life, that we consider better than our own.” This under-
mines the capacity for the local culture to adapt in a democratic way—one 
in which values can be reevaluated and problems can be negotiated in a 
climate of relative discursive and material equality.
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What becomes apparent from this discussion is that for any action to be 
“culturally sustainable,” it must facilitate a discursive equality in which 
indigenous culture and knowledge are not subordinated, overpowered, or 
dominated. Market-led development is perceived to carry with it Western 
consumer culture that is backed by material power. Development of this 
sort is not considered to be culturally sustainable because of the felt deval-
uation of indigenous culture and its submersion in the hegemony of 
Western capitalist consumer society. The same could be said of develop-
ment plans that emanate in a top-down manner from Western-trained 
development practitioners—be they rooted in liberal or Marxian theories. 
Such interventions, well-intentioned as they may be, carry with them a 
discursive force that is backed by economic power. They, therefore, 
threaten to devalue local knowledge and culture. For development to be 
culturally sustainable in Guatemala, Roberto claims, it must “come from 
the perception of the indigenous Mayan peoples … from the communi-
ties; the majority of which are indigenous communities.”
The “perception” of indigenous communities is thought still to be 
rooted in Mayan cosmovision. Members of El Centro maintain that despite 
cultural and material intrusions from Spanish colonialism, Christianity, 
consumer culture, resource-extracting corporations, and civil war, the core 
of Maya cosmovision remains intact, if buried, in the subjectivities of the 
residents of indigenous communities. The continued existence of the 
communal mayorship in most communities is offered as proof of this. So 
too is the use of traditional clothing and the perseverance of indigenous 
languages throughout the highlands. All of these institutions and prac-
tices, it is argued, have changed somewhat with external interaction, but 
have been maintained, almost miraculously, throughout over 500 years of 
what members characterize as planned and deliberate ethnocide. This cul-
tural maintenance in the face of planned destruction has been done 
through a creative incorporation and blending of cultural elements as 
Matea explains regarding religion:
In Chichicastenango, for example, inside the church are all the [Christian] 
images and pictures, while the altar outside is Mayan. Both the churches and 
Mayan alters were put on the highest points in town—the same places. And 
you see a combination of the two traditions. You see Mayan priests and the 
people doing Mayan ceremonies, and then go to the church. Or they may 
just go to the church but engage in Mayan ceremonies.
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Mayan cosmovision, then, is thought to remain embedded to varying 
degrees in the subjectivities of contemporary indigenous Guatemalans, 
even those who practice Christianity. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
a felt connection to the natural world and cosmos, as well as egalitarian, 
harmonious tendencies, is assumed to be integral to that belief system.
PartiCiPation, DemoCraCy, DeveloPment
The very fact that the cosmovision has become subordinated to colonial 
belief systems represents a fundamental inequality to the members of El 
Centro. Attempts to re-valorize the cosmovision in the eyes of ladino and 
Maya populations are, therefore, fundamental to CSD.  This “principal 
objective,” as Mario calls it, has been integrated into every part of El 
Centro’s operations. But perceived damages to nature are also threats to 
CSD—not simply in that they may compromise the abilities of future gen-
erations to realize their own development, but because nature and culture 
are one according to the cosmovision. To damage nature is to damage part 
of the culture, and to damage culture is to damage the person that is inte-
gral to that culture. As was discussed in the last section, only a develop-
ment that takes place in an environment of discursive and material equality 
can, therefore, be considered culturally sustainable, as Mario suggests:
Culture has its own value. … When the people already value and come to 
value their own form, then a great measure of development with culture will 
have been achieved. This is because without respecting their own culture, 
the people will be alienated. That will be monocultural—looking for only 
one culture and not diversity. Diversity is force. With diversity there are vari-
ous visions of the world, for example, you can not submit me to your vision 
of the world, and I cannot submit you to mine. … If we know how to 
achieve diversity with respect, with harmony, with coexistence in peace, then 
development is better.
To recapitulate a fundamental point, CSD does not imply the freezing of 
culture (or nature, or politics, or the economy for that matter). Nor does 
it suggest a complete reversion to some imagined pre-Columbian state. It 
involves the equalization of discursive and material power relationships 
between indigenous peoples with their nature/cultures and hegemonic 
Spanish colonial and global capitalist systems. Sustainability means conti-
nuity amidst constant cultural and natural change. CSD, therefore, does 
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not imply a particular cultural or economic form, but rather a transforma-
tive participatory process of deep democracy, as the organization explains 
in one of its publications:
If we understand participation as an essential element democratic system, we 
can say that this makes all the people and the political community as a whole, 
the protagonists of different social processes. All must be involved closely in 
the cultural, political, economic, and environmental aspects of group life. It 
is this involvement that, more or less, marks the advance of democracy in a 
given society. (Chávez Cayax 2003, pp. 8–9)
During El Centro’s workshops that are set to promote democratic partici-
pation, traditional elements of the cosmovision are encouraged. The inti-
mate relation of indigenous peoples to the land is reaffirmed often, for 
example. This is done not to “freeze” a primordial culture but to attempt 
to counter the hegemonic imposition of Spanish-colonial and Western 
capitalist ideologies which have conspired to devalue indigenous belief 
systems for 500 years. The value of pre-Colombian institutions such as the 
communal mayorship is reasserted in an attempt to revalorize Mayan cul-
ture as well. But so too is the value of international human rights architec-
tures, democracy, and positive change. These are all things that are 
commonly associated with “modern” or “Western” culture, and they are 
things that do not imply stagnation.
The core of the goal of El Centro’s development work is, in fact, to 
encourage a culture and politics of “transformative participation”—not a 
cultural ossification. It is hoped that this transformative process would go 
beyond the “pseudo-participation” of stakeholders being simply invited 
into the decision-making process “for the photo,” or merely being con-
sulted, being given charge of delegated tasks in larger processes that have 
been conceived from “above,” as Chávez Cayax (2003) argues in one of 
El Centro’s publications. As Chávez Cayax (2003) continues to explain, 
“transformative participation” requires political subjects who are “actors, 
not spectators” in decision-making processes at all levels, and this involves 
the building of capacities of traditional and local institutions and counter-
ing discursive structural barriers by valorizing indigenous culture and 
combating racism (pp. 10–12).
A legal architecture does exist, which provides a framework from within 
such participation can take place. And these legal texts are utilized exten-
sively by El Centro in its interaction with communities. In Article 46 of the 
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Guatemalan constitution “it is established as a general principal in matters 
of Human Rights, that the treaties and conventions accepted and ratified 
by Guatemala have preeminence over internal rights.” Often referred to 
by members of El Centro, Articles 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, ratified by Guatemala in 1994, establish “freedom of 
association and the right of participation in governing the country” 
(Chávez Cayax 2003, p. 22). Members insist that this right is not restricted 
to voting but to “participate in the decisions that are made in the State, 
and to obtain the form of organization desired by all the inhabitants that 
form the country” (Chávez Cayax 2003, p.  23). The Guatemalan 
Constitution also guarantees the right of meeting and manifestation of 
collectives that may present petitions and grievances to government, the 
right of free association (Articles 34, 35, and 44), the right of a person to 
participate in the creation of their cultural identity (Articles 57, 58, and 
66), and rights of collective participation (Articles 136 and 136).
As discussed in the previous chapter, ILO 169 is commonly evoked by 
El Centro in texts, interviews, and meetings. The agreement contains lan-
guage protecting culture, traditional lifestyles, consultation, participation, 
and control over economic, cultural, and social development processes. 
Although some of the interpretation of the agreement has been contested 
in the Guatemalan context, it is insisted at El Centro that ILO 169 contrib-
utes to the creation of space in which political participation can be 
undertaken.
Agreements negotiated under the Peace Accords also provide space for 
wide political participation in Guatemala. The interrelated agreements of 
the Accords convey a deep discourse of indigenous rights, decentralization, 
cultural affirmation, and community self-management. Guatemala agreed 
to become a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a 
part of the Peace Accord negotiations in 1994. The Guatemalan Accord for 
the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was signed in 1995. The 
Accord of Agrarian Socioeconomic Aspects and Situation and the Accord for 
Strengthening Civil Power and the Function of the Exercise of a Democratic 
Society were signed in 1996. The Law of Councils of Urban and Rural 
Development, the General Law of Decentralization, and the new Municipal 
Code were signed in 2002.
The purpose of this chapter is not to go into detail on arguments 
regarding legal interpretations of these accords and conventions. The 
essential point regarding these instruments is that they all attempt in some 
way to create legal space for direct participation of communities in politics 
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and policy via their own culturally situated political institutions and social 
organizations. Many contain strong wording in this regard. Section III.1 
of the Indigenous Accord, for example, states:
The Maya, Garifuna, and Xinca are authors of their cultural development. 
The role of the state is to help said development, eliminate obstacles to the 
exercise of this right taking the legislative and administrative measure neces-
sary to fortify indigenous cultural development in all areas corresponding to 
the state and to assure the participation of the indigenous in the decisions 
relating to the planning and execution of cultural programs and projects 
through their own organizations and institutions.
The Accord continues in part IV.B.3:
Recognizing the role that corresponds to the communities, in the frame-
work of municipal autonomy, to the exercise of the right of the indigenous 
peoples to decide their own priorities with respect to the process of develop-
ment and in particular with relation to education, health, culture, and infra-
structure. The government is committed to affirm the capacity of said 
communities in this manner.
In such a way, the concept of culture is mixed with the concept of develop-
ment in national and international law. Both concepts are tied to human 
rights and with the idea of civic participation. A legal space for decentral-
ized participation of indigenous peoples is provided by such instruments. 
This is not a sufficient condition, argue members of El Centro, however, 
to assure that such participation will occur. There is more involved in par-
ticipation than the simple granting of the right to participate, as an El 
Centro document suggests:
Participation, in all its manifestations, must be a transformative action 
and practice of liberation initiated by the person, not for them, in which 
the oppressed and the excluded encounter conditions in which they can 
discover themselves reflexively as a subject of their own historical destiny. 
In this way, people discover paths to their own liberation through their 
own research and planning, and simply because freedom to meet in such 
a way is freedom to become master of your own decisions. In this sense, 
participation is not something that is granted, as one might mistakenly 




True democratic transformative participation, this suggests, cannot occur 
without the formation of political subjects. Active groups of persons must 
initiate the processes of participation in which they discover and redefine 
themselves amidst the rubble of colonial and neoliberal ideology in which 
they may be currently trapped. The formation of political subjects, even 
within such an expansive legal architecture of participatory rights, requires 
the exertion of energy—a “constant struggle” (ibid.).
intervention, organization, PolitiCal SubjeCtS
According to El Centro, the struggle to create active indigenous political 
subject is undertaken through social organization. As Bulux (2003) argues 
in one of the organization’s documents:
Social organization is a comprehensive development process, which facili-
tates the study and understanding of the local context in formulating solu-
tions. It also provides mechanisms that enable a community to meet 
collective challenges while maintaining its own identity, unity and solidar-
ity. (p. 15)
Communities are not thought of as currently existing in a state of dysfunc-
tional disorganization, however, and CSD does not require the imposition 
of organizations and institutions by outside experts. As Bulux (2003) 
explains:
In the community there exists a diversity of forms of organization—those 
which come from the communal authorities, associations, committees, 
cooperatives etc. … It is from these cultural values of organization that cul-
turally sustainable development must be realized. In this sense, sustainability 
must be understood as a value of the culture in that cultural practices already 
exist as responses that have been created and recreated through experiences 
of life and cohabitation with neighbors and with nature throughout their 
historical social development. (pp. 21–22)
Maya cultural institutions of governance, such as communal mayorships, 
then, can be employed as the main driver of CSD. This is not as simple a 
solution to problems of development as it may appear, however. Bulux 
(2003) explains that,
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Because of colonial policies of slavery and forced labour, the organization of 
Maya society suffered the disintegration of its social nucleus and therefore 
its social organization, which had been based in the value of common good 
and collective work. (p. 12)
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, both Maya cultural 
tradition and human rights conventions encourage the direct participation 
of women in political and planning processes. There are few organizations 
of Maya women existing in most communities, however. Considering this, 
“organization must be promoted amongst those sectors, such as youth 
and women, which may not be organized” (Bulux 2003, p. 15).
It is in these areas that the work of El Centro is situated. Through vari-
ous interventions, the organization seeks to strengthen existing forms of 
social organization and to encourage the formation of political social sub-
jects where they may not exist. These interventions do not simply target 
indigenous peoples and institutions, however, but also seek to create an 
acceptance of indigenous forms of social organization, in the spirit of 
mutual support, with official, modern, ladino-dominated state institutions 
such as municipal governments. This work is undertaken through four 
distinct projects at El Centro.
Four ProgrammeS
In attempting to foster CSD, El Centro mobilizes four programmes in the 
Western Highlands. These are the Communal Mayorship programme, the 
Municipalities programme, the programme for Women and Youth, and the 
Research programme. All of these utilize participatory processes in the 
formation and building of capacities of local and municipal institutions 
and organizations. This is done through arranging information sessions, 
participatory workshops, diploma programmes, as well as community- and 
municipal-level meetings on topics that are important to the people of the 
Western Highlands.
The Communal Mayorship Programme
As discussed in the previous chapter, at the time of conquest, Mayan gov-
ernment involved communal mayorships which would undertake all the 
political, juridical, and administrative duties connected with parcialidades 
(administrative units of 300–600 people). These mayorships would 
 T. MACNEILL
159
convene from time to time at a regional level in an amaq’ council. As a 
result of hundreds of years of Spanish colonial administration and institu-
tionalized racism, the amaq’ had disappeared by the time of the Peace 
Accords, and, although their existence remains widespread, the communal 
mayorships had been reduced to largely ceremonial status in a system 
dominated by a colonially imposed municipal governance structure (Hill 
1989; Wittman and Geisler 2005; Barrios 1988). The Communal 
Mayorship programme is designed to remedy this by reasserting the cul-
tural and political relevance of the institution in the eyes of indigenous 
peoples, ladinos, and official national, regional, and municipal governance 
institutions.
The initial step of this is called “first contact” by field technicians and 
coordinators at El Centro. In this step, a number of indigenous mayors 
from geographically close communities will be invited to a meeting at a 
nearby location. Members of El Centro will deliver a talk that is designed, 
first, to educate the mayors of the rights provided to them and their insti-
tution by the legal architecture discussed earlier in this chapter. Emphasis 
here is on the assertion that the communal mayorship has as much, or 
more, legal power than does the municipal mayorship. This is generally an 
unexpected revelation to the communal mayors.
Second, the communal mayors are asked to list all of the duties they 
currently perform in the communities. This list is usually substantial and 
covers juridical, political, and administrative responsibilities. Finally, the 
session concludes with an emotionally charged speech by the El Centro 
field technician who praises the resilience of the institution in the face of 
hundreds of years of colonial attempts to dissolve it, the cultural signifi-
cance of the mayorship, and its democratic nature. “They tried to erase 
you,” as Matea said in such a situation, “they still say you don’t exist—but 
here you are.” The purpose of El Centro—to assist the communal may-
ors—is asserted, and those mayors in attendance are asked what they 
would like El Centro to do for them. Often the mayors simply want to 
“know more about these laws.”
After the first contact is completed, the communal mayors are often 
asked if they would like to attend a larger meeting—one which approxi-
mates an amaq’—of many communal mayors from across the region. 
These meetings are issue-based—perhaps covering topics such as health, 
education, or environmental degradation, but most commonly, of late, 
regarding the problems that communities are having with transnational 
mining companies. Information regarding the issue is provided by a 
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member of El Centro. The mayors are split into a number of groups and 
are asked to construct strategy proposals regarding the issue. The merit of 
each proposal is discussed by the group, and consensus is sought regard-
ing an overall strategy. All participants are paid enough to cover their 
travel, and they are fed. The meetings may last an entire day, so remunera-
tion is essential given the loss of time that the mayors would otherwise 
have been spending on farm-work.
Although policy outputs of such meetings are important, the cultural 
and social significance of the meetings themselves must be emphasized. I 
was lucky enough to attend a regional meeting of mayors only two weeks 
after first contact had been established with five participants. I had also 
attended the first contact with these participants. What is striking anthro-
pologically is that this, just as much as it is a policy meeting, is a social 
ritual in which subjectivities may be reformed. As a thought experiment, 
we could imagine what it could be like to be one of these communal may-
ors who just a few weeks before had accorded little value to their positions, 
then to be told that their institution was powerful enough to stand up to 
hundreds of years of planned ethnocide, and then told that their power is 
equal to that of the municipal government under national and interna-
tional law. Finally, these mayors attend a meeting with forty to fifty other 
indigenous mayors who are actively constructing policy.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess impacts of such activities. 
This would provide fertile ground for further study. But it should be made 
clear that this type of activity is designed to be “transformative” for par-
ticipants. This type of participation is not consistent with liberal or repub-
lican forms of citizenship which presume a pre-formed human actor with 
stable beliefs and preferences as it engages in political participation. It is 
more congruent with thinking of Habermas (1984) or Rostboll (2008), 
who focus on the way in which such forms of participation act to trans-
form subjectivities as they seek policy outputs, and assert that the over-
arching goal must be that all such participation be as egalitarian as possible. 
The goal for El Centro is to facilitate the creation of active political sub-
jects who gain increasing respect for their own culture and institutions. 




The Programme for Women and Youth
This programme is similar to the Communal Mayorship programme in that 
it seeks to transform subjects into political subjects through rights educa-
tion and social organization. The difference here is that the focus is on 
groups who are less likely to have pre-existing organizations and institu-
tions. Women and Youth, it is insisted, have been excluded from political 
participation due to the importation of colonial cultural and political 
norms. The goal of the Programme for Women and Youth is to remedy this.
The first step undertaken by this project is to locate women’s or youth 
groups that may be pre-existing in communities. Members of El Centro 
will ascertain through community interviews if such organizations are 
inclusive or exclusionary. Depending on this, activities will be organized 
within existing organizational structures or outside of them. In either case, 
the first order of business is rights education similar to that of the 
Communal Mayors Programme except that the focus is more on rights 
accorded to women and children within the national and international 
legal architecture. A second step is the organization of workshops based 
around a community issue. Similar to the case of the Communal Mayors, 
consensus on policy will be sought. Free access diploma programmes in 
democratic participation and rights are also offered. Again, the focus here 
is not so much on the policies agreed on, or number of diplomas awarded, 
but on the transformative nature of political participation.
The legitimacy of the Communal Mayorship is an important point that 
is maintained in this programme as well. The full electoral participation of 
all men, women, and children is located as a source of legitimacy. It is also 
reinforced that Mayan societies have historically sought equality and com-
plementarity between genders and that women have the legal right to 
participate equally in the Communal Mayorship. Some communities have, 
in fact, elected woman mayors since El Centro began its work in the high-
lands, although this representation at meetings of Communal Mayors 
remains very low.
The Municipalities Programme
Similar to the other programmes, the Municipality Programme is centrally 
concerned with rights education. The increased autonomy granted to 
municipalities under national law is focused on, of course, but so too is the 
power granted to the Communal Mayorships. Great effort is taken to 
7 THE MAYA IDEA OF CULTURALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
162
sensitize the municipal authorities to the equal status of the Communal 
Mayorships and the necessity that they be integrated into the municipal 
governing process. Assistance is provided by El Centro, when requested, 
with everything, from budgeting to the integration of community groups 
to conflict resolution and legal interpretation.
To have a municipalities programme was not of initial priority to El 
Centro, but members of the organization soon realized it to be necessary. 
As Sofia explains,
When we began work, we worked only with the population, with civil society, 
with organizations, with the communal authorities, but only with the popu-
lation. Therefore it seemed illogical to work with municipal governments. 
But the municipal government is a place where people take proposals. 
Therefore the work of our program now is to make the municipal govern-
ments aware of the need to open spaces [to dialogue and receive proposals 
from the population]. The problem is that many municipal governments are 
authoritarian, and remain closed. They do not accept proposals from the 
population. So our work involves facilitating a space for dialogue between the 
municipal government and the population, and to create acceptance of these 
proposals with the departmental and national governments if need be.
This sensitization of the need of municipal, departmental, and national gov-
ernments to dialogue directly with the population regarding policy is now a 
fundamental part of El Centro’s CSD strategy. Most of the focus in this 
regard is concentrated in the relationship between the communal mayor-
ships, women’s and other civil society groups, and the municipality. The 
idea is not to replace the state and municipality with a romanticized pre-
Columbian institution, but to create a space in which all of these institutions 
may dialogue and engage in mutual change, exchange, and support. It is 
with respect to the municipalities programme that we can see a fundamental 
goal of El Centro—to create an organic and mutable form of decentralized 
democracy which combines indigenous and modern (state) institutions in a 
sphere of dialogue and mutual change. This implies that indigenous culture 
and cosmovision be integrated into policymaking beginning at the munici-
pal level, but at departmental and national levels as well.
The Research Programme
El Centro has a need to investigate its own activities and evaluate their 
effectiveness. This, however, is not the primary purpose of the Research 
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Programme. This initiative is more centrally interested in facilitating a 
transformative form of participation through participatory research within 
communities, and encouraging knowledge-sharing amongst them. This is 
clear when we consider the following text, contained in the prologue of 
one of El Centro’s research documents on community conflict over water, 
which outlines the five main goals of the research process:
The first, to reconstruct the history of the experience; the second, to approx-
imate the collective reflection of those subjects who participated in the same 
[events], third; to communicate the results so that they can serve as inspira-
tion, orientation and foundation for the attitudes and actions of future gen-
erations; fourth, for the construction of collective knowledge; and fifth, so 
that it may serve as orientation and example for other communities in the 
solution of their own conflicts, from their own reality, cosmovision and 
practice. (CPD 2008, p. 7)
The process of research and distribution of published materials is at least 
as important as their textual content. The research process is participa-
tory—involving focus groups and qualitative interviews. The final repre-
sentation of events is presented and validated or changed by community 
members. In the end, travel is paid for to allow community members to 
attend a publication release event in which each attending member is pre-
sented a copy of the research.
The case of the (2008) publication of Conflictos Comunales por el 
Derecho al Agua (Community Conflicts over the Right to Water) serves as 
a fitting example. A number of communities in the municipality of 
Palestina do Los Altos were involved in a long-standing conflict over rights 
of access to a natural water source. The conflict, which lasted from approx-
imately 1988 to 2002, was typified by violence, incarcerations, kidnap-
pings, split communities and families, as well as public protest. The issue 
cut across the jurisdiction of several communal mayors, two municipali-
ties, and involved a development plan implemented with little consulta-
tion by an international development organization (CARE). After years of 
sometimes violent conflict, a solution was created with assistance from El 
Centro. Through cooperation, negotiation, and compromise, an agree-
ment between municipal (viewed as “State”) authorities and the commu-
nal mayors was achieved. The agreement was the result of several 
workgroups, meetings, public consultations, and participatory budgeting 
initiatives (CPD 2008).
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The history of the conflict was then researched in a participatory man-
ner by El Centro. The resulting document recounted the history as con-
structed by participants. A number of conclusions were also formulated. 
These included an assertion that state action is often “an imposition … 
with respect to community-based forms of organization.” This, it was 
argued, “contrasts with the communities own forms of organization, spe-
cifically the communal mayorship which has its own norms, principles, and 
values with which to resolve disputes” (p. 53). It was also argued that the 
time of conflict was also a time of learning for local authorities, as they
learned to negotiate with the institutions of the state, with all of its difficul-
ties, something that none had done before the conflict. They also learned to 
coordinate the actions of state institutions with the ancestral institutions 
represented by the communal mayorships. (p. 53)
Furthermore, it was explained that “the communities undertook partici-
patory budgeting, something that had not even crossed their minds 
before” (p. 56), and that, throughout the process, “the Communal mayor 
did not complete a roll only as ‘auxiliary’ to the municipal mayorship” but 
was engaged as equal partner (p. 56). It was argued that the conflict and 
resolution fostered not only the “construction of social capital” (p. 58), 
but also the “construction of collective conscience [as] … the experience 
served to promote the understanding that collective well-being should 
always prevail over individual interest” (p. 59). The analysis ended with a 
strong affirmation of the authority and legitimacy of the communal 
mayorship:
The efforts made to reclaim the role of communal Mayors reflect the roles 
they are playing today. The institution has transcended the role of assistant 
to the municipal mayor to perform roles of local leader and administrator of 
the community in the political aspects and administration of justice. This is 
evidence that it is not the laws that are imposed by the state that govern the 
development of communities, but is their own historical evolution that is 
shaping social relations according to their own culture. (p. 59)
The way in which these findings are disseminated is of upmost impor-
tance. The history and analysis were published in a small book. A public 
event was planned in Quetzaltenango—Guatemala’s second-largest city—
and nearly 100 delegates were invited from all of the communities 
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involved. Travel expenses were covered for attendees, and food was pro-
vided during the half-day event. The communal mayors and municipal 
mayors involved in the conflict spoke about the experience, as did mem-
bers of El Centro and other community members. In the end, community 
members in attendance were called, each by name, to receive a personal 
copy of the book, complete with handshakes from members of El Centro, 
and a photo in each case. Recipients were men, women, and children from 
the communities. They were receiving what amounted to an award for 
their ingenuity and achievement. The point, as was explained to me later, 
was to instil confidence in local communities of their competence and abil-
ity to direct their own development. Copies of the book were also given to 
community representatives for free distribution in the communities. 
Finally, such publications are distributed to other communities in the 
highlands—especially to communal mayors—in order to share these 
lessons.
maya verSuS tHe mine
The issue of mining has become central to the activities of El Centro, so it 
serves well as example within which the theory and practice of the organi-
zation may be contextualized. The Central America region, Guatemala in 
particular, is witness to a continuing proliferation of conflicts between 
communities and transnational mining interests. Since the 1996 Peace 
Accords were signed, for example, there have been 380 solicitations for 
mining rights to the government of Guatemala (CPD 2009, p. 22). No 
attempt will be made here to explore the issue deeply in all its facets 
nationally, internationally, or locally. What will be presented is a brief over-
view of the relationship of El Centro to the mining conflict involving the 
municipality of Sipacapa in the department of San Marcos.
El Centro began working with women, youth, and the communal may-
orship of Sipakapa in 2004. It was not until the following year that the 
issue of mining arose, and at this time it was the communal mayorship that 
brought it to the attention of the organization. In 2003, the Canadian 
mining company Montana (a subsidiary of Glamis Corp., and then 
GoldCorp) had been granted, without community consultation, a large 
gold-mining concession in the Western Highlands. In all, 85 percent of 
the concession lay in the municipality of San Miguel, and 15 percent in 
Sipacapa. A total of 1 percent of the proceeds from the concession was to 
be accrued by the national government, and the remaining 99 percent to 
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the company. No royalties from the resource extraction were to be granted 
to the community (CPD 2009; Yagenova and Garcia 2009).
In 2005, aided by investment funds from the World Bank, Montana 
began construction of the Marlin Mine in San Miguel. In the time between 
the granting of the concession and the beginning of construction, resi-
dents of Sipacapa had begun to educate themselves about the environ-
mental and health risks associated with mining, and about their legal rights 
of consultation in the granting of such concessions. This community-led 
research was facilitated by El Centro and a number of other human rights 
and environmental organizations such as Madre Selva. As Roberto 
explains, they were trying “to generate a process of understanding in the 
population, and to give them the elements necessary to defend their col-
lective rights.” Growing community concern led to activism against the 
development of the mine in nearby San Miguel and its planned expansion 
into Sipacapa (CPD 2009). The precautionary concerns, which soon 
manifested in reality in San Miguel, were material and cultural as Roberto 
explains:
When we have 30 kilometres of mining exploitation, it will imply that we are 
going to see 30 kilometres of territory in these municipalities without natu-
ral areas, without natural resources, without forests, without biodiversity, 
without fauna, without flora, without anything. And apart from this with 
certain contamination of water—not just the rivers but the water table, the 
subterranean water will be contaminated as well. More than this, there are 
illnesses; these have actually appeared [in San Miguel]. Many illnesses of the 
skin have appeared and we believe this to signal a great risk to the lives of the 
people. In the theme of culture, for example, as well: there is a destruction 
of the land and the land is conceived as the mother for the indigenous peo-
ples because it is what produces all that sustains and provides nutrition for 
the population … [This therefore] can affect as well spirituality, cosmovi-
sion. We speak of a culturally sustainable development from the perspective 
in the indigenous peoples—in these municipalities everything is the opposite.
This corresponds with the assertions of lawyers working with the commu-
nity, who argued that,
the company is in flagrant violation of the UN International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and ILO Convention 169 Concerning 
the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. The 
company has also infringed local property rights, including the use, posses-
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sion, and administration of local indigenous land and territory. The mining 
project has also trampled on the patrimonial right of San Miguel and 
Sipacapa to decide on whether to issue mining licenses that pose risks to 
health, the environment, security, social and cultural life as well as the right 
to the free self-determination of the people. (Yagenova and Garcia 
2009, p. 165)
In addition to this, physical damage from blasting at the mine has appeared 
in the form of cracks in housing structures (Marroquín 2009).
The communal mayors and other community groups sought help from 
the municipal mayor’s office, but received only the response that the min-
ing issue was beyond its jurisdiction. All the while, connections were being 
established between local community groups, national organizations such 
as Madre Selva, and international groups such as the Indigenous Peoples 
Council of Central America. Concerted activism was apparent in 2005 as 
citizens of Los Encuentros—a municipality hours from Sipacapa—coop-
erated in a protest which blocked the transport of necessary materials for 
the construction of the mine. In that same year, the community of Sipacapa 
held a public consultation in which they declared a ban on mining under 
the auspices of ILO 169 and the authority of the traditional communal 
authorities (CPD 2009; Yagenova and Garcia 2009).
The legality of the consultation was challenged on many levels by the 
mining company. The most notable of these challenges was a grievance 
filed on the grounds that the consultation was unconstitutional. The 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court on 8 May 2007 granted that the con-
sultation was legal, but only as just that—a consultation—and was not 
legally enforceable since subterranean resources are constitutionally the 
property of the national government (OCG 2010). Shortly after this, the 
same court found, however, that the national mining law was unconstitu-
tional in that it violated environmental stipulations in the constitution. In 
2010, a group of over 80 civil society organizations including El Centro 
officially petitioned the national government to suspend mining opera-
tions in the country, pending community consultations and impact assess-
ments (Prensa Libre 2010). Later that year, just as members of El Centro 
were meeting in Canada with indigenous peoples who had conflicts with 
resource extraction under the invitation of the Canadian Ambassador to 
Guatemala, a Canadian Supreme court ruling required Canadian extrac-
tive industries to abide by stricter ethical and environmental guidelines 
(Ljunggren 2010). Finally, in June of 2010, the Guatemalan government 
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officially enforced the closure of the Marlin Mine, pending more research 
into the environmental and social consequences of mining (Marroquín 
2009). This closure was suspended in 2011 when the mine resumed full 
production. The Marlin Mine finally closed permanently in 2017, some-
what due to political pressure, but more so due to the near-complete 
extraction of all gold. All mining equipment has been moved to a new 
mine, which is currently beginning production in Cerro Blanco, 
Guatemala.
The saga of opposition to the Marlin Mine is complex. There are many 
researchers that will no doubt craft exemplary accounts of the issue. There 
are two import points for the current discussion that involve, first, the way 
in which mining was perceived as a threat to CDS in the Western Highlands, 
and, second, the way in which communities, and especially communal may-
ors, organized with the assistance of a large network of rights organiza-
tions—a processes to which El Centro was integral.
Regarding the first point, there were five main damages that emanated 
from the mining project which were perceived by the community and El 
Centro. First, there was the damage of disrespect associated with the com-
munity not being consulted regarding plans to initiate mining on com-
munal territory. Second, there were damages associated with contamination 
of water supplies and associated illness. Third, there were physical dam-
ages to housing structures. Fourth, there were environmental damages, as 
the ecosystem near the mine was completely destroyed. Finally, and related 
intimately to this, is the personal felt cultural damage inflicted indirectly as 
environmental degradation impacted indigenous subjectivities which have 
a close felt relationship with their natural environments, as Roberto’s ear-
lier statement suggests. These damages are material, spiritual, and cultural, 
but each is perceived as real and important. And, as Roberto has suggested, 
they all run contrary to a development that is culturally sustainable, despite 
promises of potential employment. Importantly, at no point has commu-
nity opposition to the project been undertaken with the goal of receiving 
economic proceeds from the mining. This reveals that economic incen-
tives are low on the list of priorities of community members compared to 
the other damages listed earlier.
The second point—regarding the reaction or the communities to these 
perceived damages—is equally revealing of the multifaceted nature of El 
Centro’s theory of development. Resistance to the project was undertaken 
in multiple ways—through press, through protest, through the judicial 
system, but key to this was the building of capacities of pre-existing 
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cultural institutions such as the communal mayorship. El Centro does not 
measure success in the conflict by noting constitutional court decisions, 
but by recognizing the capacities of environmental monitoring and politi-
cal action that have been developed in the communities during the pro-
cess, as well as the increased status of the communal mayorship that has 
been achieved (CPD 2009). Underlining this, it was the community that 
introduced mining as a problem to El Centro in the first place, and the 
community of Sipacapa and many others in the Highlands have made this 
point strongly enough that mining has become the main issue around 
which CSD work revolves at the organization.
ConCluSion
Any attempt to succinctly summarize the thinking of El Centro must begin 
with the cosmovision. The essence of Maya cosmovision is that the three 
discursive, analytical categories of nature, culture, and human are insepa-
rable—that they are one. Cosmovision is practically inseparable from cul-
ture—it is the way of seeing that is predominant in a particular cultural 
setting. It also prescribes, however, ways of acting, and all ways of acting 
are thought to be consistent with the cosmovision, since it is the core of 
the culture. Appeals by El Centro to Mayan cosmovision may be thought 
as attempts to point out that threats or damages to culture or nature are 
interpreted as real human damages by subjects that are situated within 
Mayan culture, and that Mayan subjects, by virtue of their intimate rela-
tionship with nature, are culturally predisposed to be effective stewards of 
the local natural environment.
The “subjects” that are evoked here may be single persons, but are just 
as likely to be groups of persons. This ambiguity exists partly because the 
concept of an individual, which is divisible from the community, is not 
consistent with Maya cosmovision. Subjects are created by their material 
and cultural environment. Importantly, this implies that values, valuations, 
beliefs, tastes, and utility functions (to use the language of neoclassical 
economics) are viewed as the products of culture, and this culture is not 
understood simply as the product of self-interested interaction as new 
institutional economics tends to suggest. Culture exists for culture’s sake. 
“It has its own value,” as Mario has suggested.
This depiction need not imply that cultures and subjects are stagnant 
and immutable. Cultures are constantly mutating, and subjects may have 
agency to change their cultural situation, just as they may have agency to 
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change their material situation. Cultures, it is asserted, are constantly 
informed and re-formed from their interaction with their “outsides”—
through the blurring of their edges. It is the agency of social subjects 
within this process that is thought to determine the outcome of the 
interaction.
It is argued by members of El Centro that agency, however, is not 
equally distributed across the globe, within Guatemala, or within the 
Western Highlands. Material deficiencies are thought to impact the agency 
that a subject has to change its discursive and material environments, so 
are less tangible elements such as racism and cultural devaluation. The 
agency of indigenous Mayan subjects is promoted by the organization 
through measures that attempt to assure that food, health, and clean water 
are attainable to subjects but also through increasing indigenous peoples’ 
self-valuation of their own culture and sensitizing ladino subjects and state 
institutions to the same. This is attempted through El Centro’s four major 
programmes which deal with communal mayorships, women and youth, 
municipalities, and research.
It is essential to note that claims that Maya subjects are culturally pre-
disposed to environmental consciousness should not be taken to imply 
that all indigenous Maya men, women, children, or even communal may-
ors exhibit this behaviour and feel this connection. Of course, it is under-
stood by members of El Centro that many do not. But the underlying 
logic of CSD is this: the cultural tradition of the Mayan cosmovision gives 
much more credence to the unity of human/culture/nature and the place 
of humans as “givers of praise, givers of respect, providers, and nurturers” 
than do Western enlightenment culture with its Newtonian model of the 
universe, consumer capitalist culture with its view of the environment as a 
resource (whether or not that resource must be sustained for the benefit 
of future generations), or related forms of Christianity which tend to 
depict the natural world as a gift from God to be exploited by Man 
(Molesky-Poz 2009, p. 38). The simultaneous work of valorizing Maya 
culture while opening space for indigenous political action is undertaken 
in order to create political subjects that value Maya cosmovision more 
intensely. These resultant Maya political subjects, it is assumed, will there-
fore be environmental subjects by virtue of this increased valuation of the 
cosmovision.
This is simultaneously cultural change and cultural continuity, and it 
would not be possible if Maya cosmovision was not already ingrained, if 
only partially, in the subjectivities of indigenous people. For proof that it 
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is, members of El Centro point to the continued existence of a wide variety 
of Maya cultural practices—from the widespread use of traditional cloth-
ing and language to the persistence of indigenous religious practices and 
the continued relevance of the communal mayorship. The programmes of 
cultural valourization are not considered impositions because they reso-
nate with the existing cosmovision of the indigenous peoples of the 
Western Highlands. In cases where the cosmovision is lost to a greater 
extent, such as could be argued to be the case in the town of Tecpan (Hill 
1989; Wittman and Geisler 2005), decentralization would be instead pro-
moted via the municipal government.
The revalorization of Mayan culture, the amplification of indigenous 
political agency, and the reassertion of rights to resources and territorial 
control that are implied in this process are linked to the promotion of 
grassroots democracy which is thought to be the prerequisite to any mean-
ingful sustainable development plan. Centuries of racism, colonialism, and 
neocolonialism have robbed indigenous Maya not only of their culture, 
and their political voice, but also of the fundamental sustenance necessary 
to assert their own culture and their own idea of development. The pro-
gramme of El Centro is designed to promote a foundational level of dis-
cursive and political equality which includes access to material resources—or 
at least not the continued degradation of existing resources (by mining 
operations, e.g.). The guiding principal is that of equality of the capacity 
to participate in decision-making, policy, and planning processes, as well as 
the communicative production of culture. Only once this is achieved will 
culturally sustainable development initiatives be possible.
In such a climate, it is argued by members of El Centro, development 
plans, governing policies, and systems of cultural understanding impli-
cated in development processes would be authored substantially by the 
communities of the Western Highlands themselves. This does not neces-
sarily suggest that this authorship not be undertaken in cooperation with 
the Guatemalan State, foreign donors, or transnational corporate inter-
ests, nor does it prescribe insulation from global cultural flows. It does 
suggest a fundamental and ongoing commitment to struggle for equality 
so that such interactions remain democratic.
In this we can see the solving of a suggestive riddle: why would an orga-
nization that is centrally concerned with culturally sustainable development 
be called the Pluricultural Centre for Democracy? The answer is that CSD 
is predicated on democracy in the deepest sense. Or, rather, that develop-
ment is democracy. This democracy is not limited to the formal liberal 
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architecture of municipal, national, and departmental elections with free 
press and active civil society which exerts pressure on decision-makers in 
government. This Maya form of democracy involves the devolution of 
decision-making power to local communities, as well as the valorization, 
continued transformation, and respect for diverse cultural institutions and 
schemes of understanding. It is a decentralized and pluricultural democ-
racy—one in which human agency and human subjectivities are in con-
stant flux, but also rooted meaningfully in the past. It is also a democracy 
whose maintenance requires constant struggle.
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The last two chapters described a Maya idea of sustainable development 
that has been emerging from Guatemala’s Western Highlands. This 
involved a detailed look at the cultural, discursive, historical, and material 
roots of the idea, as well as a description of the idea itself. This chapter uses 
the same method, but moves the focus southward into the contested 
Garifuna territories of coastal Honduras. Much of this chapter is based on 
ongoing fieldwork that I have undertaken since 2011. This work is begin-
ning to show a complex and contested Garifuna sustainable development 
ideal that is emerging around the concept of food sovereignty. Just as with 
the study of Maya sustainable development, an indigenous political insti-
tution will be used as a locus around which to describe an indigenous idea 
of development. In this case, the story will revolve largely around ideas 
and activism associated with the Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras 
(OFRANEH). The story of Garifuna activism stands as another exemplar 
of the transmodern nature of indigenous development ideas that are 
merging in Latin America during a period typified by neoliberal 
multiculturalism.
The hisTorical consTrucTion of Garifuna
The Garifuna case study allows, more than most, a clear example of the 
co-constructed nature of indigeneity and modernity. Processes of colonial-
ism actively created the Garifuna subjectivity while Garifuna subjects 
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helped build the modern nation of Honduras while possibly adding force 
to the percolation of European enlightenment ideals such as national sov-
ereignty, personal freedom, and human rights. Currently, Garifuna activ-
ism contributes to environmental, indigenous rights, and food sovereignty 
movements while being, at the same time, at least partially, created by 
them. There is no distinct pre-Columbian Garifuna culture, rooted in a 
deeply associated territory, to appeal to in this discussion. It was colonial-
ism, and resistance to it, that produced the Garifuna.
In 1675, a ship carrying Mokko people, destined to be slaves, from 
present-day Nigeria, was wrecked near the Caribbean island of St. Vincent. 
The indigenous Kalinaku were known for resisting British and French 
attempts at colonialism. The widely known success of this resistance 
attracted escaped slaves from throughout the Caribbean, and within a few 
generations of intermarriage amidst an increasing Afro-heritage popula-
tion, an emergent Garifuna culture began to take form—combining ele-
ments of African and Kalinaku culture. Perhaps due to the historical 
shock of the Mokko escape from slavery, and the famous resilience of the 
Kalinaku, the islanders were fiercely independent and resistant to colo-
nialism. St. Vincent continued to be a beacon for anti-slavery movements 
as Kalinaku and Garifuna worked together to repel attempted invasions 
by both the French and English in the eighteenth century (Taylor 2012). 
Although the island was officially granted to Britain by the French in the 
Treaty of Paris of 1763, continued resistance of the local inhabitants 
delayed the British colonization of the island until 1796. St. Vincent was 
the last of the Caribbean islands to be subjugated by colonial rule (Taylor 
2012; Anderson 2009).
When British colonial rule did arrive, it was brutal. Although the popu-
lation of St. Vincent was intermixed by 1796, the colonial administration 
chose to abruptly and arbitrarily disrupt the solidaric community. The 
population was sorted along a binary of lighter and darker skin colour, and 
5000 of the latter were deported. This tore both immediate and extended 
families apart, but also solidified the separate indigenous category of 
Garifuna. These darker coloured Mokko/Kalinaku (mixed with other 
Maroon Afro-descendants) were relocated by force to the smaller island of 
Roatan—just off the coast of present-day Honduras. Only half made it 
there alive. Those who survived the perilous forced migration, increasingly 




At this time, the Spanish were intent on maintaining their land holdings 
in Central America. After the injuries of Spanish colonialism all but depop-
ulated the North Coast of Honduras, the Empire was in a tenuous situa-
tion—having to hold on to a large expanse of land without a settler 
population. Creating an unlikely alliance, the Garifuna petitioned the 
Spanish to allow them to occupy the mainland of Honduras. Since the 
Spanish were eager to fill the underpopulated territory with Spanish sub-
jects, the majority of the country’s North Coast was granted to the 
Garifuna (Taylor 2012). Although Garifuna life on the North Coast was 
disrupted from time to time by colonial trade, their de facto title to the 
North Coast of Honduras was relatively stable until the late twentieth 
century.
This colonial history created the Garifuna through the fusing of Mokko 
and Kalinaku DNA and culture. The injustice and injury of colonialism 
based on slavery, conquest, and forced relocation also forged Garifuna 
subjectivity. The Garifuna are at once an indigenous African people and an 
indigenous Caribbean people who have been dislocated to new territory 
in Northern Honduras, with which they have developed a deep felt rela-
tionship. As a result, Garifuna remain fiercely independent—often reiterat-
ing that they are the only Afro-descendent peoples in the Americas that 
have never been slaves. They consider themselves as indigenous, and are 
legally recognized as such. The Garifuna also have a deep cultural relation-
ship with the land of the North Coast—to which many insist they still 
hold title.
These historically driven proclivities are obvious in interviews of 
Garifuna villagers who often assert their independence as never having 
been slaves, as inheritors of indigenous land title, and as having relative 
autonomy within the Honduran state. Many of these assertions find their 
official home in OFRANEH—the main Garifuna political organization in 
the country. Although OFRANEH is the largest, most active, and most 
radical Garifuna organization, it is not the only one. The Garifuna do not 
have a singular voice. OFRANEH is, however, the main conduit through 
which ideas of indigenous Garifuna sustainable development are articu-
lated. It therefore holds a central role in this chapter.
Often speaking through OFRANEH, Garifuna activists strongly assert 
their indigenous culture. For them, this is an essential part of their cultural 
and political identity. This is vital for the movement, as there has been a 
move by the national government to deny the indigenous part of the iden-
tity by designating Garifuna as simply “Afro-decedent” in national 
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statistics. This is a discursive move that threatens to bleed into popular 
culture, putting into question claims to indigenous status, along with land 
title. These important implications for land tenure and political rights are 
apparent in an OFRANEH (2013) memo:
In the decade of the 30s, the Trujillo intellectual Sixto Cacho maintained 
that the Garifuna people were black skin but indigenous culture. To date we 
have managed to preserve a good part of the cultural heritage despite the 
homogenization promoted by the state, through the education system and 
the mass media … In recent decades, the cultural scam has been promoted 
to eradicate the Garífuna identification to replace it with the vague term of 
Afro-descendant, discarding the cultural patrimony of our ancestors by a 
simple identification of supposed race, denying this form the genetic hybrid-
ism of which we are carriers … The difference of visions between the 
Garífuna and those who call themselves ‘Afro-descendants’ is abysmal, the 
first ones seek territorial autonomy and defense of our communities, the 
second ones are satisfied with an insertion within a corrupt system and the 
power handouts of the satraps (foreign-controlled dictators).
This memo suggests that the cultural hybridity implicit to Garifuna iden-
tity is both a valued cultural trait and a political resource to many Garifuna. 
The identity encapsulates a felt history of independence and resistance 
that propels the political activism of a people who have never been slaves 
and still refuse to become so. This is combined with an understanding of 
cultural distinctiveness and indigenous cosmovision. This political identity 
is evident in the words of Mirian Miranda, OFRANEH’s president:
Things like spiritual recognition and cultural identity are important to our 
people. We think our cultural identity can also be a route to revolution … in 
a country where we have a uniform model of living, where there is definitely 
a tendency to believe everything white is better, that white is perfect. 
(Brigida 2017)
This Garifuna Afro-indigenous identity is entangled with territory as well. 
This assures that this indigenous resistance is not limited to the cultural 
sphere, but inhabits the material one as well.
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a ThreaTened land Base
In interviews, North Coast and Garifuna assert a strong historical right, 
and cultural connection, to the land. Stories of the survived attempt at 
enslavement, the expulsion from St. Vincent, and the granting of title on 
Honduras’ North Coast are common. Alfredo Lopez, a Garifuna leader, 
articulates the relationship with land clearly:
The Earth is our mother; the sea is our father. When this relationship is 
broken, we are no longer Garifuna peoples. We make our living from fishing 
and navigation. We don’t use fertilizers because we don’t want to offend the 
earth. What do we do? There is a model of working, its called Barbecho. We 
work five years in one area, then we let it ferment and fertilize, and then we 
occupy another space. This is why our property is collectively owned. 
Because we need this space, which relates to our functional habitat … so the 
cultural and ancestral life we are accustomed to can continue. Rights are 
collective; there is no private property in our way of thinking. 
(Matamoros 2016)
As the following statement by OFRANEH’s leader shows, the organiza-
tion works actively to protect indigenous title while underlining the con-
nection between the land of the North Coast and Garifuna culture:
Without our lands, we cease to be a people. Our lands and identities are 
critical to our lives, our waters, our forests, our culture, our global com-
mons, our territories. For us, the struggle for our territories and our com-
mons and our natural resources is of primary importance to preserve 
ourselves as a people. (Miranda 2015)
Anthropological studies have noted this connection between land and 
identity while describing the indigenous Garifuna tenure system. Garifuna 
beachfront communities were traditionally built at a distance from agricul-
tural and hunting lands, so that food sources were separated from living 
spaces. This left much Garifuna land to appear unsettled and unused in the 
perception of non-Garifuna. The barbecho rotating crop system that 
involved leaving farming plots fallow for numerous years contributes to 
this impression (Brondo 2010).
All Garifuna land was traditionally tenured collectively, creating vast 
territories that were governed internally via Garifuna communal councils 
and tribal leaders. According to Garifuna norms, no land is transferable 
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without the approval of local councils. These internal governance and sub-
sistence practices had the historical effect of distinguishing Garifuna terri-
tory from the dominant Mestizo society with its European-sourced 
national governance structure and private tenure traditions (Taylor 2012). 
This common title, cultural identity, and territorial distinction were rein-
forced through repetition and lived experience. The distinct Garifuna lan-
guage, kinship structures, matrilineal inheritance patterns, subsistence 
farming, fishing and hunting practices, governance structures, dance, and 
other cultural practices all created a repeated lived experience rooted in 
the land (Euraque 2003).
Garifuna tenure was challenged, especially in the late twentieth century. 
This was often interpreted by Garifuna as a direct attack on the people and 
culture. Although the large territorial grant of the North Coast was essen-
tial in the establishment of the Spanish colony and later the state of 
Honduras, the state did not officially recognize Garifuna title or custom-
ary law. Nor were subsistence practices thought to be important when 
compared to production for international markets. As a result, the state 
granted large amounts of Garifuna territory to international banana com-
panies in the early twentieth century. This injury was met with strong 
Garifuna opposition. Garifuna preferred to continue subsistence practices 
on limited land rather than to join the Mestizo-dominated labour force 
(Euraque 2003). As a result of Garifuna resistance, the Instituto Nacional 
Agrario (INA), which administered titling nationally, began to recognize 
the collective right of Garifuna to their remaining lands in the 1970s. This 
was officially only a permission for occupation of the land, not ownership. 
This legal ambiguity facilitated multiple and continued encroachments on 
Garifuna land by local elites and foreign investors (Brondo 2010).
As neoliberal development policy became hegemonic in the late twen-
tieth century, the push for clear land-ownership institutions became stron-
ger in both Honduras and in the rest of the world. With this, official titling 
on Garifuna lands began in 1990 (Brondo 2010). These policies privi-
leged individual title as the primal component of market-led development. 
A UNHP project at that time mapped and demarcated Garifuna commu-
nal land—limiting it to those tracts that were most obviously settled and 
recently used. Due to the prevalence of barbecho, this restricted the 
Garifuna land base a great deal.
Official collective title meant that Garifuna land could not be sold with-
out community agreement, but this title was applied to a very limited 
geography. It has been estimated that as much as 80 percent of Garifuna 
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traditional land was lost by the end of this titling process (MacNeill 2017). 
In addition, Decree 90–90 was enacted in 1990 to develop the North 
Coast as a Caribbean tourism destination by allowing foreigners to own 
beachfront land. The privilege was formerly limited to Honduran nation-
als. This decree, therefore, brought a new threat to Garifuna territory—
foreign capital aimed at tourist industry investment.
This history of land titling and dispossession has had a major impact on 
Garifuna indigenous development and political identity. Leaders, espe-
cially those associated with OFRANEH, describe a continual history of 
“land stealing” by “colonizers” who use their economic power to bend 
the Honduran state and judiciary to their advantage. For example, 
Garifuna protesters at a trial of Canadian investor Randy Jorgensen in 
November 2015, shouted, “no more sales of Garifuna land; no more theft 
of Garifuna land” (Rights Action 2015). The lawyer representing the 
Garifuna at the trial cited reaffirmations of Garifuna title in 1901, 1934, 
and 1995 by the Honduran government. Garifuna activists claim that dis-
possession is the result of a failed state and judiciary that have been cor-
rupted by wealthy elites and foreign capital, despite official protection by 
law. “We could say the rule of law in Honduras is corruption,” said 
Garifuna protestor Carmen Alvarez, “All the way from the Supreme Court 
to the local court here in Trujillo, and everything in between, is cor-
rupted … but we Garifuna are not going to give up” (Rights Action 
2015). OFRANEH continues to hold the ultimate return of all traditional 
lands as an explicit goal (OFRANEH 2019).
Oligarchy, repression, and dictatorship were the prominent forms of 
government in Honduras historically. By 2008, however, the Honduran 
resistance movement, including OFRANEH and other Garifuna groups, 
had become powerful enough to influence national politics (Shipley 
2013). This inspired the then president Manuel Zelaya to pursue numer-
ous progressive policies. Honduras joined socialist and social democratic 
national governments in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA). The minimum wage was raised by 60 percent. Numerous 
pro-poor policies were undertaken. A moratorium was placed on the 
granting of mining concessions until environmental impact assessments 
were completed. The lands of poor campesinos were increasingly pro-
tected, and some was redistributed (Gordon 2010). The Garifuna were 
not explicitly mentioned in land reform initiatives, but drew hope from 
these conciliatory politics (Brondo 2013).
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These reforms threatened the interests of national elites as well as 
Canadian and American investors who were heavily involved in the min-
ing, agricultural, tourism, and manufacturing sectors. These elements 
conspired and successfully removed Zelaya via military coup in 2009. 
Successive oligarchic post-coup governments reversed the changes of the 
Zelaya administration. This inspired poverty rates to increase from 58 per-
cent before the coup, to 68 percent in 2016, and then to drop slightly to 
66 percent. Unemployment rates moved from 3 percent to 7.3 percent in 
that same period, dropping to 6.5 percent in 2018 (INE 2019). Social 
spending was also dramatically curtailed, the minimum wage was reduced 
to pre-Zelaya levels, and the proportion of people employed below that 
wage increased from 28.8 to 43.6 percent (Johnson and Lefebre 2013).
Sustained political crisis and repression have permeated post-coup 
Honduras. This has famously inspired large numbers of Honduras to flee 
their country towards the United States. Politics on all levels have tradi-
tionally been controlled by an oligarchic group of ten powerful families. 
This control was solidified with the coup. Additionally, national policy has 
regularly been influenced by foreign governments and business interests 
(MacNeill 2017). This too intensified after the coup. Oligarchic and for-
eign capital control was extended via the assassination, torture, and repres-
sion of large numbers of oppositional politicians and activists, including 
members of the Garifuna community. For example, North Coast Garifuna 
residents have accused Canadian investor Randy Jorgenson of having 
Garifuna land rights activist Vidal Leiva shot three times in 2015 (Cuffe 
2015). More recently, the resistance movement’s de facto leader, Berta 
Caceres, was assassinated in 2016, followed by two other high-profile 
members, Lesbia Janeth Urquía and Nelson García (Lyengar 2016; 
Agren 2016).
Violence and corruption have become an understood inevitability in 
the country. Post-coup Honduras became the most violent in the world 
outside a war zone. Political and legal systems are so extensively compro-
mised that the national government is instituting a plan to carve out mul-
tiple localities from the official Honduran judicial and political system in 
order to offer stability in some areas to international investors (Government 
of Honduras 2017). Most Hondurans consider their government to be 
highly corrupt, while it ranks as one of the worst in the world when regard-
ing the abuse of public power for private gain. Transparency of govern-
ment finances is characterized with the lowest distinction of scant or none 
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and the country rates extremely low on Press Freedom and Voice and 
Accountability (Transparency International 2017).
Garifuna land tenure has been a notable flashpoint in the post-coup 
climate. Much Garifuna activism has been occurring in the Trujillo area, 
and complaints are largely aimed at the Canadian investor Randy Jorgensen, 
and his companies Life Vision and Banana Coast. Complicating this local 
confrontation, there are established links between this investment consor-
tium and the post-coup government. OFRANEH and local Garifuna 
claim that these links have facilitated foreign acquisition of Garifuna lands 
(MacNeill 2017). Specifically, OFRANEH has accused Canadian investors 
of illegally usurping lands belonging to the villages of Cristales and 
Guadalupe. Furthermore, Garifuna activists charge that the entire popula-
tion of Rio Negro was illegally evicted to allow for the construction of Life 
Vision’s Banana Coast cruise ship port.
Construction of the port began in 2011, and it was completed in 2014. 
Former residents are difficult to find locally. According to local accounts, 
many have scattered to other parts of Honduras or have fled the country. 
To OFRANEH, who insist that “the majority of these transactions were 
carried out under pressure,” the usurpation of Rio Negro is a “fraud car-
ried out against the inhabitants” of the town (OFRANEH 2011). The 
writ of eminent domain, used by Jorgensen in the eviction, was obtained 
through bribery and corruption according to OFRANEH. Jorgensen, and 
the Canadian investors, insist that the town had been “a waterfront eye-
sore and a habitat for disease.” They also insist that the town had been 
legally removed to make way for “a project that would create community 
wide benefits” (Jorgensen 2014).
Jorgensen’s nearby Campa Vista housing project is subject to similar 
accusations of land grabbing. In this case, it is traditional Garifuna hunting 
and farming territory just south of the community of Cristales that is in 
dispute. Both ILO 169 and the Honduran constitution require Garifuna 
community consensus prior to the sale of pertinent land. Jorgensen claims 
that a consultation was held in which the community allegedly agreed to 
sell 20 hectares to a third-party business associate of Jorgensen (Jorgensen 
2014). This associate paid the community president of the time, Omar 
Laredo, $5000 US dollars for the land. Community members allege that 
they never received this money. Laredo immediately left town and has not 
returned. Jorgensen then purchased the land for $20,000 from his associ-
ate and actually fenced-off 62 hectares of land. Over the next few years, he 
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sold the lands, parcel by parcel, to Canadians as vacation home lots, for a 
total of approximately $8.5 million.
There are other land disputes between Jorgensen and Garifuna com-
munities in two other barrios in the Trujillo area. There are also disputes 
involving other Canadian land investors (Aqui Abajo 2017). Jorgensen is 
adamant that the land in each case was legally obtained, and that it was not 
being productively used by the Garifuna anyway. He also rejects the 
authenticity of Garifuna land rights saying, “they are foreigners; they are 
immigrants to Honduras” (Hadden 2016). Local Garifuna and OFRANEH 
insist that they have the same rights of any indigenous group in Honduras, 
that the lands were essential to their subsistence food practices, and that 
they were illegally sold (Cuffe 2015).
Accusations of police intimidation and state corruption and violence 
are also related to these land disputes. One Garifuna, a self-proclaimed 
“land defender,” claims she was arrested and tortured by Honduran police 
and military for opposing a Canadian tourism project (Aqui Abajo 2017). 
Others claim to have been shot and/or intimidated by Jorgensen’s “hit-
man” (Rights Action 2015). The barrios of Cristales and Rio Negro have 
attempted to bring criminal charges against Jorgensen for illegal posses-
sion of Garifuna lands, but these charges were granted a five-year stay in a 
Trujillo court (Rights Action 2015). Truth and legality are difficult to 
discern in these murky events. However, it is clear that many local Garifuna 
assume as a quotidian fact that the police, local government, and Honduran 
state are corrupt and operating in the interest of foreign investors and 
local elites. This implies that any indigenous Garifuna development proj-
ect will need to be undertaken via strong mobilizations towards Garifuna 
territorial autonomy and self-direction.
food sovereiGnTy, environmenTalism, and indiGeneiTy
The 1990s saw the erosion of Garifuna territorial rights due to neoliberal 
reforms and the encroachment of foreign tourism interests. Perhaps pre-
cipitated by the Zapatista movement in Mexico and the now global Via 
Campesina movement, a global indigenous rights movement emerged in 
this period as well. Garifuna thought on indigenous sustainable develop-
ment both informs and is animated by this movement. The Honduran 
ratification of the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, in 1995, granted the Garifuna 
official indigenous status (ILO 2017). Importantly, it contains protections 
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for language and culture while asserting indigenous control over eco-
nomic development and territorial administration. These territorial rights 
were not limited to regularly used human settlements, as any lands used in 
traditional subsistence practices are also protected (ILO 1989).
In 2007, these commitments were reaffirmed via Honduras’ adoption 
of United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These 
conventions require that development projects be designed “with respect 
to peoples’ right to healthy food, to water, to forests for foraging …, and 
ability to continue traditional small-scale agricultural customs” (ILO 
1989, p. 183). The Garifuna, especially through OFRANEH, fought hard 
to pressure the Honduran state to become a signatory to these interna-
tional indigenous rights conventions. Their adoption is an essential part of 
Garifuna sustainable development, and the discourse contained in the 
conventions has become essential to Garifuna ideas of indigenous 
development.
Adding to the discursive power of indigenous rights instruments, 
UNESCO took an unprecedented step in 2001 when it recognized 
Garifuna culture as the first “masterpiece of oral and intangible cultural 
heritage.” The UNESCO proclamation explicitly noted the cultural cen-
trality of land and subsistence practices (UNESCO 2001). These conven-
tions and international recognitions are key to Garifuna sustainable 
development initiatives. True indigenous development, Garifuna leaders 
claim, is not possible without the land protections integral to ILO 169 
(Rights Action 2015). It is clear that OFRANEH considers such conven-
tions to be protections from the imposition of culturally and environmen-
tally destructive development projects. A 2012 memo clearly articulates this:
The Right to Consultation in Honduras, and we can say in the rest of the 
continent, has become a defense mechanism for indigenous people in the 
face of the advance of ‘development’ based on the ideology of the accumula-
tion and the destruction of the environment and the planet. 
(OFRANEH 2012)
Local Garifuna that I interviewed in the Trujillo area were all aware that 
their culture had been designated a “masterpiece of cultural heritage.” 
One local, for example, asserted that, “there is no culture like the Garifuna. 
We have our punta [dance and music], serre and hudut [foods]. We are 
original in the world.” OFRANEH makes these claims explicit by citing 
the UNESCO designation repeatedly on their website (OFRANEH 
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2019). This distinction gives force to the idea that development organized 
from within Garifuna culture would be substantially different from devel-
opment imposed from without.
Given the cultural significance attached to Barbecho and the determined 
resistance to territorial loss exhibited by Garifuna activists, the concept of 
food sovereignty has become central to Garifuna sustainable development. 
In October 2015, OFRANEH was awarded the 7th annual Food 
Sovereignty Prize from the U.S.  Food Sovereignty Alliance. The prize 
purposefully emphasizes grassroots culturally appropriate organization of 
local food systems in juxtaposition to the homogenizing, environmentally 
destructive, and disenfranchising practices of the neoliberal world 
food system.
OFRANEH insists that locally controlled subsistence practices have 
been severely threatened by modern development. In some areas, such as 
the marine coastal reserve at Cayos Cochinos, subsistence practices are 
relatively strong. In others, they are greatly diminished. In Chachahuate—
the main Garifuna settlement on Cayos Cochinos—47 percent of those I 
surveyed in 2016 practised subsistence farming or fishing. Some tradi-
tional fishing rights have been protected, although the loss of land and 
subsistence there has been severe (Brondo 2013). In contrast, only 17 
percent claimed to engage in these traditional food production practices in 
Garifuna settlements in the Trujillo area. No traditional fishing remains in 
the Trujillo bay, and much farmland has been lost.
As this note from OFRANEH’s director Miriam Miranda suggests, 
autonomous food production based on traditional practice is key to 
Garifuna sustainable development:
Our liberation starts because we can plant what we eat. This is food sover-
eignty. We need to produce to bring autonomy and the sovereignty of our 
peoples. If we continue to consume [only], it doesn’t matter how much we 
shout and protest. We need to become producers … It’s also about recover-
ing and reaffirming our connections to the soil, to our communities, to our 
land. (USFSA 2015)
She continues:
Without our lands, we cease to be a people. Our lands and identities are 
critical to our lives, our waters, our forests, our culture, our global com-
mons, our territories. For us, the struggle for our territories and our 
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 commons and our natural resources is of primary importance to preserve 
ourselves as a people … There’s more pressure on us every day for our ter-
ritories, our resources, and our global commons … [T]hey’re taking land 
that we were using to grow beans and rice so they can grow African palm for 
bio-fuel. The intention is to stop the production of food that humans need 
so they can produce fuel that cars need. The more food scarcity that exists, 
the more expensive food will become. Food sovereignty is being threatened 
everywhere. (USFSA 2015)
The idea of food sovereignty was cited as a goal by Garifuna leaders in the 
Trujillo area during interviews I conducted in 2014. For example, speak-
ing of actions being taken by local Garifuna to reclaim traditional lands, 
one leader stated “this land contains our cultural heritage, without our 
lands we cannot have food sovereignty, we cannot be self-sufficient, we 
lose our traditions.” The village of Vallacito, east of Trujillo, is actively 
attempting a Garifuna sustainable development programme, which has 
food sovereignty as its centrepiece. The village is under regular attack from 
drug cartels, palm-oil plantation owners, and charter cities—a government- 
directed plan to usurp local land and form islands of modern develop-
ment. Even in this volatile locale, communal kitchens, organic gardens, 
and a coconut plantation have been established with plans to grow medici-
nal plants, rice, and beans in adjacent areas according to the practice of 
barbecho. The idea, according to Garifuna leaders associated with 
OFRANEH, is sustainable development based on self-sufficiency 
(Clark 2018).
Food sovereignty is central to Garifuna activism and ideas of develop-
ment. The national resistance movement, of which OFRANEH is an 
important member, has been built around an existing national civil society 
network that centralized and even incubated the concept of food sover-
eignty. Boyer (2010), for example, has shown that the Honduran resis-
tance movement has played a vital role in the creation and popularization 
of La Via Campesina—the global movement that is most commonly asso-
ciated with food sovereignty. From 1996 to 2004, La Via Campesina 
maintained its international headquarters in Honduras in the offices of 
CONOCH (The Honduran Coordinating Council of Peasant 
Organizations). CONOCH included Garifuna activists and was attached 
to the civic Council of Popular Indigenous Organizations of Honduras 
(COPINH). COPINH, which includes Garifuna groups such as 
OFRANEH, emerged from Honduran indigenous coalitions of the 1970s 
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and has centralized the idea of food sovereignty since the 1990s (Frank 
2010; Boyer 2010).
In May 2016, La Via Campesina reaffirmed their connection with 
Garifuna in particular when they issued a statement of solidarity with the 
“Afro-Indigenous” Hondurans. The statement affirmed that La Via 
Campesina was “extremely troubled by repeated violations of … human 
rights” against the Garifuna. They continue to denounce “violations of 
the human right to life as well as of the right to food sovereignty” in 
Garifuna Honduras (La Via Campesina 2016).
As with most indigenous groups, environmentalism is deeply connected 
to Garifuna politics of indigeneity and food sovereignty. One of the major 
concerns made by Garifuna representatives about land titling projects 
reflects this. A 2006 report from the World Bank’s Honduras Land Titling 
Project documents Garifuna dissatisfaction with land titling. The report 
shows how Garifuna considered World Bank designed title, instituted 
under the guise of an indigenous development project, a limitation of 
their “functional habitat” as opposed to a protection of title. The Garifuna 
complaint was partially connected with environmental concerns—assert-
ing that Garifuna had preserved the land of the North Coast for centuries, 
and the titling project would leave the territory open to environmental 
degradation. Garifuna livelihoods and culture, according to the complaint, 
are connected intimately to the natural environment. Therefore, Garifuna 
patrimony equates to environmental protection (World Bank 2006).
Being one of the largest indigenous groups in Honduras, the Garifuna 
are appropriately active in the Council of Indigenous Peoples of Honduras 
(COPINH). COPINH is central to the Honduran environmental move-
ment, considering itself and members to be “environmental defenders.” 
In the current political climate of the country, such environmental activ-
ism is incredibly dangerous. Consequently, numerous COPINH members 
have been assassinated, tortured, jailed, and surveilled. COPINH is not 
alone in its struggle for territorial and environmental defense, however. 
The groups are connected to a network of organizations that are integral 
to the global environmental movement.
Global witness is an organization that exists to “protect human rights 
and the environment by fearlessly confronting corruption and challenging 
the systems that enable it” (Global Witness 2019). In a 2017 report, the 
organization pronounced Honduras to be “the deadliest country in the 
world for environmental activism,” claiming that 120 environmentalist 
had been assassinated since 2010 (Global Witness 2017). OFRANEH 
 T. MACNEILL
189
(2019) and its leaders reiterate this distinction regularly, purposefully posi-
tioning themselves on the frontline of the global fight for indigenous and 
environmental defense. In addition to the Food Sovereignty Prize, the 
organization has recently won the Nota Sol Award for defending human 
rights and promoting sustainable development, and the Carlos Escaleres 
Environmental Award after OFRANEH launched its “Defense without 
Fear” environmental and territorial protection campaign. Following this, 
a diversity of large global environmental organizations have used Garifuna 
as an exemplar of strong environmental activism and indigenous steward-
ship. Some of the more notable of these organizations are the Sierra Club 
(Gibler 2017), the Rainforest Action Network (2016), Friends of the 
Earth (2017), and the World Watch Institute (2019).
This positioning of Garifuna culture and land tenure as positively 
related to ecological protection is not fanciful. Multiple studies have found 
evidence that indigenous farmers tend to maintain more ecologically 
diverse farms than do their non-indigenous counterparts (Brush & Perales 
2007; Perreault 2005). This has been found to be true with Garifuna 
communities in particular (Williams 2016). This does not necessarily mean 
that Garifuna culture is essentially pro-ecological diversity, however. It 
would be more accurate to say that Garifuna identity is a node upon which 
global food sovereignty, indigenous rights, environmental movements, a 
felt history, and marginalizing political economy exert significant interpo-
lating pressure. These pressures form and are formed by Garifuna subjec-
tivities in a way that substantiates—in fact—that Garifuna-controlled 
agriculture tends to promote ecological diversity.
conclusion
Garifuna is a people and subjectivity forged in both colonialism and resis-
tance to it. Their resistance on the island of St. Vincent, along with slave 
revolts in other locales, is likely to have had a larger impact on the British 
anti-slavery movement and discursive force of enlightenment ideals than 
Eurocentric histories will admit. Their very existence helped to secure the 
land required to forge the modern state of Honduras. There heritage is 
simultaneously indigenous and modern in a more obvious way than is the 
case with any other group.
Territorial claims based on international rights agreements such as ILO 
169 are commonly used in Garifuna politics. Furthermore, the Garifuna 
also hold on to an idea of development—one rooted in food sovereignty 
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and political autonomy within modern Honduras. Garifuna culture has 
clearly been forged via colonialism, and this colonialism continues in the 
form of land grabs. Thus, Garifuna politics constitutes, and is constituted, 
in relation to “modern” ideals such as freedom, rights, and progress as 
they mix within global indigenous, environmental, and food sovereignty 
movements.
Garifuna sustainable development requires cultural, economic, and 
political autonomy. This stems as much from their independent history as 
much as the coercive weight of the current Honduran and international 
political economy. Garifuna, like most people, strive for a better life—
some form of development. But development controlled by national elites 
and foreign investors has only depleted their land base without yielding 
local benefits (MacNeill and Wozniak 2018). They feel that a distinct 
Garifuna form of development will naturally embody environmental pro-
tections because of their cultural relation to nature.
Connecting to, and caring for, the land of the Honduran North Coast 
is integral to this idea of development. Similar to Maya ideas of sustainable 
development, the Garifuna have had little opportunity to enact their own 
version of culturally embedded progress. The idea involves food sover-
eignty, but this programme is embroiled in a politics of land protection as 
a prerequisite to the flourishing of local indigenous ideas and policies. This 
land protection, as with the Maya, is the first order of business in the quest 
for a culturally embedded sustainable development. Only then, when what 
Garifuna activists call their “functional habitat” is protected, can a sustain-
able development based on collective title, food sovereignty, and the 
revival of Barbecho be established.
references
Agren, D. (2016, July 7). Honduras Confirms the Murder of Another Member 
of Berta Caceres’ Activist Group. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/honduras-murder-lesbia-janeth- 
urquia-berta-caceres.
Anderson, M. (2009). Black and Indigenous: Garifuna Activism and Consumer 
Culture in Honduras. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Aqui Abajo. (2017, February). One Land Defender’s Story of Repression, 
Criminalization and Arrest: Young Garifuna Woman Arrested for Reclaiming 





Boyer, J. (2010). Food Security, Food Sovereignty, and Local Challenges for 
Transnational Agrarian Movements: The Honduras Case. Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 37(2), 319–351.
Brigida, A.  C. (2017, February 23). Garifuna Flee Discrimination and Land 
Grabs in Record Numbers. Retrieved from Telesur http://www.telesurtv.net/
english/news/Garifuna-Flee-Discrimination-and-Land-Grabs-in-Record-
Numbers-20170223-0002.html.
Brondo, K. (2010). When Mestizo Become (Like) Indio … or Is It Garifuna? 
Negotiating Indigeneity and Making Place on Honduras’ North Coast. Journal 
of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, 15(1), 171–194.
Brondo, K. V. (2013). Land Grab: Green Neoliberalism, Gender, and Garifuna 
Resistance in Honduras. University of Arizona Press.
Brush, S. B., & Perales, H. R. (2007). A Maize Landscape: Ethnicity and Agro-
biodiversity in Chiapas Mexico. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 
121(3), 211–221.
Clark, C. (2018, August 28). Honduran Minority Fights for a Threatened Way of 
Life. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-
landrights-garifuna/honduran-minority-fights-for-a-threatened-way-of- 
life-idUSKCN1LD168.
Cuffe, S. (2015, December 12). The Struggle Continues: Garifuna Land Defender 
Shot in Honduras. Truthout. Retrieved from http://www.truth-out.org/news/
item/33976-the-struggle-continues-garifuna-land-defender-shot-in-honduras.
Euraque, D. (2003). The Threat of Blackness to the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in 
the Banana Economy. In S.  Stiffler & M.  Moberg (Eds.), Banana Wars 
(pp. 229–252). Durham: Duke University Press.
Frank, D. (2010, May). Out of the Past, a New Honduran Culture of Resistance. 
NACLA Report on the Americas. Retrieved from https://nacla.org/news/
out-past-new-honduran-culture-resistance.
Friends of the Earth. (2017, June 28). In Solidarity with OFRANEH and Social 
Activists in Honduras. Retrieved from https://www.foei.org/features/
solidarity-ofraneh-social-activists-honduras.
Gibler, J. (2017, February 2). Honduras: The Deadliest Place on Earth to Defend 
the Planet. Sierra Club. Retrieved from https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/
green-life/honduras-deadliest-place-earth-defend-planet.
Global Witness. (2017). Honduras: The Deadliest Country in the World for 
Environmental Activism. Global Witness. Retrieved from https://www.global-
witness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-deadliest-country- 
world-environmental-activism/.
Global Witness. (2019, July 11). Retrieved from https://www.globalwit-
ness.org/en/.
Gordon, T. (2010). Imperialist Canada. Arbeiter Ring Pub.
8 GARIFUNA SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
192
Government of Honduras. (2017). Zonas de Employo y Desarollo Economico. 
Retrieved from Zonas de Employo y Desarollo Economico http://zede.gob.hn/.
Hadden, G. (Director). (2016). Lands to Die For [Motion Picture]. Retrieved 
from https://america.cgtn.com/2016/12/20/lands-to-die-for-the-garifuna- 
struggle-in-honduras.
ILO. (1989). ILO 169—Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. International 
Labour Organization. Retrieved August 16, 2017, from http://www.ilo.
org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ 
ILO_CODE:C169.
ILO. (2017, August 16). Ratifications for Honduras. Retrieved from International 
Labour Organization http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:1120
0:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102675.
Instituto Nacional Estadistica (INE). (2019). Estadisticas Nacional. Government 
of Honduras. Retrieved from www.ine.gob.hn.
Johnson, J., & Lefebre, S. (2013). Honduras Since the Coup: Economic and Social 
Outcomes. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research.
Jorgensen, R. (2014, January 3). Personal Communication with the Author 
(T. MacNeill, Interviewer).
La Via Campesina. (2016, May 18). Honduras: Statement from the CLOC-La Via 
Campesina Central America in Reaction to the Increasing Criminalisation of the 
Peasant Movement. La Via Campesina. Retrieved from https://viacampesina.
org/en/honduras-statement-from-the-cloc-la-via-campesina-central-america-
in-reaction-to-the-increasing-criminalisation-of-the-peasant-movement/.
Lyengar, R. (2016, March 16). Two Weeks After the Murder of Berta Caceres, 
Another Activist Killed in Honduras. Time. Retrieved from http://time.
com/4262328/honduras-activist-nelson-garcia-berta-caceres-shot-dead/.
MacNeill, T. (2017). Development as Imperialism: Power and the Perpetuation of 
Poverting in Afro-Indigenous Central America. Humanity & Society, 
41(2), 1–31.
MacNeill, T., & Wozniak, D. (2018). The Economic, Social, and Environmental 
Impacts of Cruise Tourism. Tourism Management, 66, 387–404.
Matamoros, B. (Director). (2016). OFRANEH [Motion Picture].
Miranda, M. (2015, October 7). Defending Afro-Indigenous Land: Black Fraternal 
Organization of Honduras Wins Food Sovereignty Prize. Retrieved from Upside 
Down World http://upsidedownworld.org/archives/honduras/defending- 
afro-indigenous-land-black-fraternal-organization-of-honduras-wins-food-sov-
ereignty-prize/.
OFRANEH. (2011). Garifuna Communities of Trujillo Take Legal Action 
against Canadian Porn King. Retrieved from Oragnizacion Fraternal Negra 
Hondureño http://friendshipamericas.org/ofraneh-garifuna-communities-
trujillo-take-legal-action-against-canadian-porn-king.
OFRANEH. (2012, March). Honduras: El Banco Mundial, REDD y el Derecho 





OFRANEH. (2013, September 16). Afrodescendientes o Garifunas? Retrieved from 
OFRANEH https://ofraneh.wordpress.com/2013/09/18/afrodescendientes- 
o-garifunas-raza-o-cultura/.
OFRANEH. (2019). Organizacion Fraternal Negra Hondureño. Retrieved from 
http://www.ofraneh.org/ofraneh/index.html.
Perreault, T. (2005). Why Chacras (Swidden Gardens) Persist: Agrobiodiversity, 
Food Security, and Cultural Identity in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Human 
Organization, 64(4), 327–339.
Rainforest Action Network. (2016, March 10). An Open Letter to Secretary of 
State John Kerry. Retrieved from https://www.ran.org/the-understory/
an_open_letter_to_secretary_of_state_john_kerry/.
Rights Action. (2015). Canadian Porn King on Trial for Tourism Projects 
in  Honduras. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
wWqoB5GTfm8.
Shipley, T. (2013). The New Canadian Imperialism and the Military Coup in 
Honduras. Latin American Perspectives, 192, 44–61.
Taylor, C. (2012). The Black Carib Wars: Freedom, Survival, and the Making of the 
Garifuna. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
Transparency International. (2017). Corruption by Territory: Honduras. Retrieved 
from Transparency International www.transparency.org/country#HND.
UNESCO. (2001). First Proclamation of Masterpieces of Oral and Intagible 
Heritage of Humanity. Retrieved from UNESCO http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0012/001242/124206eo.pdf.
USFSA. (2015). Food Sovereignty Prize. Retrieved from US Food Sovereignty 
Alliance http://foodsovereigntyprize.org/portfolio/international-winner/.
Williams, N. E. (2016). The Political Ecology of ‘Ethnic’ Agricultural Biodiversity 
Maintenance in Atlantic Nicaragua. Journal of Political Ecology, 23(1), 223–245.
World Bank. (2006). Inspection Report No. 35470: Honduras Land Administration 
Project. Washington: World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.world-
bank.org/curated/en/510281468034825301/pdf/35470.pdf.
World Watch Institute. (2019, July 11). Finding Sustainable Alternatives to Large 
Hydropower in Central America. Retrieved from http://www.worldwatch.
org/finding-sustainable-alternatives-large-hydropower-central-america-0.
8 GARIFUNA SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
194
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
 T. MACNEILL
195© The Author(s) 2020
T. MacNeill, Indigenous Cultures and Sustainable Development in 
Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37023-7_9
CHAPTER 9
Andean Indigenous Sustainable Development
Indigenous development has been institutionalized in the Andean region 
more than in any other region in the world (with the possible exception of 
Bhutan). This is most apparent when we consider the constitutions of 
Ecuador and Bolivia, in which multiple indigenous concepts of gover-
nance and citizenship have been enshrined (Schilling-Vacaflor 2010; 
Hidalgo-Capitán et  al. 2019). Debates over the particularities of these 
national constitutions notwithstanding, these Andean countries provide 
an essential case study of indigenous sustainable development. Taken 
together, the 40 million-plus indigenous citizens of Bolivia and Ecuador 
represent 20 percent of the entire indigenous population of Latin America 
(Yashar 1999). This manifests an indigenous majority in Bolivia and large 
minority in Ecuador. Given the relative size of the indigenous populations 
in these countries, along with other historical, economic, and political par-
ticularities, it should not be surprising that indigeneity has had such force 
in the region. This chapter will examine the case of Ecuador specifically, as 
it provides a prescient example of the entanglements (Radcliffe et al. 2002) 
involved in the mainstreaming indigenous sustainable development.
IndIgeneIty and natIon-BuIldIng In ecuador
Struggles of indigenous groups within the country have often dovetailed 
with efforts of international agencies towards ethnodevelopment, helping 
to produce a uniquely indigenized politics in Ecuador. Classification is an 
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issue with defining indigeneity in the country, but it has been estimated 
that the indigenous population is somewhere between 7% and 40% of the 
total population. This indigenous population is significantly poorer than 
the Mestizo majority (Radcliffe et  al. 2002; Masala and Monni 2017). 
Since the mid-twentieth century, numerous indigenous groups of the 
country have organized politically. Initially, this organization was focused 
on local associations, then more regional affiliations, and, since the 
mid- 1980s, national confederations were formed. As a result of this work, 
Ecuador has developed one of the strongest national indigenous rights 
movements in the world (Yashar 1996; Escobar and Alvarez 1992).
Not surprisingly, the most intense indigenous organizing began follow-
ing externally imposed neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s. Extreme 
wage repression during the neoliberal period aggravated social conditions 
to the point that nearly 80% of the population lived in poverty by 1990 
(Masala and Monni 2017). These issues were compounded by a fall in the 
price for oil—the country’s main export—and a related crisis of inflation. 
These crises exacerbated the conditions of the country’s poor, by pushing 
the unemployment rate to 30%, and reducing real incomes drastically 
(SIISE 2015). The government dollarized the economy in 2000  in an 
attempt to address the inflation problem. This further increased poverty 
and inequality, stimulating a high volume of emigration to Canada and the 
United States (Acosta 2006). Ecuador’s colonial history had assured that 
indigenous people were especially marginalized; therefore, despite a lack 
of ethnically disaggregated statistics before 2000, we can expect that these 
crises impacted that group disproportionately. Social exclusion if indige-
nous peoples due to their geographical distance from power structures, 
poverty, and continued racism further diminished their status (Masala and 
Monni 2017).
As was the case throughout the globe, the neoliberal, and later post-
neoliberal, periods saw the rise of NGOs and other elements of civil soci-
ety as the state was retracted. A global indigenous movement became 
especially forceful in 1992, with the 500-year anniversary of colonialism 
and the Nobel Prize of Rigoberta Menchu. Ecuadorian indigenous groups 
both took inspiration, and were integral to, this movement (Radcliffe 
et  al. 2002). Largely in response to pressure from the transnationally 
linked national indigenous rights movement, Ecuador ratified ILO 169 in 
May 1998. This changed customary law significantly in the country and 
also related to a shift in cultural and political power for indigenous peo-
ple—many of whom were appointed to important development boards or 
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elected to congress (Radcliffe et al. 2002). This indigenous movement was 
integral to the broader-based Ecuadorian Revolución Ciudadana, which 
began to mobilize around values such as solidarity, equality, and dignity 
for indigenous peoples (Masala and Monni 2017).
Beginning around 2000, the postneoliberal period saw the injections of 
the concept of indigenous social capital into economic development the-
ory. Due to perceived inadequacies in neoliberal marker fundamentalism, 
the idea that social capital could be harnessed as a corrective to market 
failures became widespread (Fine 2002). To those in the guiding global 
development institutions, indigenous culture became a marker for social 
capital. A World Bank working paper, for example, claims that
indigenous peoples in Ecuador suffer from economic deprivation but are 
well-endowed with social capital (for example, organization, solidarity pat-
terns, and shared social and cultural values). (van Nieuwkoop and 
Uquillas 2000)
What has become known as ethnodevelopment encapsulates these ideas. 
Ancestral knowledge, reciprocity, non-market exchange, collective iden-
tity, a capacity to mobilize labour, and close attachment to ancestral lands 
have now all become key resources for ameliorating market failures accord-
ing to development economists (Radcliffe et al. 2002). This, according to 
postneoliberal development economics, contributes to economic growth 
while lessening the probability of negative environmental consequences. 
As one World Bank report phrases it, “strengthening cultural identity and 
promoting sustainable socioeconomic development are mutually reinforc-
ing” (Deruyttere 1997).
As a result of the mainstreaming of social capital and ethnodevelop-
ment, funding and political support for indigenous groups intensified 
globally (Radcliffe et al. 2002). Ecuadorian indigenous institutions bene-
fitted significantly from this. The World Bank, for example, created a $50 
million Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples’ Development Project that 
was active from 1998 to 2003. The project specifically sought to facilitate 
land access and funding for indigenous communities and other groups. Its 
four goals included strengthening indigenous organizations, securing land 
and title for indigenous communities, providing investment in community 
infrastructure and micro-enterprise, and strengthening the National 
Council of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Development (World Bank 
2019). Similarly, since 1996, multiple mainstream international agencies 
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have funded the Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Fondo Indigena), from which 
Ecuadorian groups continually benefit (Fondo Indigena 2019). Fondo 
Indigena supports capacity building in indigenous civil society organiza-
tions as well as investing in community-level projects, cultural revitaliza-
tion, and indigenous education.
Such programmes have increased the interpolating power of the 
national indigenous movement and of the Revolución Ciudadana. The 
result was an increased incorporation of the indigenous movement’s four 
main goals into national politics in Ecuador. According to Radcliffe et al. 
(2002), these goals are “to strengthen their own cultures, to construct a 
plurinational state, to gain self-determination as a people with right to land 
and collective rights; and self-management of their own development” (p. 5).
Although indigenous movements in Ecuador have gained funding and 
legitimacy via postneoliberal development policy, it is important to note 
that the goals of movements such as Revolución Ciudadana align only 
partially with those of development economists and funding agencies. As 
Radcliffe et al. (2002) put it, “[u]nder social capital models culture is an 
asset, while for indigenous movements, culture represents a successful 
politics of anticolonialism” (p. 11). As social capital, indigenous culture is 
supposed to make markets work better, but new economic models of 
development have little theoretical space for the radical, communitarian, 
and often anti-capitalist politics of indigenous movements. Just as with 
examples from Guatemala and Honduras, this theoretical and practical 
misalignment provides opportunities for indigenous peoples at the same 
time as it introduces tensions. These tensions occur as the economic devel-
opment imperatives of states and multilateral institutions misalign with 
alternatives to development often advocated by indigenous groups. These 
tensions become obvious when we consider the politics around the Andean 
indigenous concept of Sumak Kawsay and an associated plan for resource 
non-extraction in the Yasuní region.
Sumak kawSay and the ecuadorIan constItutIon
The Andean indigenous concept of Sumak Kawsay has received a good 
deal of attention recently as it is likely the most systematized, institutional-
ized, and clearly delineated proposal for an alternative to development 
that has emerged from Latin America. While the Maya of Guatemala and 
Garifuna in Honduras can only hope to attain the physical, discursive, and 
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political resources required to systematize indigenous development, 
Ecuadorians have gone some distance in realizing a true alternative to 
modernization. This should not be taken to imply that Sumak Kawsay, 
and related policy and politics, has achieved a pure vision that has been 
systematically implemented. The concept and its use by indigenous com-
munities and the state are embattled and multiply interpreted. Thus, 
studying the incongruencies associated with Sumak Kawsay allows us to 
understand better the pitfalls and possibilities involved in establishing and 
institutionalizing indigenous alternatives to development.
Although the concept of Sumak Kawsay is deeply rooted in indigenous 
cosmology, the concept has emerged only recently as welfare or develop-
ment paradigm. Hidalgo-Capitán et al. (2019) explain that this formaliza-
tion began with the Amazanga Plan, initiated by the Pastaza Indigenous 
Peoples’ Organization of Ecuador in the early 1990s. The plan docu-
mented, for the first time, what is called the wisdom of the people of the 
jungle (sacha runa yachai in Kichwa). This “philosophical framework,” 
according to Hidalgo-Capitán et al. (2019, p. 2), is embedded in three 
concepts. The first, Sumac Allpa, indicates a “land free of evil,” the sec-
ond, Sumak Kawsay, implies a “clear and harmonious life,” and the third, 
Sacha Kawsay Riksina, evokes the “art of understanding-knowing- 
convincing- being” (ibid.). Carlos Viteri, a Kichwa anthropologist, then 
“systematized this concept until it became a theoretical proposal for wel-
fare and a proposal for social transformation” (ibid.). Despite previous 
uses of the term, it is Viteri’s ethnography-based synthesis that has been 
increasingly evoked by the signifier Sumak Kawsay.
The concept combines spiritual, ecological, and communitarian ele-
ments and rests on indigenous perceptions of multiple, interrelated 
spheres. The first of these, Amasanga, is described by Coq (2017) as “the 
spirit of the forest,” which “acts as an energy that flows through an 
extended perception of the ecosystem” (p. 169). This extended notion of 
ecosystem includes animals and insects, humans, water, soil, as well as 
“spirits of the forest” (ibid.). Thus, Amasanga is “essential for under-
standings interconnections amongst different sets of elements (social, 
natural, spiritual)” (ibid.). Nunghui, according to Coq-Huelva et al. 
(2018), is the spirit of things that are made, or nurtured, by humans—
such as gardens or handicrafts. Vitally, this concept is also associated with 
equilibrium and stability. The third sphere of Sunghui, the source of life, 
is interrelated with the other two spheres.
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Sumak Kawsay is intimately related to these spheres as they interact 
within a given locality. Thus “people cannot be understood without terri-
tory, and territory cannot be understood without people” (ibid.). In turn, 
“[t]he community not only includes people but also animals, plants, eco-
systems, even forces and spirits that supposedly live in the territory” 
(ibid.). Sumak Kawsay, therefore, implies the nurturance of well-being of 
this community that extends beyond the simple human elements, evoking 
the importance of balance with nature where human needs cannot pre-
dominate the well-being of nature. Consequently, according to Coq 
(2017), “[c]ommunitarian harmony is not only the product of but also 
the guarantee of good family living” (ibid.). Therefore, “having a good 
family and residing in a non-conflictive human community that conserves 
forests and their associated spirits are essential elements” of indigenous 
understandings of being (ibid.). This translates into a “preference for self- 
sufficiency,” often articulated in terms of food sovereignty as well as a 
bio-centrism (ibid.).
Given these characteristics, Sumak Kawsay has found many allies in 
postneoliberal political and economic paradigms. The idea has resonated 
well with streams of decentralized new socialism that have emerged in 
twenty-first-century Latin America. Increasingly powerful discourses of 
sustainability and environmentalism have found a congruence with the 
concept as well. The global food sovereignty movement too supports, and 
is supported by, the idea (as well as the Andean indigenous movements 
that have propagated it). Furthermore, the idea that Andean indigenous 
peoples have a transcendent understanding and relation with nature fits 
well with the indigeneity-as-social-capital postulates of post-Washington- 
Consensus development policy. All of these things have produced a perfect 
storm for the ascendance of Sumak Kawsay in Ecuador. As the idea has 
gained formality and popularity, however, its essence of localism and bio- 
centrism may have been ejected. This can be seen clearly with the inclusion 
of the concept in the Constitution of Ecuador.
Due to the multiple political, economic, and discursive forces outlined 
above, Sumak Kawsay emerged at the forefront of the Ecuadorian political 
imagination in the period leading up to the institution of a new national 
constitution in 2008. Although the concept has a complex meaning that 
is differently interpreted in various locales (Uzendoski 2018; Coq 2017), 
it came to be translated to Bien Vivir (to live well) in Spanish. This was 
part of a massive undertaking by the leftist government of President Rafael 
Correa to create a national constitution that would be later touted as the 
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“most radical in the world” (Lalander 2016, p.  623). Although that 
description may be appropriate, many tensions emerged with Sumak 
Kawsay’s interpretation and institutionalization into the constitution. The 
most striking of these tensions is between the indigenous concept and 
attempts of the Correa government to simultaneously institute a new 
socialism. Following the emergent “red tide” in Latin America, this new 
socialism focused on decentralization and egalitarianism, funded by 
resource extraction.
The constitution of 2008 was propelled largely by the Revolución 
Ciudadana, which advocates “policy aimed at abolishing social stratifica-
tion along ethnic, gender, religious and class lines” (Lalander 2016, 
p. 629). This abolishment of stratification does not mean the elimination 
of difference, however, as the Constitution’s first article declares the coun-
try to be intercultural and plurinational. This recognition of difference in 
worldview along with a progressive, extractivist, model of development 
inspired many to label the Constitution as an exercise in “Sumak Kawsay 
Socialism,” as opposed to being a definitive expression of indigenous ide-
als (Ramírez Gallegos 2012, p. 33). Thus, As Lalander (2016) argues, the 
use of Sumak Kawsay in the Ecuadoran Constitution signifies a process 
through which “ancient indigenous traditions are applied in new contexts 
to create alternatives to global capitalism” (p. 631) that are not necessarily 
in opposition to modernizing development. Consequently, recognition of 
indigenous relations to nature was secured amidst a national effort to 
intensify development through large-scale mining. Typifying the new 
commitment to indigenous cosmovision, Article 71 of the Constitution, 
states that:
Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right 
to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regenera-
tion of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. 
[Furthermore] All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon 
public authorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and interpret 
these rights, the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as 
appropriate. The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal enti-
ties and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the 
elements comprising an ecosystem.
Article 72 follows by declaring that nature has a right to be restored if it 
has incurred damages. Following this, Article 73 delineates measures that 
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the government must take to prevent or restrict damage to the natural 
environment. Article 57 applies specific protection to peoples who are liv-
ing in voluntary isolation, and to their environments. The article states 
that they “are an irreducible and intangible ancestral possession [of their 
land] and all forms of extractive activities shall be forbidden there.” 
Subsequently, “[t]he State shall adopt measures to guarantee their lives, 
enforce respect for self-determination and the will to remain in isolation.” 
In accordance, “[t]he violation of these rights shall constitute a crime of 
ethnocide.” These articles are all in accordance with the sentiment extended 
in the preamble, which states:
We women and men, the sovereign people of Ecuador … hereby decide to 
build a new form of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with 
nature, to achieve the good way of living, the Sumak Kawsay. (República del 
Ecuador 2008)
Lalander (2016) points out, however, that although the Constitution, and 
ILO 169, contain language emphasizing the right to free, prior, and 
informed consultation in the face of planned resource extraction in their 
territories, the related requirements are ambiguous. As Lalander (2016) 
suggests, the Constitution makes clear in multiple articles that the state 
has a responsibility to use natural resources in the interest of social welfare. 
For example, Article 276 delineates state development responsibilities:
1. To improve the quality of life and life expectancy, and enhance the capaci-
ties and potential of the population within the framework of the principles 
and rights provided for by the Constitution. 2. To build a fair, democratic, 
productive, mutually supportive and sustainable economic system based on 
the egalitarian distribution of the benefits of development and the means of 
production, and on the creation of decent, stable employment. (República 
del Ecuador 2008)
Although territorial and environmental protection remains uncommonly 
strong in the constitution, there are many such caveats. For example, 
Article 405 declares:
Activities for the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources are forbidden 
in protected areas and in areas declared intangible assets, including forestry 
production. Exceptionally, these resources can be tapped at the substanti-
ated request of the President of the Republic and after a declaration of 
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national interest issued by the National Assembly, which can, if it deems it 
advisable, convene a referendum. (República del Ecuador 2008)
The Constitution of Ecuador does, in general, stand as an exemplary and 
revolutionary document in its protections for plurinational indigenous 
rights and rights accorded to the natural environment. It is, however, an 
incorporation of some biocentric and indigenous principles into a devel-
opmentalist state apparatus that is interested in neo-extractivist new- 
socialist development. Development remains a form of modernization 
premised on resource-based economic growth, albeit one that emphasizes 
protections for nature and cultural alterity. The ambiguities generated by 
this document, and the cultural political economy in which it is situated, 
are visible in the politics around the failed Yasuní-ITT initiative.
the Yasuní Plan and Its FaIlure
Yasuní-ITT refers to the protected ecological area of the Yasuní National 
Park and three untapped oil blocks contained therein—known collectively 
as Ishpingo–Tambococha–Tiputini. Ecuador’s main indigenous organiza-
tion CONAIE demanded the suspension of exploitation of oil resources in 
the area in 1995 (Lalander 2016). The Tambococha and Tiputini both 
lived in voluntary isolation in Yasuní, and CONAIE claimed that their 
ancestral territories and ways of life were extremely vulnerable to expanded 
oil exploration (Fierro 2017). In 2007, before the national endorsement 
of the 2008 Constitution, President Correa and his government initiated 
a bold plan for the protection of the area, which contained some of the 
nation’s largest oil reserves: the Yasuní-ITT initiative.
Purportedly following the spirit of Sumak Kawsay—which had become 
a guiding principal for both CONAIE and the federal government—the 
Yasuní-ITT proposed to keep all oil of the area “in the ground.” The 
simple idea was to ask the international community to compensate Ecuador 
for half the loss of income it would incur due to the non-exploitation of 
oil. This would protect carbon sink, flora, and fauna in one of the most 
ecologically diverse areas of the world, and the way of life of the region’s 
indigenous inhabitants, while providing social development funds 
(Lalandar 2016).
Specifically, as a UNDP document claims, the project would leave 846 
million barrels of oil in the ground. This oil would be worth approximately 
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$90 billion in 2019-adjusted dollars. Since the government of Ecuador 
would voluntarily forfeit half the opportunity cost of the oil, Correa was 
seeking international support in gaining $45 billion to establish a Yasuní-
ITT trust fund. Touted as a new model for development, this initiative 
specifically proposed the following:
 (a) An innovative option for combatting global warming by avoiding 
the production of fossil fuels in areas that are highly biologically 
and culturally sensitive in developing countries.
 (b) Protecting the biodiversity of Ecuador and protecting the volun-
tary isolation of indigenous cultures…
 (c) Social development, nature conservation and implementing the 
use of renewable resources. (Larrea 2009, p. 2)
Capital gained via the fund would be invested in the production of renew-
able energy via solar, wind, and hydroelectric facilities. These would pro-
vide stable investment income thereafter. The profits of which, along with 
interest from the remainder in the fund, would be used for:
 (a) [C]onserving and preventing deforestation … in 43 protected 
areas, totaling 4.8 million hectares … equaling 18% of 
Ecuador’s territory
 (b) Reforestation, forestation, natural regeneration and appropriate 
management of one million hectares of forest owned by small 
landholders
 (c) Increase national energy efficiency
 (d) Promote social development … with programs that include health, 
education, training, technical assistance and productive job cre-
ation in sustainable activities. (Larrea 2009, p. 3)
The massive project would fund a national-scale attempt to diversify the 
economy away from a model of development based on oil extraction, 
towards a new strategy based on equity and sustainability. As Lalander 
(2016) claims, “the Yasuní-ITT initiative turned into the symbol of 
another possible world and a rejection of extractive capitalism” for pro-
gressives around the world (p. 633). The region and project became a 
“national refrain of Ecuadorians across the nation, around the identifica-
tion of the environmentalist purposes of the initiative”; “I am Yasuní” (Yo 




The project, however, reproduced tensions between the meaning of 
Sumak Kawsay for indigenous people, and its use by the national govern-
ment and non-indigenous population. At its root, Sumak Kawsay is an 
alternative to development. The Yasuní-ITT initiative, however, espoused 
an alternative form of development. The difference is not trivial. One con-
cept rejects modernization and elevates another, ecologically rooted, way 
of existing. The other concept advocates modernistic national develop-
ment via a new-socialist and sustainable development model. Although 
indigenous groups such as CONAEI supported the initiative, this support 
was tentative, and such groups did not tend to support the Correa govern-
ment in general (Lalander 2016).
Fierro (2017) explains that this tension also resulted from Ecuador’s 
position as an oil-dependent developing country within a capitalist global 
political economy. The scale of the project was too large to be internally 
financed; thus, Correa had to turn to the international community of 
nations for funding. These donors balked at the framing of the project 
because it hinged on the non-extraction of resources. Germany, for exam-
ple, announced that it would not offer finances because “the proposal is 
dangerous and might be a precedent for other producing countries to 
demand a similar amount” (AGENCIA AFP 2010). Although Germany 
supported many elements of the project, it could not “support the idea of 
paying compensation to a country for renouncing oil exploitation” (ibid.). 
Much of the international community balked in this same way, ultimately 
leaving the initiative virtually unfunded.
Ecuador was not in a position to leave the oil in the ground without 
compensation, however. The country was not only dependent on oil 
income, which equaled 66% of its total imports, it was also dependent on 
oil derivatives (refined petroleum, petrochemicals for agriculture, etc.). In 
all, 74% of the derivatives used in the country were imported (Acosta 
2006). The abandonment of modernizationist development could not be 
supported by the non-indigenous majority (nor likely by many indigenous 
Ecuadorians). That the country could only premise non-extraction on 
payment from the international community, makes obvious its dependent 
position in the global economy. This dependency exists discursively—in 
the largely imported cultural norm of modernizationist development. It 
also exists economically—in the lack of funds available to pursue sustain-
able forms of modernization (Fierro 2017).
Correa cancelled the Yasuní-ITT initiative in August 2013. The 
Ecuadorian government had promoted the idea for six years, but sufficient 
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funds were never accumulated. In an impassioned press conference, the 
president explained, “unfortunately we have to say that the world has 
failed us … I think the initiative was ahead of its time, and those respon-
sible for climate change were unable to understand it, or did not want to.” 
In his mind, not only had the international community of nations let 
Ecuador down, but also the global environmental movement and associ-
ated individual progressives from all over the world also failed to put their 
finances behind the project.
But many have also pointed out that the failure was also on the 
Ecuadorian government’s hands. They had promoted a green moderniza-
tionist development programme and de facto continued embedding of the 
country within an extractives capitalist world system instead of rejecting 
that system and pledging simply to keep the oil in the ground without 
financial strings attached. Sumak Kawsay was, in fact, never a cohesive part 
of the programme. It was a plan for modernization via green new-socialist 
principles. The plan purported to protect indigenous peoples, but did not 
take their ideas as seriously as it could have.
conclusIon
Sumak Kawsay, as the idea emanates from indigenous Ecuador, is unprec-
edented as a well-delineated alternative to development. It is biocentric as 
opposed to anthropocentric. This biocentrism is achieved as indigenous 
cosmovision extends the idea of community beyond the human domain 
and into the natural world. Nature is framed as something to be nurtured 
and maintained, instead of as a resource for development. There is an idea 
of development contained in Sumak Kawsay, however. This involves the 
complex ideal of the extended community “living well.” This does not 
necessarily require economic growth or modernizationist development.
Sumak Kawsay emerged in a time typified by the forceful emergence of 
a neo-extractivist, new socialist model of development in Latin America 
(Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano 2017). This model aims to use resource 
extraction to create economic surplus that will be used to fund a decentral-
ized, egalitarian, but modernizationist form of development. 
Environmental sustainability is not ejected in new-socialist development 
models, nor is the protection of indigenous peoples, their cultures, and 
their land. With their emphasis on economic diversification and equity 
along modernizationist lines, however, they clash with Sumak Kawsay, 
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which is more closely aligned with a de-growth perspective that empha-
sizes well-being and nurturance of the extended community.
Furthermore, the ascendance of both new socialism and indigenous 
alternatives to development has emerged within a capitalist and extractivist 
global political economy. This global political economy favours indigene-
ity only so much as it is a corrective for market failures. Neoliberal multi-
culturalism assures that this acceptance of alterity stops where it clashes 
with capital accumulation. As a result, indigenous culture is supported in 
a superficial way. When Andean indigenous cosmovisions conjure propos-
als that eschew economic development via resource extraction, that sup-
port stops.
Thus, the Ecuadorian constitution simultaneously includes and excludes 
indigenous ideas of development. This case study, then, evidences not 
only a lack of resources that dependent nations have to pursue endoge-
nous development priorities, but also shows a lack of empathy and imagi-
nation even amongst sympathetic developmentalist governments. As a 
result, indigenous alternatives to development have yet to be pursued seri-
ously even in the most sympathetic and progressive governments of the 
world. Indigenous development in Ecuador does have obvious allies in 
global de-growth and deep-ecology movements, but these movements are 
not close to being mainstreamed. Sumak Kawsay, along with other forms 
of indigenous sustainable development, therefore, remains to be marginal-
ized and incorporated only piecemeal. This is true whether they are incor-
porated by new socialist states such as Ecuador, or predatory, clientalist 
regimes such as those in Honduras or Guatemala.
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Much work has been done in this book so far to describe both indigenous 
and “non-indigenous” ideas of development. Since the vital element of 
indigenous development is a recognition of cultural difference, culture 
was centralized in development ideas. Using a transmodern perspective 
allowed us to admit that, although marginalized, the influence of indige-
nous peoples must have exerted some formational pressure on both 
enlightenment and development thought. We can expect, therefore, that 
there will be some congruencies between indigenous ideas of sustainable 
development and other streams of development thinking.
To my knowledge, there has not been any major attempt to search the 
annals of historical text to show the influence that the peoples marginal-
ized by colonialism had on enlightenment thought. Although I have not 
begun that work here, my goal is to go some distance towards finishing 
it. Towards that end, I will examine the extent to which traditional 
development theories can be incorporated into contemporaneous indig-
enous thought. I am not attempting to do the opposite—to integrate 
bits of indigenous knowledge into mainstream theories. I will privilege 
the indigenous here. If mainstream development theory is incommensu-
rate with indigenous ideas of sustainable development, the former will 
not be considered useful. In this chapter, I will use “indigenous thought” 
and “indigenous development” to describe the Andean, Maya, and 
Garifuna case studies discussed in this book. It is understood that these 
are just three of many different indigenous groups in Latin America and 
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the world. This language is used for descriptive expedience and is not 
intended to suggest that all indigenous groups share the same cosmol-
ogy as those treated here.
ClassiCal PolitiCal EConomy 
and nEoClassiCal EConomiCs
The thinking of the classical political economists of late eighteenth- century 
Europe had striking similarities to current indigenous thought. This asser-
tion holds especially true regarding the work of Adam Smith and J.S. Mill. 
Importantly, both of these political economists considered human tastes, 
values, and propensities—including those to engage in self-regarding indi-
vidualistic market transactions—to be cultural constructions. These ten-
dencies, especially for Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, were 
products of the social institution of capitalism and forced upon human 
actors by abject poverty and inequality. Out of poverty came a desperate 
need to attain the primal elements of life. Out of inequality came the need 
to show status through emulation. Similarly, Andean, Maya, and Garifuna 
thoughts often contain a fear that the global capitalist system is creating 
competitive consumers out of indigenous subjects. They also insist that it 
is in their relationships with others that human subjects gain their tastes 
and values.
In this sense, a primal compulsion of the human in both traditions is to 
build a system of beliefs through communication. The prime impulse, in 
other words, is not narrow personal gain, but communicative world- 
building and other-regarding behaviour. This is abundantly apparent in 
the Maya, Andean indigenous, and Garifuna assertion that the division 
between community and individual is a false one, and repeated descrip-
tions of the ways in which human wants and needs are cultural products. 
Similarly, Smith makes a clear assertion in The Wealth of Nations that the 
apparently natural self-interested action of humans in a market society is 
likely the result of being embedded in such a society and not a natural 
propensity at all. Mill similarly suggests that a time may come that systemic 
change will lead to more communitarian behaviour in formerly competi-
tive societies. Smith went even further in his Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759/1790) to suggest that it was the ethical other-regarding “inhabit-




Classical political economists and indigenous thinkers share scepticism 
about the fairness of a capitalist system of production and distribution as 
well. This is obvious in the case of the latter. It is often overlooked, how-
ever, that classical political economists shared this scepticism due to the 
inclusion of the labour theory of value in their theoretical framework. 
Smith’s warnings regarding class divisions in capitalist societies were much 
more extreme than those found in the work of Mill or Ricardo, but an 
inherent tension between landed, capitalist, and labouring classes is com-
mon to all, as are warnings about tendencies of capitalist classes to accu-
mulate disproportionate economic and political power. For Smith, this 
tendency was enough to threaten the continuance of democracy itself, as 
the capitalist class may attempt to force its favoured policies through gov-
ernment at the expense of the well-being of society at large.
Important differences do exist between Latin American indigenous 
thinking and that of the classical political economists, however. First, the 
scepticism of the capitalist system is much more profound amongst the 
Maya, Andean indigenous, and Garifuna. This is not to diminish the sub-
stantial distrust Smith had of free markets, but the indigenous ideas dis-
cussed here treat the free market with fear and occasionally with cautious 
acceptance—but the acceptance appears only where the institution is to be 
governed substantially by democratic processes to ensure the market oper-
ates in the interest of social and environmental well-being.
A more fundamental difference exists regarding the propensity of the 
classical political economists to circumscribe the economy for the purpose 
of analysis. The classical political economists were guilty of the enlighten-
ment habit of separating the knowable world into distinct parts. The most 
fundamental of these was the distinction of humans and nature. The latter 
was consistently characterized as a resource by the classical political econo-
mists, while nature is conceived as part of community in indigenous 
thought. The classical habit of demarcating the economy from culture is 
just as problematic. If there is a fundamental character to Andean indige-
nous, Maya, and Garifuna thought, it is that all aspects of humanity, 
nature, and culture constitute a single system and cannot be abstractly 
separated.
The nature/human/culture distinction is not the only problematic 
classical demarcation in relation to indigenous thought. Although Smith 
and Mill, for example, insisted that moral philosophy must be considered 
in addition to economic analysis—and Smith even believed that the eco-
nomic analysis of The Wealth was to be subordinate to his more 
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encompassing work in The Theory of Moral Sentiments—classical political 
economists tended to hold these spheres separate in their analyses. This 
led, for example, to The Wealth being read at the expense of Moral 
Sentiments by the social scientists that would follow Smith. This, if we are 
to take Karl Polanyi at his word, contributed very much to the creation of 
an economic society.
This economic society is very different from the society that is con-
doned by the Maya, for example—one in which production, consump-
tion, and exchange of goods are integrated into a cultural system typified 
by Maya cosmovision. The most basic premise of Maya cosmovision is that 
nature, culture, and the material world are one. This implies that a sphere 
of material production, distribution, and consumption cannot be artifi-
cially severed from the other aspects of human existence. It also suggests 
that nature be viewed as more than simply a resource for production. 
Cultural sustainability is thus tied to environmental sustainability. An eco-
nomic science that holds human wants as stable and refuses to situate 
them historically or culturally—let alone one which refuses the reciprocal 
relation between human and nature—cannot be thought to be consistent 
with indigenous development.
The neoclassical economics that was born of the marginalist revolution 
continued the trend of severing the economic from the cultural. In this 
move, economics was defined only as the study of exchange in markets 
and was therefore effectively disconnected from the political, the cultural, 
or the ethical considerations. Humans were considered to be atomistic 
and stable in their preferences—only interacting with one another through 
prices. Neoclassical policy implied that the more liberal markets are, the 
more efficient transactions will be, the more aggregate economic product 
will be produced. Development was taken to mean increased gross national 
product, and free markets were the means to achieve this.
It would be difficult to imagine a theory of development that is further 
from the indigenous—with its insistence on the cultural and natural 
embeddedness of all action, the centrality of politics, the malleability of 
preferences, the broad definition of development to include non-economic 
factors, and scepticism of the efficacy of markets. The Keynesian turn in 
neoclassical economics reduced the economists’ blind faith in the perfect 
functioning of markets, and even introduced cultural considerations into 
conversations regarding policy. It did little to address the other issues that 
are central to indigenous thought, however, and, in Smithian fashion, held 
cultural considerations largely apart from economic ones.
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The circumscription of an economic field of analysis from the social, 
cultural, and political milieu had another important implication for devel-
opment thinking that was to follow. Development itself came to be char-
acterized in terms of material and economic gain at the expense of 
interwoven social, ecological, political, and cultural considerations. This 
form of economic reductionism in development thought would remain a 
dominating characteristic in much of the thinking that followed classical 
political economy—from Marxism, to neoclassical economics, and mod-
ernization theory. It would not be until later cultural approaches to devel-
opment—such as postcolonialism and post-development—emerged that 
this econocentric approach would be contested.
marxian PolitiCal EConomy
The relation between early Marxian political economy and indigenous 
thought is difficult to establish with perfect clarity. Given the vastness of 
Marxian interpretation and debate, it is difficult to make any claim regard-
ing Marxian theory without being challenged by varying contradicting 
exceptions and alternative readings. It is clear, however, that indigenous 
thought finds it useful to recognize inherent tendencies towards labour 
exploitation and material inequality in a capitalist system. Those who con-
trol the means of production are assumed to be able to benefit unfairly in 
such a system and may use this power to produce ideology, which can 
change the values and beliefs of dominated classes and peoples. 
Furthermore, indigenous thought resembles that of Marxian/Leninist 
theories of imperialism, which note that wealthy capitalists in industrial 
nations have the means and incentives to manipulate government in less 
economically powerful areas of the world. This neocolonialism at the 
hands of oligopolistic transnational capital is one of the main concerns that 
has provoked a focus on political decentralization and relative autonomy 
for the Garifuna, Andean indigenous, and Maya.
We may, however, interpret early Marxian thought (arguably) to be 
materially reductionist, overly concerned with aggregate economic output 
at least at early stages of development, teleological in that it presumes 
society to advance in a number of predetermined steps to an ultimate state 
of modern development, and addicted to the enlightenment concepts of 
“real” human propensities that may be obscured by an ideology or a fetish 
and a natural world that exists only as a resource for production. Where 
(or rather if) Marxism ebbs towards these tendencies, it distances itself 
from indigenous thought.
10 INDIGENIZING DEVELOPMENT 
216
Later iterations of the Marxian tradition are not so easily characterized 
in these terms, and therefore fall more in line with indigenous ideas and 
politics. Gramsci presented an early challenge to the Marxian assertion 
that the nature of ideas, of consciousness, of culture, is determined solely 
by the economic base. His assertion that the naturalized ideas which 
uphold an exploitative system can be challenged is similar to the core ideal 
that indigenous culture can challenge neoliberal development. Certainly, 
indigenous peoples’ work to valorize indigenous thought vis-à-vis Western 
capitalist hegemony is reminiscent of a Gramscian battle of ideational 
position.
Gramscian thought, however, maintains the Marxian presumption that 
consciousness can be somehow “false.” Correspondingly, members of a 
society are presumed to be misled by capitalist-produced propaganda 
which prevents them from seeing the true nature of their exploitation. 
The goal of a Gramscian countermovement would be to expose that the 
relations of production are working in the interest of a capitalist class at 
the expense of others and to thereby prompt revolutionary change. 
Indigenous activists, however, are careful to depict consumer culture, for 
example, not so much as a false belief system, but as a system of beliefs that 
has been adopted amidst profound material, political, and cultural power 
imbalances. As much as there is a large distaste for capitalism and con-
sumer culture among Maya activists, for example, the main problem is not 
seen to be the nature of this cultural form, but the material and discursive 
inequality out of which it has been constructed.
The goal of indigenous development is more to institute a thorough 
discursive democracy than to expose the “true nature” of exploitation 
through challenging ideas. This distinction is actually quite important in 
that it disallows the imposition of a new “revolutionary” system that has 
been designed by radical intelligentsia in the “interest” of the common 
people. Instead, it promotes the creation of a decentralized sphere of poli-
tics and discursive production in which the culturally formed “interest” of 
the people is constantly, and democratically, renegotiated. There is no 
“true” economic plan, be it capitalist, socialist, or communist, to be 
designed by left-leaning technocrats and imposed with the goal of ending 
exploitation. There is only democracy and participation. Any system, plan, 
or policy devised as a result of such a thoroughly decentralized democratic 
process would be thought to be good in an ethical sense, not because of 
its technical, productive, or even redistributive merits, but because of the 
extent of the democratic processes from which it emerged.
 T. MACNEILL
217
We might carefully infer here a similarity with the work of Habermas 
(1989) regarding communicative ethics within discursive democracy. 
Indeed, one Maya field technician at El Centro mentioned an affinity with 
the European theorist’s work to me in correspondence. Although 
Habermasian ideas stem from Marxian political economy, their focus on 
intersubjectivity and the socially constructed nature of human identity 
situate them more closely with the tradition of cultural political economy, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter.
soCiology and institutional EConomiCs
Just as with the Marxian tradition, indigenous thought can only be pre-
cariously aligned with that of the early sociologists. Neoclassical econo-
mists tend to assume that humans have a natural need to increase 
consumption. Marx argued that this need was not natural, but the result 
of the materiality of the capitalist social relations of production in which 
the human subject is embedded. The early sociologists (excluding Marx 
himself) challenged both of these presumptions by questioning if humans 
are endowed with any pre-social propensities at all, while arguing that 
wants and values were produced in the cultural realm and that this had 
force independent of the material.
This brings early sociologists close to indigenous alternative theories in 
many respects. Even when arguments of indigenous groups verge on an 
essentialism which claims indigenous peoples to be closer to nature, for 
example, this depiction is based on cultural traits, not biological ones. This 
mirrors Durkheim’s claims of human nature being formed from “with-
out,” and that the fundamental tendency in humans is not to search for 
personal gain, but to build communicative relationships with other humans 
in order to order and make sense of the world.
Cultures are presumed to change in both modes of thought. However, 
Durkheimian cultural change is prompted by increased population den-
sity, as humans engage with an ever more successful “struggle against 
nature” (1893/1997, p.  38). There is an inevitable directionality in 
Durkheim’s cultural change—towards the individualism and division of 
labour inherent to organic society. This type of depiction remained current 
through Weberian sociology where Western-style development was pre-
sumed to represent the highest yet achieved state of human social evolu-
tion and individualistic, entrepreneurial, forward-thinking cultural 
subjects—the necessary constituents of this social system.  As opposed to 
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valorizing indigenous culture, this type of thought tended to demean it 
and even blame it for underdevelopment. Cultural change towards indig-
enous values, on the other hand, is seen as positive for Andean, Maya, and 
Garifuna thinkers. Otherwise stated, indigenous “rationality” is a cultur-
ally situated characteristic, but one that necessitates the freedom of sub-
jects from being dominated materially or culturally. The imposition of 
European-style “rational” thought would be seen as one such domination. 
Therefore, the imposition of development programmes and thought based 
in modernization theory would be perceived as a form of domination, and 
not rational from an indigenous perspective, and therefore as the opposite 
of development.
This is not necessarily the case for the early economic sociology (or old 
institutional economics) of Veblen, Commons, Duesenberry, and Polanyi. 
What seemed to economists as an insatiable appetite for goods and ser-
vices inherent to human life was argued by the institutionalists to be the 
result of an innate cultural need to demonstrate belonging. The trajectory 
of this thinking is that in an unequal society, humans will act as if they are 
insatiable regarding consumption. In a situation of greater equality, how-
ever, this seeming natural propensity to consume will wane. If humans 
have an insatiable desire, it is for belonging, and perhaps status, within a 
social group. What this suggests is that beyond a minimal level of health 
and nutrition (and even this is arguable), there is no one state of human 
existence that can be called “developed” in the sense that total individual 
utility, or well-being, has transcended a predefined level. Economic growth 
amidst inequalities may, in fact, reduce aggregate sense of well-being. 
Economic growth in an environment of generalized equality may be 
unnecessary and irrelevant.
The similarity between this form of economic sociology and Latin 
American indigenous thought is notable. In both traditions, the goals of 
development policy should be a basic level of health and nutrition and 
generalized equality. This equality is thought to be symbolic and material 
in nature (since material commodities are taken to be symbolically valued 
in any case). Culturally, a developed society could take many forms. In 
both traditions, ideas have the power to shape society. Liberal economic 
theory, Polanyi (1944/2001) argued, worked to create market society, for 
example. Similarly, influxes of Western consumer culture, argue indige-
nous activists, are changing indigenous society fundamentally in Latin 
America. The (often inequitable) propagation of ideology and culture is 
linked with material power in both cases. But culture cannot be read 
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directly from the material relations of production in either. In fact, the lat-
ter can be challenged by culture and ideas in the conception of indigenous 
activists. Indigenous sustainable development thought, in this respect, 
resembles a Marxian–Gramscian tinged form of economic sociology.
The assertion of these similarities must not be taken as a claim that 
indigenous development thought is an unwitting form of old institutional 
economics, however. All human desire, it seems, was not thought to be 
culturally rooted for the institutionalists. Nurkse (1957) suggests that 
some Western products are “superior” in a non-social sense, for example, 
and that knowledge of these would provoke want due to a non-ideological 
evaluation of the merits of the good. Veblen insisted that human wants 
were, in fact, insatiable, but that competitive symbolic consumption sim-
ply amplified these wants. Similarly, Polanyi argues that humans have a 
natural inclination to protect themselves from the ravages of the market. 
This implies a pre-social, biologically imbued state of acceptable existence. 
The indigenous groups studied in this book tend to shy away from such 
biological depictions of human nature and centralize the cultural.
A more fundamental break exists regarding the relation between 
humans and nature. Perhaps victims of their times, the early institutional 
economists never really challenged the modern cultural disposition to 
depict human existence in terms of a struggle against nature. The incorg-
poration of indigenous cosmology into development theory, however, 
lends itself naturally to the challenging of this presumption. There is no 
reason that such a challenge could not be mounted within an institutional-
ist framework, however, and Polanyi, for example, notes the environmen-
tal destruction that market society tends to cause. The transcendence of 
the human–nature divide, however, was never as clearly achieved by the 
institutionalists as it is by indigenous traditions. Thus, indigenous devel-
opment is necessarily ecologically sustainable development in that it is bio-
centric, containing an explicit goal to achieve balance within an extended 
community that includes nature.
modErnization thEory
Unsurprisingly, indigenous thought often stands in direct opposition to 
post-WWII modernizationist theories of development. The moderniza-
tionist assertion that “traditional” cultures are to blame for underdevelop-
ment clashes fundamentally with attempts to valorize indigenous culture. 
The groups studied in this book all insist that both democracy and 
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development require the continuity of a plurality of cultural forms as 
opposed to the institution of a singular form. The modernizationist insis-
tence that any cultural form that fails to promote egoism and insatiability 
is somehow “not rational” is insulting to Maya, Andean, and Garifuna 
activists who seek to promote respect of indigenous and communitarian 
cultural forms. The homo economicus, that is the cultural goal of modern-
ization theory, does not resonate with most indigenous cosmovisions.
Indigenous leaders tend also to be much more pessimistic about the 
ability of capitalism to be conducive to development than are moderniza-
tion theorists. Maya organizers, for example, argue that capitalism requires 
self-interested consumers in order to exist, and they see this as a direct 
threat to their culture and well-being. Moreover, they argue, markets 
bring profound inequality and exploitation. Maya thinkers often hold 
equality as the end of development. Obviously, this makes unfettered mar-
kets more of a threat than an institutional necessity. It is important to 
note, however, that Maya development thinkers do not reject market- 
based transactions outright, but do advocate more extreme regulation that 
modernization theorists tend to endorse.
It must not be overlooked that indigenous theories of sustainable 
development do not reject the concept of development or progress. There 
is a sense within indigenous thought, as with modernization theory, that 
history involves continual cultural, technological, political, and social 
change. The difference lies in the fact that modernization posited an end 
point to such change—generally a stage of high mass consumption which 
is to occur within an institutional structure of Western liberal democracy 
and capitalism. Indigenous thought implies something quite different, 
however. It implies, first, that there is no predetermined economic, social, 
political, or cultural endpoint to the development process and, second, that 
historical change can only truly be labeled “development” where it occurs 
in an environment of material and discursive equality.
CritiCal PolitiCal EConomy
The indigenous development ideas studied in this book share much with 
the critical political economy. With the early structuralists of this tradition, 
members of indigenous movements share a profound mistrust of free mar-
kets. In both traditions, unfettered markets are seen to work in the interest 
of the industrially powerful nations which can use their capital and estab-
lished market power to benefit inordinately from trade, resulting in the 
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exploitation of labour of peripheral people and natural resources in periph-
eral areas for the benefit of consumers and capitalists in industrialized 
ones.  But similarities end at this point. Many of the structuralists, par-
ticularly Myrdal (1968), shared with modernizationists the condemnation 
of traditional culture. Furthermore, the policy recommendation that 
emerged from structuralist theory was to centralize power in the hands of 
a strong developmentalist state which would design top- down pro-
grammes based in import substitution industrialization. Development is 
defined as a technical exercise in central management that has the ultimate 
goal of industrial economic growth and increasingly effective exploitation 
of natural and human resources. This is entirely incongruent with indige-
nous assertions, that there is more to development than industrial output, 
that nature is centrally important, and that political and economic decen-
tralization are both means and ends of development processes.
Dependency theory provides a partial corrective for some of the short-
comings of structuralist vis-à-vis indigenous thought. The most important 
advancement in this regard was the dependency assertion that the persis-
tent poverty of ethnic minorities was not the result of cultural pathologies 
but of structural marginalization and racism. The recognition that elites 
within less developed countries tended to benefit disproportionately from 
economic development and that they often monopolize political control is 
congruent with indigenous thought as well. There is a divergence as 
dependency theorists characterize underdevelopment as exclusion from 
the benefits of industrial modernity and economic growth, while environ-
mental issues are rarely addressed.
Cultural analysis is relatively impoverished in dependency and world- 
systems approaches when compared with indigenous thought. First, alter-
native conceptions of the ends and means of development are not 
considered. And second, alternative cultural identities and practices tend 
to be simply read off of economic structures in dependency and world- 
systems theory—thought of as cultural responses to economic marginal-
ization. To begin analysis from a position that is embedded in indigenous 
cosmovision would be illogical in the often materially reductionist tradi-
tion of dependency theory. Indigenous and dependency/world- systems 
theory do share a lamentation of loss of cultural diversity due to the 
homogenization that is wrought by Western consumer culture. It is not so 
much that cultural difference is valued in and of itself for dependency 
theorists, but rather that homogenization represents a forced incorpora-
tion into a consumer culture that impoverished peoples lack resources to 
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participate in properly—it is an invitation to exclusion. This dynamic is 
noted in indigenous thought as well, but the loss of cultural identity itself 
is accorded as more severe. According to indigenous ideas of develop-
ment, a transformation to consumer culture is not simply a fetish that 
obscures the true nature of capitalist exploitation, but it represents a real 
loss in and of itself, and one that threatens environmental sustainability as 
well. Furthermore, to challenge this system of domination is largely 
thought to be a material process according to dependency theory and 
much world-systems theory, but indigenous theory contends that cultural 
alterity and resistance are at least of equal importance in this regard.
There is also a break between critical political economy approaches and 
indigenous thought regarding the materiality of culture. Much is pre-
sumed in dependency theory, for example, regarding the hard reality of 
material needs and the corresponding necessity of industrial production 
for development. Indigenous ideas of development, however, tend to 
privilege the cultural embeddedness of wants, values, and necessities. 
Beyond a minimal level of health, food, and shelter provided by material 
production, Maya, Andean, and Garifuna development thought questions 
that well-being is increased by economic output. This is especially true 
where increased material production may have adverse environmental or 
cultural impacts. Related to this, indigenous thought proceeds from an 
assumption that the separation of material and cultural realms is a false 
abstraction. Accordingly, the penchant in critical political economy to 
favour the material in analysis sits rather uncomfortably with indigenous 
thinkers.
PostColonialism and Post-dEvEloPmEnt
It is difficult to deny the similarities between indigenous thought and that 
of early postcolonial theorists such as Fanon and Freire. Both traditions 
contain a presumption that human wants, values, and understandings 
about the world (cosmovisions) are produced communicatively via lan-
guage. Culture, for both, creates what is to be defined as the “good life” 
as well as the means for attaining it. Modernity and Westernization are 
seen as forms of imperialism for indigenous activists and post-develop-
ment thinkers alike. Both traditions note an associated culture of racism 
and ethnocentrism that underwrites discourses of development. This rac-
ism and cultural devaluation is not thought simply to be an ill because it 




The programmatic response at of Maya and Andean organizers has 
been similar to a Frierean pedagogy of liberation in that culture and ideas 
are accorded emancipatory power. Participatory learning is undertaken in 
which indigenous Guatemalans or Ecuadorians become aware of the legal 
support that exists to help them realize the promise of equality. Indigenous 
culture and institutions are valorized as well—in order to combat racism 
and to also disrupt the hegemony which holds Western lifestyle as the 
endpoint of human social development. Much of this work involves exam-
ination of indigenous cosmovision as it relates to nature in a way that is 
posed as superior to the way it is conceived in the Western tradition. This 
is undertaken with the purposeful intent of diminishing the superiority 
attributed to Western culture.
Cultural PolitiCal EConomy
To the extent that post-structural thought in its postcolonial and post- 
development varieties tends to privilege cultural difference to the point of 
succumbing to a relativist trap, indigenous ideas often differ from these 
traditions. Indigenous thought also recognizes the centrality of the mate-
rial world to a greater degree than does much post-structural theory. Maya 
activists’ assertions that a development plan that is formulated from Maya 
cosmovision is not possible at this time due to extreme material depravation 
is telling in this regard. Garifuna leaders have made similar observations, 
and the politics around the Yasuní-ITT initiative underline the impor-
tance of economic resources to indigenous initiatives. One cannot imagine 
away malnutrition and hunger, and one will have little chance of formulat-
ing an alternative development imaginary while stricken by disease. 
Furthermore, access to land, capital, and resources is important to indig-
enous development not only because of the cultural relation to the land 
that is inherent indigenous cosmovision, but because it is a productive 
resource that provides for material sustenance and political power.
These considerations place indigenous thought within the ambit of cul-
tural political economy (CPE). In both formulations, social subjects are 
formed through discourse, and the social and material world is only made 
intelligible through such discourse. This implies that human desires, cos-
movisions, and related utility functions are cultural constructs. This does 
not imply, however, that a re-imagination of all things is possible at any 
time. Discourses, ideas, understandings, and desires have histories, and 
other discourses, ideas, understandings, and desires are built around these 
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histories. This understanding inserts a theory of cultural path-dependency 
into indigenous thought and CPE which serves to avoid the whimsical 
nature of more fickle forms of postmodern thought.
Cultures are not depicted as being stagnant or insular either in indige-
nous thought or in CPE, however. The groups studied in this book make 
no claims that indigenous culture today is identical to its pre-Columbian 
form. In the case of the Garifuna, there was no pre-Columbian form. Nor 
do they make an attempt to conceptually amputate indigeneity cleanly 
from modernity. Indigenous sustainable development ideals incorporate 
the concepts such as human rights, democracy, and development—ideas 
which more radical early post-development or anti-development theorists 
would have rejected as modernizationist imperialism. This is congruent 
with Dussel’s (1980) understanding of “transmodernity” which suggests 
that such concepts were developed not only in European ivory towers but 
also with input from postcolonial struggles including indigenous move-
ments. The fact that indigenous leaders were involved in the negotiation 
and design of international human rights instruments bolsters this claim, 
as does the continued work of Garifuna, Andean, and Maya leaders who 
utilize and attempt to reinforce the power of national and international 
human rights instruments.
There is some tension between CPE and indigenous thought regarding 
their respective understandings of the relationship between the material 
and the cultural. Dussel and Escobar, for example, imply that there is a 
material world which exists but that this is only made intelligible through 
culture. This maintains a nature–culture divide which does not resonate 
perfectly with indigenous cosmovision.
nEw ClassiCal EConomiCs
Just as was the case with the neoclassical forbearers of new classical eco-
nomics, a more substantial divergence from indigenous thought would be 
difficult to imagine. Where new classical economists equate the free mar-
ket with freedom and efficiency, indigenous development thinkers view it 
as an instrument of exploitation and domination as well as material and 
cultural imperialism. New classicalists believe markets to work for aggre-
gate well-being, whereas indigenous ideas argue that markets tend only to 
benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor and the environment.
In both indigenous thought and new classical economics, however, we 
do see a profound distrust of large-scale government bureaucracy and 
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central planning. In the case of Maya sustainable development, this mis-
trust comes from structuralist and dependency analyses that characterize 
central governments as being compromised by internal and external eco-
nomic and political power. New classical economists tend to share this fear 
of co- option but tend to root it a generalized animosity towards any sys-
tem that seeks to interfere with the freedom of market transactions. As a 
result, respective solutions to this problem diverge significantly. Informed 
by involvement in the global indigenous rights movement and in congru-
ence with CPE approaches, indigenous Maya, Andean, and Garifuna lead-
ers prescribe radical decentralized pluricultural democracy which would 
direct economic activity—largely displacing central government control. 
New classical economists, however, tend to shun any non-market control 
of economic activity, favouring the complete institution of free and unfet-
tered markets.
On a more basic level, the difference between indigenous thought and 
new classical economics is ontological. As a form of neoclassical econom-
ics, the new classical school begins analysis with homo economicus—a natu-
ralized asocial economic actor with stable and insatiable wants, which is 
inhibited in its consumption only by resource-based constraints. In the 
indigenous thought addressed in this book, however, these wants are con-
sidered to be largely mutable and communicatively produced. Human 
beings, that is to say, are social beings, not atomistic individuals. This 
presumption renders the entirety of neoclassical analysis and related mar-
ket advocacy illogical. To use a quantitative example, if people truly seek 
to increase their sense of social belonging and ability to manoeuvre in a 
socially constructed world, it is their relative income compared to other 
social actors that would determine individual well-being in terms of utility 
gains. This is the case, since social beings, as is argued by old institutional 
economists, tend to evaluate their own well-being in relative terms. 
Inequality could be therefore inefficient, despite generalized gains in 
material output. To the extent that markets produce inequality, then, they 
could be inefficient in the production of generalized social welfare. The 
culturally situated actors that are central to indigenous cosmology violate 
market principles because choices become based on non-price communi-
cation—people actually see and compare themselves with others, encour-
aging values to change.
A more qualitative example can be provided through a paraphrasing of 
cultural homogenization fears articulated by Maya members of El Centro. 
In a society that increasingly values Western clothing due to the simple 
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fact that it is increasingly normalized as a result of more common use, it 
does not matter to your individual well-being how many indigenous gar-
ments you can afford to purchase or produce. The increased adoption of 
Western clothing leads to the increased normalization of such practices, 
and, in turn, tastes change from indigenous clothing to Western clothing. 
Such taste changes occur, it should be noticed, because the good that is 
desired is not simply clothing, but social inclusion as well. Where Western 
garments are more expensive, a welfare loss will be felt due to indigenous 
inability to afford socially desirable garments. Indigenous peoples, in this 
scenario, would also feel a welfare loss due to the devaluation of their own 
path-dependent identities—which cannot be changed “from night until 
morning.” A programme that seeks to revalorize indigenous practices and 
counter Western cultural imperialism would be welfare increasing in this 
case. Such a programme of taste-changing does not make sense in a strict 
new classical framework.
nEw institutional EConomiCs
Although the examples given earlier were meant as interpretations of the 
logic being used by Maya members of El Centro, they are obviously closely 
aligned to old institutional economics. It is also possible that the new insti-
tutional economics (NIE) that has emerged out of the neoclassical school 
is resonant with indigenous thought. NIE does, after all, incorporate con-
cepts such as market failure and social interaction into analysis. It seems, 
then, that there could be a resonance between indigenous thought and 
NIE in that they are both sceptical about markets and that they both base 
their theories, at least in part, on social, non-price, interactions between 
humans. NEI is a tricky beast to understand, however, and with a closer 
look, a significant rift appears between the two modes of thinking about 
development.
Gary Becker’s (1976) four premises of economic method provide a good 
starting point for questioning the relationship between indigenous develop-
ment thought and NIE.  The first premise is that human agents always 
engage in utility maximizing behaviour. To a proponent of indigenous 
thought, this may be problematic first because of language which seems to 
describe human nature as inherently selfish. Exception might also be taken 
to this premise on the grounds that according to much indigenous cosmovi-
sion, humans only exist as part of a universal whole which transcends the 
physical, cultural, and spiritual. This would make the separation of a 
“human” with an “interest” from the rest of the quotidian nonsensical.
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However, this first premise translates roughly into humans always do 
what they want to do unless otherwise coerced. This may well be tautological, 
but without any delineation of wants or constraints, it seems a fairly 
benign, albeit liberal-tinged conceptual tool. Other than the noted inven-
tion of the individual as a physically separate entity, there is no necessary 
reason that this premise must clash with indigenous thought or old insti-
tutional economics for that matter. Furthermore, despite the basic indig-
enous belief that all things come from, and remain part of, an unnamable 
incomprehensible something, it is repeatedly asserted by indigenous lead-
ers that the resultant human subjects have a degree of agency. The human 
agents described in this NIE premise, I believe, are therefore incorporable 
within an indigenous theoretical framework.
The second premise of NIE is that human agents are rational in that 
they choose one action over another by calculating, consciously or sub-
consciously, costs of each option and weighing them against benefits. In 
reality, this is not all that different from the first premise. It again implies 
that humans do what they would prefer to do within given economic con-
straints. It does not necessarily suggest that humans know for sure which 
actions will make them feel better, or that they understand all associated 
material or immaterial costs. Again, this premise does not address the 
question of where costs or constraints come from. There is no reason to 
assume that all of these could not be culturally generated. There is no 
necessary reason that this premise clashes with indigenous develop-
ment theory.
The third premise of NIE is that markets are ubiquitous in all facets of 
human life. This is provocative in that it may be interpreted as a move to 
extend neoliberal hegemony by naturalizing the concept of markets. This 
alone would be enough to put an ill-taste in the mouths of many social 
scientists and likely members of indigenous movements as well. Even if we 
agree, however, that the discourse employed here may be problematic and 
then move to a closer analysis of the concept, we can see that this premise 
is again nothing more than a reassertion of the previous two. A market, 
after all, is nothing more than a metaphor used to characterize an act of 
exchange in which an agent seeks to get what it wants to get in the face of 
constraints. NEI asserts that people do what they want, but that every 
action has its costs. Markets are little more than the conceptual space in 
which this occurs.
Economists, to be sure, tend to depict markets as something real. But 
they are fundamentally nothing more than a way of describing price-based 
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interactions between humans, other humans, and their environment. For 
example, if I choose to pick you a flower, I am fulfilling my desire to do 
something nice for you in order to gain your appreciation. There are costs 
involved in this, however. I must exert energy in order to find a flower, 
pick it, and bring it to you. I have engaged in a cost–benefit analysis and 
engaged in a transaction in the market for your love. Costs are changed for 
others as well since I have just simultaneously increased demand for flow-
ers and for your love in a market in which supplies might be presumed to 
be fixed. But really there is no market—markets are simply abstractions 
that are used to describe human behaviour and relationships in NIE. And 
the type of behaviour that is presumed is one in which people do the 
things that they would like to do, given economic constraints. Premises 
one, two, and three of NIE are conceptually identical.
The fourth and final premise of NIE is a claim that all human agents 
have a stable set of tastes (preferences), which are, in Becker’s (1976) 
words, “assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very dif-
ferent between wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in 
different societies and cultures” (p. 5). This premise is not the same as the 
first three. And this premise, it would seem, is also entirely incommensu-
rate with indigenous thought which presumes tastes beyond minimal 
needs for physical nutrients (or maybe for all needs) to be mutable cultural 
constructs.
Premise four is not necessarily incommensurable with indigenous 
thought, however. Its agreement depends, I would suggest, on the con-
tents of the utility function—the set of unchangeable core wants that 
human agents prefer. To evaluate this commensurability, we are compelled 
to question if the indigenous thought examined in this book contains a 
presumption that there is a stable set of natural wants that are the same in 
every human. We see evidence in the testimony of Maya organizers of 
presumed wants for televisions, stereos, and a close-felt relationship with 
the natural environment, for example. But these things are also claimed to 
change—for better or for worse. We might think that a minimal level of 
health and nutrients would be desired universally. Indeed, it is suggested 
by some Maya thinkers at El Centro that for development to be actualized 
in accordance with indigenous culture, a minimal level of health and edu-
cation is required.
But these same indigenous thinkers also lamented occasions when they 
noted that people were buying “equipment for their houses” such as tele-
visions and stereos at times when they did not have enough to provide for 
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their basic health. It seems, then, that there is an observation that even 
health can be a mutable want, the satiation of which can be undermined 
by a desire for consumer durables, at least to a degree. Also related to this 
is the common assertion in literature about indigenous cosmovisions, that 
any division of material elements such as human bodies and natural 
resources from the cultural and spiritual leads to a false distinction. This 
again would make any claim that there exists a universal set of basic pre- 
cultural needs highly questionable, and the arbitrary designation of such 
needs correspondingly problematic.
We enter into a tricky area here in indigenous development theory, but 
tensions between claims of false distinction between cultural and material, 
and those that imply basic human needs to satiate things such as hunger 
and thirst, must be reconciled theoretically if we are to explore the com-
mensurability of indigenous thought to the neoclassical method. There is 
a distinct danger of interpretive colonialism in the theorizing and explora-
tion of this area of thought, however. Any attempt to understand and 
represent this tension must be undertaken with a degree of careful humility.
It would be prudent to start with the core claim of the indigenous cos-
movision. If Heart of Heaven (in Maya cosmovision) is an unconceivable 
something out of which everything is constructed, then human conscious-
ness, bodies, culture, and desires—physical and otherwise—are therefore 
part of this construction. There is no prefigured reason why this construc-
tion—our social and physical reality—must be of any particular form. This 
would imply that there is no reason why humans need to experience hun-
ger. Or at least this may imply that our perception of health, hunger, and 
nutrition is relative to social experience.
We may be able to make the jump to insist that since human actors are 
part of the construction that emerges out of Heart of Heaven and that 
they presumably have a small bit of agency in its construction—just as they 
do with the construction of culture. This is congruent with claims of 
indigenous thinkers that humans have agency, to varying degrees, in the 
production of cultural schemata. We can then make a larger jump to sug-
gest that physical human need such as hunger may be in some way at least 
partially imagined into existence by human belief systems and human con-
sciousness. This makes sense when we remember to incorporate the asser-
tion that culture and material existence are part of a single unitary thing. 
We would inhabit a perfect post-structuralist thought paradise here if we 
didn’t have to admit a final claim that human consciousness is path- 
dependent—that we become addicted to our beliefs, that we expect to 
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experience the world as we have experienced it in the past, and so there-
fore we do. This is an admittedly indulgent interpretation of indigenous 
cosmovision. But it does serve to illustrate the commonly held refrain that 
human/nature/culture is one while allowing a space in which hunger, ill-
ness, and thirst can exist as well. Such phenomena are simply the physical 
manifestations of entrenched belief systems.
Put differently, this logic helps us to understand that while hunger, 
thirst, and ill-health are facts in Guatemala, Ecuador, and Honduras, 
whether they are physical or cultural facts is not important. When mem-
bers of El Centro claim that most people in indigenous communities do 
not have enough food, water, health, or basic education to be able to 
assert their own development at this point, they are suggesting that a cer-
tain degree of materiality is required universally. When we incorporate this 
with the ideas of Maya cosmovision, however, we are forced to draw the 
conclusion that this materiality is, in fact, cultural. But indigenous thinkers 
argue that cultural belief systems are extremely resilient. We might inter-
pret this as a result of self-reinforcing path-dependence of belief. The 
more a particular element of a cosmovision—a way of understanding the 
world—is used, the more real it becomes. The idea that humans are 
organic material beings which require food and water to survive may be 
interpreted as a physical fact, or as the oldest cultural assumption. If we 
conceive of cultural belief systems as path-dependent and if we agree with 
proponents of Maya cosmovision that any division between the cultural 
and material is only abstraction, then hunger, thirst, and ill-health are 
facts. What we conceive as hunger or thirst is both cultural and material 
because the categories of cultural and material seem functionally identical 
at this extremity of path-dependency.
A metaphysical excursion such as the one mentioned leads us into 
uncomfortable territory—especially for those such as I whose conceptual 
schemes are rooted in Western scientism. It is a necessary excursion for 
those who wish to explore deeply, and hopefully contribute to, a cultural 
political economy of international development that gives due respect to 
indigenous cosmovision. It is also necessary if such scholars and policy 
analysts are to enter into meaningful conversation with neoclassically 
trained economists regarding culture and its relation to development the-
ory and policy. How do we begin this conversation? First, by mentioning 
parenthetically that the depiction of the relationship between the cultural 
and the material that resulted from an interpretation of indigenous cos-
movision is commensurable with some of the most recent advancements 
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in both physical and social-scientific theory. I speak here of quantum phys-
ics and the complexity sciences. Second, we could begin this conversation 
by suggesting a way in which such ideas may be incorporated into neoclas-
sical theory.
I would suggest beginning with Gary Becker’s (1976) assertion that 
there is a universal set of human wants which exist across cultures and 
time—proposition number four of NIE as stated earlier. In light of the 
exploration earlier, we would be forced to deduce that the content of 
this universal preference set would be cosmovision according to indige-
nous development theory. At root, human beings need a way in which 
they can symbolically order their world in order to make that world 
comprehendible. This cosmovision is established through non-price 
communication. Such an assertion suggests a substantial transformation 
of neoclassical economics. It implies that the base impulse of human 
nature is to share information with other humans through non-price 
communication. New institutional economists tend to assume that non-
price-based communication only occurs when markets fail, however. The 
aforementioned assertion turns this presumption on its head by implying 
that non-price communication is the prerequisite for the existence of 
markets in that it is how values, preferences, and the presumed natural 
order of things come into existence. This theoretical incorporation 
would transform new institutional economists essentially into old insti-
tutional economics, since values, beliefs, wants, desires, and ordering 
systems become socially established.
This need not imply that a cartoonish version of infinitely fickle post-
modernity be integrated into economic analysis, however, since the con-
cept of path-dependency must also be included (as, I would suggest, it is 
with any responsible theorization of post-modernity). This concept of 
path-dependency, as was discussed in Chap. 3, has two related variants in 
NIE.  First, a human institution such as a cultural belief, law, or social 
norm may become more resilient with use, thus continuing to mediate 
human behaviour even at a time when that institution has become ineffi-
cient—in that it does not prescribe the most economically efficient behav-
iour possible. Second, a path-dependency may exist in tastes. The 
consumption of a good may provide information about it that makes con-
sumption of the same good easier the next time. These two variants of 
path-dependency collude to suggest that we may rationally develop addic-
tions to institutions and also to consuming certain goods.
10 INDIGENIZING DEVELOPMENT 
232
The dual assumptions of cultural constructivism of wants and of path- 
dependency complicate the economic theory of human behaviour sub-
stantially. If we allow that the primal human want is for a cultural ordering 
system with which we may understand the world, it becomes evident that 
the satiation of this want must necessarily generate a secondary order of 
wants. Once the idea that humans are organic beings that need food to 
survive has been established, for example, the need for food would appear 
as a second-order want. A third order of wants might then appear regard-
ing what objects are preferred as food. Normal Beckerian-style analysis 
might well be incorporated at this point in order to establish the reasons 
associated with particular third-order choices.
Due to path-dependency, the more these wants are expressed through 
markets or otherwise, the more permanent—the more real—they become. 
There is a feedback loop—or an endogeneity problem in econometric 
terms—in that the satiation of a want changes the intensity of that want in 
the future. If second- and third-order wants are based on first-order want, 
then the satiation of a third-order want could also be presumed to rein-
force the stability of the wants that preceded it.
The implications of this for economic theory, empirical research, and 
policy would obviously be substantial. First, as noted earlier, the relation-
ship between the desires that inhabit the utility function and the satiation 
of these wants would be presumed to be nonlinear. That is to say there 
would be feedback loops as the satiation impacts future desire in complex 
ways. Second, due to path-dependency, some wants may be perceived as 
more stable than others. Need for food and water would be, as discussed, 
the most stable of these wants. However, wants for the maintenance of a 
particular cultural heritage or of a particular type of relationship with the 
natural world may also be quite intense. One might find that a third order 
of wants is generated from these second-order ones—perhaps for particu-
lar clothing, political institutions, musical expressions, or foods. As we 
move away from the first order of want for cosmovision, the related desire 
might be presumed to diminish in its stability. Probabilities may even be 
attached to such propensities if they can be realistically approximated.
It is not the place of this current work to designate such a theory in its 
completeness. Such work should be done, I would suggest, through col-
laboration with new institutional economists, complexity theorists, and 
communication theorists. It should be noted, however, that extensive 
empirical work would be required in order to map the nebulous structure 
of wants and associated stabilities, as well as costs and constraints. The 
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evolving nature of such wants would suggest a repeated engagement with 
empirical work amidst constant analysis and policy output on the part of 
economists. At the very least, this would require a meaningful engage-
ment between anthropologists, sociologists, and economists who are 
doing empirical work.
Given the volume of ever-changing information required for modeling, 
analysis, and policy design in such a scenario, it is likely that such levels of 
data collection and planning would become unwieldy, however. The new 
classical fallback point would be to not interfere with markets. But new 
institutional economics—the mainstream of current development eco-
nomics—presumes that markets at least occasionally fail, resultantly requir-
ing intervention. Furthermore, while indigenous thought suggests that 
non-price communication is fundamental to human existence, non-price 
communication is indicative of market failure to new institutional econo-
mists, as is path-dependency.
The theoretical implication of this in NIE terms is that markets always 
fail, although we may be able to assume the existence of a workable 
approximation of markets at times where utility function seems reasonably 
stable. This implies that a web of measurements must be made and policy 
interventions devised in order for an economist to steer the social world to 
a point at which resources are efficiently utilized in the satiation of wants, 
or even to discern if it is reasonable to consider utility functions to be fixed 
for the sake of analyzing the problem at hand. This is indicative of a high 
degree of central planning and technocratic control.
The extent of design and technocratic intervention that would be 
implied for an economist to direct development processes under assump-
tions commensurate with indigenous thought would not be received well 
in more than one camp. Neoclassical economists of the more liberal per-
suasion could easily revisit Hayek’s (1944) warnings about extreme levels 
of centralized planning leading society down a “road to serfdom.” Most 
cultural political economists could be expected to be similarly uncomfort-
able with such top-down management of development processes by 
Western trained technocrats.
A method of escape from such a quagmire is suggested from within 
indigenous development theory itself, however. A radical decentralization 
and democratization of policy and planning processes may ensure that 
decision-making power rests in the hands of those with most recent and 
pertinent information regarding their goals and constraints. The incorpo-
ration of indigenous cosmovision into new institutional economics, then, 
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is possible, but it would imply a programmatic response involving either a 
high—perhaps impossible—degree of central planning, or a thorough 
democratization of planning and political processes similar to that which is 
advocated by indigenous rights movements. I would suspect that most 
liberal-minded economists as well as cultural political economists would 
prefer the latter.
Such a commitment is already emerging from the murky waters of the 
capability approach. As was discussed in Chap. 3, much of the ambiguity 
of the approach is due to that fact that the conversation in that sphere is 
being undertaken as older ideas (ironically associated with new institu-
tional economics) are being confronted by new ideas (ironically associated 
with old institutional economics). Much of the debate in this expansive 
field is between those such as Nussbaum (2007) and the older incarnation 
of Sen (1977), who presume the existence of a stable set of universal core 
functionings, and those such as Sen (1999, 2004), who don’t. This dis-
tinction is fundamental since the former implies that development is a 
technocratic problem of devising plans to achieve predetermined needs, 
and the latter implies that development is a form of democracy in which 
both ends and means are continually negotiated. Sen seems to have 
resigned himself to the latter, and perhaps his prominence can act as a 
motivator for a move in the capabilities approach from NIE techniques to 
those that more closely resemble a neoclassical theory of development that 
is encapsulated within indigenous thought.
ConClusion
In this chapter, resonances and discords between indigenous thought on 
sustainable development and numerous other theoretical traditions of 
development were discussed. Interesting congruencies with classical polit-
ical economy, Marxian political economy, neoclassical economics, institu-
tionalist economics (economic sociology), modernization theory, critical 
political economy, new classical economics, postcolonialism, and post- 
development were discussed. Profound differences between each of these 
schools and indigenous thought were also located. When the relationship 
between indigenous thought and cultural political economy was discussed, 
however, similarities seemed far more evident.
An attempt was then made to explore the possibility of incorporating 
indigenous cosmovision into new institutional economics—that is, into 
the newest variant of neoclassical economic approaches to development. 
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This was done by pushing each approach to its logical extremity and 
searching for areas of possible commensurability. The most realistic answer 
to the commensurability question in this case would be that the two theo-
retical frameworks are incompatible. To morph indigenous thinking to a 
degree that it becomes compatible with NIE would require the abandon-
ment of the fundamental belief system that undergirds indigenous thought. 
That is, it would require the abandonment of the assertion that human 
institutions, desires, even costs and benefits are culturally constructed. It 
would also require the abandonment of a Maya cosmovision, which denies 
the separability of nature and culture, human and resource, actor and con-
straint. To bend NIE economics to suit indigenous cosmovision, on the 
other hand, would require the discipline’s transformation into a nonlinear 
social science which ejects the presumption that life begins with markets. 
Where policy is concerned, such a theoretical incorporation would require 
either an extreme level of technocratic monitoring of society, or a substan-
tial decentralization of political and economic power. The former would 
be distasteful to any neoclassical economist. The latter would be less so, I 
would guess, however, it may involve local decisions to embrace non- 
capitalist forms of collective economics. This may not sit well with many 
development economists. Such a conceptual bending of NIE seems 
unlikely. However, it should be noted that such terrain seems to be 
explored diligently by neoclassically trained economists who have 
embraced the capability approach, and also by heterodox behavioural and 
experimental economists.
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This book was designed to address some specific questions that would aid 
understanding of indigenous concepts of sustainable development. This 
has involved some empirical and theoretical inquiries into the tricky con-
cepts of culture, development, and sustainability. Since the goal was to 
update our understandings of development theory by interacting those 
with indigenous perspectives, the first large task was to understand the 
place of culture in the history of development thought. The next task was 
to update theories of development and culture by synthesizing them with 
indigenous thought.
This began with an assumption that to understand indigenous concepts 
of sustainable development, these must be politically, economically, and 
historically situated. Case studies of Maya, Andean, and Garifuna develop-
ment ideas were undertaken towards this goal. Each of these case studies 
was embedded in a specific local political economy, but they did share a 
common attribute: a history of economic, political, and cultural marginal-
ization. The ways that these local histories interacted with colonial domi-
nation, as well as more current global material and cultural flows, produced 
each of the ideas. That is, indigenous ideas of sustainable development 
were produced as deep cultural histories interacted with rights and envi-
ronmental movements at both local and global levels. Indigenous ideas of 
sustainable development, of course, continue to change with such 
interactions.
238
In the last chapter, interacting indigenous ideas with “Western” ideas of 
development led to some interesting tensions and insights. The relation 
between indigenous thought and sustainability was not overtly addressed, 
however. In this chapter, we will explore this relation specifically. A pre-
liminary description would be something like this: indigenous cosmovision 
does not create a separation between the natural world and a human one. 
Therefore, equity in material and non-material forms, insomuch as it reduces 
the marginality of indigenous peoples, will bend economy, politics, and cul-
ture towards ecological sustainability. Once indigenous perspectives are 
given their appropriate weight, related ideas such as deep ecology, biocen-
trism, or de-growth take a less radical, more pragmatic, aura.
To understand the implications of indigenous ideas to sustainable 
development, it is important to avoid two countervailing tendencies. One 
of these ebbs towards discounting indigenous thought as being “not real” 
or an “invented tradition.” The other tendency reifies, freezes, or essen-
tializes indigenous ideas—framing them as immutable, time-transcendent, 
and unrelated to other modes of thought, such as modernity, that may 
corrupt them. In truth, indigenous tradition, just like any tradition, is at 
once rooted and mutable. This becomes most apparent when we consider 
the origins in indigenous sustainable development, address issues of essen-
tialism, and then explore indigenous sustainable development and its pos-
sible implementation.
Where Does InDIgenous sustaInable Development 
Come From?
A central concern of this book was to locate the cultural, political, and 
economic origins of indigenous sustainable development. Discerning this 
required the interpretation of “grassroots,” “bottom-up,” largely induc-
tively devised indigenous theories of development. Although indigenous 
development has become popularized in recent decades, it is obviously not 
a new idea. Rather, ideas of indigenous development have materialized 
through deep histories of thought and experience. The ideas of progress, 
development, and human rights that are so often associated with “Western” 
or “enlightenment” thought are present in this history. So too are the 
remnants of historical experience of Spanish conquest and association with 
an “indigenous” identity that was created as an “other” to the Spanish. 
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More recent histories of civil war, dispossession, marginalization, geno-
cide, racism, and persecution are also included in this history.
Contact with Marxist and postcolonial thought as well as the anti- 
colonial pedagogies and assertions of Friere and Fanon are traceable in the 
discourse and practice of Maya and Andean development programmes 
especially. Current discursive structures such as International Human 
Rights, and Indigenous Rights law, as well as interaction with indigenous 
and environmental movements, were cited as key factors that assisted the 
historical emergence of Maya, Garifuna, and Andean ideas of develop-
ment. These ideas were equally born of involvement with local, community- 
level interactions with and oppositions to the impositions of externally 
devised development projects, whether they be from international compa-
nies, development organizations, or national governments. Indigenous 
sustainable development, then, is best described as an iteration of existing 
ideas from varying sources as they interact with the historical and current 
every-day experience of indigenous communities.
Indigenous sustainable development, this implies, is not a new idea in 
the sense that it has emerged in a pristine form that is unrelated to other 
modes of thought. It has an expansive history of engagement with ideas 
that stem from modernity and coloniality. It is a transmodern idea of 
development—that is, an idea that is not modern or traditional, but both. 
A look at the origins of the idea makes obvious the fictitiousness of an 
assumed binary that separates the modern from the traditional. Indigenous 
sustainable development represents an interpretation of development that 
is informed by indigenous culture and historical experience. It is not a 
pure idea of development that has emerged from some pristine “other” of 
modernity, however. It has been forged by a continual relationship 
between coloniality and modernity, as the colonized mind is articulated by 
the modern, which is, in turn, articulated by the colonized. They are not 
separate, but constituent parts of a transmodern cultural, political, and 
economic reality. Indigenous ideas of sustainable development emerge 
from this transmodern reality, but unlike the majority of such ideas, they 
favour the perspectives and knowledges of the historically marginalized.
Substantial critiques may be raised regarding Maya, Andean, Garifuna, 
and indigenous movements in general regarding a tendency towards the 
essentialism and romanticization of indigenous culture. If Maya culture is 
as egalitarian and as rooted in a deep integration with nature as members 
of El Centro tend to argue, it might be asked, then, why do indigenous 
people so regularly throw plastic, paper, and metal refuse out of the 
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windows of cars and public buses? Why do tourists learn upon visiting the 
ancient Maya ruins at Copan that that civilization disappeared due to the 
severe environmental degradation it wrought on its local natural environ-
ment? Why does culture in Maya villages seem so patriarchal, and why are 
women severely underrepresented in communal mayorships? Maya culture 
does not reveal itself to the outside observer to revolve around the types 
of ideals that are encapsulated in the so-called Maya cosmovision. The 
same could be said of Garifuna and Andean traditions.
Certainly, it seems fair to say that all indigenous people do not display 
nature-centric, communal, and egalitarian tendencies. A responsible devel-
opment practitioner or policymaker would be wise to think about this 
before funding or designing any development intervention. The carte 
blanche support of an indigenous group that makes such claims may not 
lead to intended consequences. If this cultural characterization is dishonest, 
an indigenous-run grassroots project that is intended to promote gender 
equality and environmental sustainability may fail to achieve its goals. Blind 
trust in the egalitarian and naturalistic tendencies of indigenous culture 
could lead to bad programmes and misplaced development assistance funds.
When confronting indigenous leaders regarding this issue, the answer 
one receives is as simple as it is uncontestable: indigenous people who 
diverge from ideals of environmentalism and egalitarianism, it is explained, 
have/had lost their way. They have/had lost touch with their culture and 
the wisdom of their ancestors. Patriarchy and disrespect for the natural 
environment, it is argued, are largely Spanish colonial imports, and pre- 
Columbian divergences from nature and equality were temporary depar-
tures from ingrained cultural traits. Such answers are inscrutable due to 
their tautology. But the asking of them might just miss the point of move-
ments for indigenous sustainable development in general.
It should be clear from the account given in this book that claims that 
the people have “lost their way” are a way of saying that indigenous cul-
ture has been transformed in a climate of severe discursive inequality—that 
cosmovision has been dominated, and that this is not democratic, nor 
does it represent development. This cultural domination (along with its 
economic and political counterparts) is contested by indigenous move-
ments as they attempt to move towards an ideal of pluralistic democracy. 
Such a democracy, in its ideal form, would ensure that all cultural knowl-
edges, understandings, and identities carry the same persuasive force. The 
valorization of indigenous cosmovisions in Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Ecuador is a political project designed to counter cultural domination that 
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maintains discursive and material inequities. It is not intended to maintain 
an “indigenous” culture in a pre-assumed frozen state.
These indigenous democratizing projects were born at an intersection. 
One of the metaphorical roads in this meeting brings a deep historical past 
which includes an egalitarian, nature-centric ethic, as well as divergences 
from this. It also includes a history of colonial marginalization. This road 
carries the past. The other road brings current thinking on topics such as 
the environment, indigeneity, human rights, and development. It also car-
ries the material and cultural realities of conflict with international mining, 
extraction, or tourism interests, and various laws and/or development 
projects. This road carries the present.
Many of these concepts of the past and present have resonance at the 
crossroads at which indigenous development thought works, and the 
items which resonate exude the pitch of a local-centric, nature-centric, 
egalitarian, indigenous, and endogenous political project. It is the strength 
and depth of this resonance which is the item to be judged for its “authentic-
ity”—not its relation to historical “fact.” The essentialist question oversim-
plifies the claims and the project connected with indigenous politics in 
Latin America and elsewhere. It may be functional as a limited academic 
trope, but is of limited functional interest where policy choices, develop-
ment projects, and political assertions are concerned.
The sustainable development projects described in this book are not so 
much concerned with the revival of indigenous culture. They are con-
cerned with building new manifestations of indigenous culture as rem-
nants of the past mix with ideas of the present. These new manifestations 
place emphasis on equity and respect for the natural environment. 
Practitioners and policymakers that wish to engage similar culture-based, 
indigenous-run organizations in the interest of collaborative development 
would benefit from considering such things. An indigenous organization 
that simply references the assertion of culture as its policy goal is different 
from one that also has programmes enacted that seek to promote environ-
mental sustainability and gender equality. These types of markers are 
important when considering development assistance or political solidarity.
What Is InDIgenous sustaInable Development?
But what, in the end, is the relation between indigenous culture and sus-
tainable development? To answer this, it must first be understood that 
indigenous ideas of development resonate strongly with the group of ideas 
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that were labelled cultural political economy (CPE) in this book—this 
includes more recent and less relativistic variants of post-development 
theory. At the very root of indigenous development theory is the depic-
tion of humans as social subjects that are formed through discourse—
which also serves to make the social and material world intelligible. Such 
discourses also shape the materiality of the physical world as humans enact 
their cultural relation with their environment. The material environment 
simultaneously formats the range of possibility available to society and 
culture. Fundamental to indigenous sustainable development, then, is the 
inseparability of the material and the cultural—these are part of the same 
substance. Separation of them can occur for descriptive and analytical pur-
poses, but this split should not be reified in the process. In indigenous 
thought, nature and culture are one. Indigenous thought posits a similar 
relationship between the individual subject and larger community. 
Individual subjects, with their range of beliefs, tastes, and values, are pro-
duced socially and communicatively. One may be able to pull the individ-
ual apart from the social temporarily for descriptive or analytical purposes, 
but the fact that they belong to one substance should not be left aside. 
The individual and its social world are continually iterating one another. 
The connections between these two typological categories are so substan-
tial that, in practice, they cease to be separable entities.
With this, an image is created of a circular, mutually constituting rela-
tionship between subject, society, culture, and nature. It would be more 
accurate, in fact, to describe these interrelated spheres as one substance. 
This substance is described in terms of the Heart of Heaven/Heart of 
Earth relationship in Maya cosmovision. Similar unities are implied in 
Andean and Garifuna insistences that the people cannot be conceived of 
separately from the land, and that development should be culturally 
defined. In the interest of generalizability, and in recognition that many 
indigenous cosmologies around the globe contain a similar concept, the 
term naturacultura will be used hereon to refer to this.
The world that is assumed at the base of indigenous sustainable devel-
opment is one in which the naturacultura is continually shifting. One 
could easily misinterpret this as a suggestion of an unstable postmodern 
world, the structure of which can shift at any moment at the whimsy of 
social imagination. This would be a misrepresentation, however. 
Naturacultura is always embedded in a history that structures the possi-
bility of its form. It is highly path-dependent. Any change in it must be 
iterative—built onto the past, not in denial of it. Policies that are devised 
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to direct this iteration can only be imagined in relation to it, and they must 
resonate with it to have impact.
Andean, Garifuna, and Maya thinkers and practitioners are vitally aware 
of power in this relationship, however. Being a constructivist theory at its 
root, the vision of power contained in indigenous sustainable develop-
ment is generative and productive. It works to create conceptions of the 
world and—due to the fact of naturacultura—it shapes that world itself. 
This idea of power, it should be noted, is not dissimilar to those concepts 
generally associated with the French theorist Michele Foucault. And, as 
was Foucault, indigenous thinkers are aware that economic, political, and 
cultural power tends to congeal—that it is not equally distributed. The 
structural form of naturacultura has very much been determined by the 
power relations suggestive of a colonial and neocolonial history, by racism, 
patriarchy, and physical and symbolic variants of violence. Given this, the 
degree of environmental degradation and indigenous marginalization that 
exists in Latin America should not come as a surprise.
In practice, indigenous sustainable development involves attempts to 
build multiple physical, political, and cultural capacities in a culturally 
applicable way. This requires direct support for indigenous institutions 
such as the indigenous mayorship of Maya communities. In Ecuador, it 
involves the rewriting of the constitution to contain elements of Sumak 
Kawsay. In the predatory state of Honduras, this involves struggles for 
Garifuna autonomy and food sovereignty. Official integration of such 
institutions into more mainstream regional, national, and international 
governance and legal frameworks is vitally important to this goal. This can 
be achieved through articulation with both legal instruments and social 
movements on these various levels. In other words—the goal is to build 
social capital by facilitating the networking of indigenous institutions with 
a myriad of other entities such as national governance structures, political 
parties, media, international NGOs, and social movements on all levels.
Indigenous development movements do not just seek to increase 
awareness and visibility of indigenous institutions, however. Beyond this, 
they seek to increase the recognition and sense of legitimacy attached to 
these institutions—in both the eyes of external actors and members of 
their own communities. This might be framed as a project to build what 
Pierre Bourdieu (2005) has called cultural capital, or what Taylor (1995) 
called the terms of recognition. It involves a valorization, or an increase of 
the respect attached to indigenous culture, institutions, and practices. This 
recognition is vital in increasing what Appadurai (2004) has called the 
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capacity to aspire. Recognition means that indigenous institutions can 
function more effectively in asserting claims. It also means that these 
claims can be asserted in a way that is culturally relevant to the communi-
ties involved. This, so the argument goes, would lead to a sense of empow-
erment where members of the local community gain the ability to credibly 
imagine and enact the steps that are necessary to improve their conditions.
Increases in both social and cultural forms of capital, however, are not 
thought to be sufficient in the pursuit of culturally sustainable develop-
ment. Andean, Garifuna, and Maya leaders all insist via alternative word-
ings that social capital and cultural capital cannot be built independently 
of physical capital—especially in the form of land and related natural 
resources. It is not reasonable to expect poor Garifuna or Kechwa who 
work most of their waking hours in handicrafts production, as farm labour, 
or in other facets of the informal economy, to also invest serious energy 
in local governance and in participating in community groups.
The sustainability of such groups in the face of material constraints was 
the largest single problem voiced by the Maya organizers of El Centro as 
well. Put simply, the time expended on work necessarily undertaken by 
community members in the interest of survival on the most basic of levels 
often makes the building and maintenance of social and cultural capital 
almost impossible. Access to land as well as proceeds from (and control 
over) natural resources such as gold deposits are necessary if any meaning-
ful pursuit of culturally sustainable development is to be undertaken. Like 
naturacultura itself, the elements of social, cultural, and physical capital 
are mutually reinforcing.
As anthropologist Charles Hale (2004) has suggested, the hegemonic 
neoliberal global political economy does not conceptually blend physical 
resources with social and cultural ones, as Maya, Garifuna, or Kechwa 
activists do. Neoliberal multiculturalism has an ability to tolerate rights to 
cultural expression and political voice, and to prevent discrimination. 
When indigenous peoples make appeals to rights to physical resources, 
however, neoliberal multiculturalism reaches its limits of tolerance. For 
the indigenous leaders, intellectuals, activists, and rights educators, these 
limits of neoliberal multiculturalism can have stark implications. El Centro 
Pluricultural para la Democracia, the focal point of the Maya case in this 
book, was placed on a national list of terrorist organizations, its funding 
was subsequently revoked, and it was eventually dismantled. Indigenous 
rights education programmes of El Centro came to be seen by foreign 
capital and the Guatemalan business elite as a threat to profits. Garifuna 
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rights and environmental activists continue to be targets of state suppres-
sion in Honduras. Finally, as the Yasuní-ITT initiative illustrated, indige-
nous rights cannot insulate lands from extractive exploitation even in a 
country with one of the world’s most progressive constitutions.
praCtICIng InDIgenous sustaInable Development
Building social, cultural, and physical capital is the core of indigenous 
sustainable development. This capital formation can be pursued through 
education programmes and the establishment of community working 
groups. Indigenous sustainable development should be utilized by devel-
opment practitioners, sympathetic academics, or active citizens only under 
certain circumstances, however. First of all, a cultural revivalist movement 
must preexist in a particular community—it cannot be conjured as the 
romanticization of a well-meaning outsider. As in the Maya case, this 
movement must have evolved to solve current problems and not simply 
for the valorization of antiquated culture. Indigenous sustainable develop-
ment is only possible where things like environmental sustainability and 
gender equality are held as primary components of development.
This is often the case with indigenous movements. As with the Maya, 
Kechwa, and Garifuna, many of these search for traces of environmental-
ism and gender equality in their own cultural histories. They then central-
ize these cultural traits in the iteration of a new indigenous cultural form. 
New ideas attach themselves to old cultural traits within these movements 
to create something newer still. But, just as with the cases in this book, 
these programmes are rarely simply cultural—they are material as well. 
Physical resources are linked to cultural realities. Access to land is espe-
cially important in most indigenous movements and should be an essential 
component of any indigenous sustainable development programme 
as well.
In assisting such movements, practitioners, citizens, or sympathetic aca-
demics could do a number of things. First, since the provision of material 
resources is essential in such projects, development assistance funding 
should be pursued. So too should access to land for nutritional, economic, 
and cultural subsistence. Further on this point, assistance in the preven-
tion of degradation of communal lands by outside agents such as mining 
or tourism companies is in the spirit of indigenous sustainable develop-
ment—since the degradation of the land is also thought to degrade the 
culture, not to mention the health of the community. Working with groups 
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to ensure that cultural revivalism projects include components that cen-
tralize equality, environmental protection, and access to land is paramount.
If these things are all in place, practitioners and policymakers must then 
take a hands-off, supportive approach. Indigenous sustainable develop-
ment projects must be self-driven. The idea is for development to be pur-
sued via cultural systems of understanding that exist in the community. 
The well-intentioned assertion of a romanticized ideal of indigenous cul-
ture or attempts to impart purified modern rationality on indigenous com-
munities will not work. The content of an indigenous sustainable 
development programme must be internally sourced—it must find its fuel 
in the transmodern reality of local culture.
This should not present itself as a foreign idea to university-trained 
academics, policy analysts, or development practitioners. There are many 
components in that culture too that could be centralized in the interest of 
pursuing and understanding indigenous sustainable development. It was 
argued in this book that the most innovative current trends of thought in 
development thinking already do this. These trends were typified as cul-
tural political economy approaches to development. The goal in such 
approaches is building the capacities of communities and individuals to 
assert their will and ideas in a more equitable environment, and thus rein-
forcing the capacity to aspire (Appadurai 2004) of such entities through 
programmatic attempts to create an equality of agency (Rao & Walton 2004).
Analysts whose intellectual tradition comes more from economics than 
the other social sciences might find a resonance with indigenous sustain-
able development in newer nonlinear theories such as those of the com-
plexity sciences (Urry 2005; Colander 2000; Bowles 1998) and cultural 
theory (Williams 1977; Kaufman 2004). They might also look to the 
“old” institutional economics of Veblen (1899/1994), Dusenberry 
(1949), and the foundational work of Adam Smith (1759/1790).
The policy implications of indigenous sustainable development could 
be dramatic in some ways, particularly to development economists. 
Arguments that free markets be embraced as the most efficient means of 
ensuring material development would become nonsensical, since the fun-
damental theoretical premise on which such ideas stand—a stable and sov-
ereign homo economicus—would have to be abandoned. The old habit of 
measuring development in absolute quantitative terms such as GNP per 
capita would cease to make sense since well-being would need to be mea-
sured relatively and qualitatively. Importantly, a shift should take place 
from defining development in terms of output to defining it in terms of 
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equality. That is to say that indigenous sustainable development projects 
would seek to ensure that the naturacultura is used and recreated in a 
democratic way by the humans that both compose and are composed of it. 
This would ensure the most efficient allocation of resources given that 
equality in the composition and maintenance of naturacultura is the goal 
instead of crude aggregated economic output.
I have been speaking of this point about the implications of indigenous 
sustainable development to issues in what is often called the developing 
world, the Third World, or the Global South. A suggestion was made in 
the introduction of this book, however, that the idea might have value to 
a larger society that needs to think its way out of substantial large-scale 
social, economic, and environmental predicaments. Certainly, conflict that 
is rooted in reified nationalisms and essentialized ethnicities remains com-
monplace throughout the globe—whether we are referring to well- 
publicized (an often reified) tensions between Islam and the West, or 
ethnic and nationalistic conflicts in places such as Sudan, Kashmir, Somalia, 
and Yemen. Perhaps the non-essentialized view of culture used by indig-
enous thinkers might contain a fragment of thought that could help 
inform attempts to solve such serious and persistent conflicts.
The constant threatening global economic crises that have been indica-
tive of life in the twenty-first century may also be addressed somewhat by 
these ideas. If economic instability has stemmed from increased debt levels 
in the advanced economies, and if this increased debt is the tangible result 
of competitive consumer cultures that have become unmoored from the 
natural environment to which all consumption is ultimately tied (Schor 
2005), then indigenous cosmovision may be of some help. The ideals of 
both discursive and material equality that are embedded in indigenous 
ideas, along with the rejection of overly powerful Western media, could 
reduce the need for competitive consumption in general, if we allow, as 
Veblen (1899/1994) and Frank (1985) suggest that consumption is 
fuelled by drives towards relative wealth and its display as opposed to 
absolute measures.
Considering the Latin American indigenous development pro-
grammes discussed in this book leads to an important, and obvious, con-
clusion: to speak of indigenous development is to speak of sustainable 
development. Garifuna, Maya, and Andean groups do not conceptually 
separate nature from the human community. They also utilize a holistic 
concept of development. To improve the welfare of the community, 
from these perspectives, is to improve the health of the natural 
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environment. Development that disrupts, or fails to repair, harmony 
between the human community and environment, cannot be defined as 
development from such perspectives.
This creates an imperfect fit between indigenous development and the 
United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—the most nota-
ble mainstream development programme that considers both environ-
ment and development. Listing the 17 SDGs separately, or choosing one 
or two to focus on, is common practice amongst researchers, practitioners, 
and policymakers who prioritize mainstream sustainable development. 
The separation, or singling out, of any SDG, however, is in conflict with 
the indigenous, holistic vision of development. All must be considered at 
once to resonate properly with indigenous concepts.
A further issue is that two SDGs do not make sense within indigenous 
cosmology. SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth, lists in its title two 
elements that are not necessary for indigenous sustainable development. 
Indigenous perspectives have a close resonance with de-growth or no- 
growth development and often see economic growth as harmful to healthy 
communities and environments. Work in formal labour markets sits equally 
uncomfortably, although work redefined to mean activity taken to benefit 
the family, environment, or community may resonate with indigenous 
thought.
Equally problematic is SDG 9 Industry and Infrastructure. To resonate 
with indigenous sustainable development ideas, both of these elements 
would have to be defined in ways that prioritize community and environ-
mental wellness as opposed to economic growth. Oil extraction attempts 
in the Yasuní National Park, gold mining in Maya territory, and tourism 
infrastructure projects in Garifuna lands have all failed local indigenous 
communities and their natural environments. Unless directed by indige-
nous communities themselves, and subsumed in their own cosmovisions, 
industry and infrastructure projects are likely to diminish community and 
environmental well-being. Thus SDG 9 can often make little functional 
sense from an indigenous perspective.
Indigenous ideas could be used to guide SDG implementation and 
global economic policy towards more holistically sustainable outcomes, 
however. The concept that nature and culture are inseparable implies a 
reinstated cultural connection to the natural environment and its preserva-
tion. Greater discursive and material equality may encourage the easing of 
competitive consumption. This could go a long way in easing the impact 
of human behaviour on the natural world. The incorporation of such ideas 
 T. MACNEILL
249
into mainstream models, policies, and proposals could be effective in ush-
ering the globe in the direction of a truly sustainable human and ecologi-
cal future.
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